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Summary
In an electric power system, the instantaneous balance between demand and sup-
ply must always be maintained. Due to the inherent stochasticity of certain types
of generation sources and demand, as well as contingencies in the power system,
imbalances occur. Hence, corrective actions are required to continuously keep the
system in a balanced state. For this, the system needs reserve generation capacity
with a set of desired technical characteristics such as fast ramp up speed and short
startup time. By making use of market mechanisms, the System Operator ensures
the availability of enough reserve capacity ahead of time and activates the resources
in response to system imbalances in real-time in a setting called balancing market.
An integrated European electricity market is expected to increase the eﬃciency,
overall welfare, competition, and security of supply. With this understanding, the
day-ahead market in Europe has undergone integration eﬀorts with the long-term
goal of establishing a single European electricity market. Integration of the bal-
ancing market is also expected to bring a socio-economic beneﬁt. This is due to
the sharing of balancing resources and the reduction of required balancing actions
by netting of imbalances in adjacent areas. However, prior to the realization of a
fully integrated balancing market, balancing market variables such as gate closure
times, remuneration mechanisms, and the contract periods have to be harmonized
ﬁrst. This PhD work assumes that these variables are in place in the mathematical
formulations and the associated results.
The main objective of this thesis is the modeling of integrated reserve procurement
and balancing energy markets in a setting similar to the current sequential market
clearance order in Europe. The models are used to analyze the impact of balancing
market integration in the current European electricity market settings and allow the
comparison of diﬀerent market designs. To assess the impact of balancing market
integration, optimization models addressing cross-border reserve procurement and
balancing energy market integration are developed. The ﬁrst one is composed of
three interdependent blocks: Reserve bidding price determination, reserve procure-
ment, and day-ahead market clearance. The other one is a formulation for balancing
energy market. In addition, a methodology for optimal cross-border transmission
capacity allocation is developed. The balancing market integration is implemented
in both NTC based and ﬂow-based market coupling settings.
The following are some of the main results obtained in this PhD work:
vii
• Unit based upward and downward bidding prices for reserve provision are a
function of the diﬀerence between the spot price forecasts and a unit’s marginal
cost.
• The total reserve procurement cost decreases with increased share of reserved
Net Transfer Capacity (NTC), as a result of the possibility of procuring cheaper
cross-border reserves. The day-ahead cost generally increases with increase in
reserved capacity. However, for small shares of reserved transmission capacity,
procuring reserves from another system reduces the need to keep reserves in
the expensive system, increasing the ﬂexibility and reducing the day-ahead
cost.
• Given the possibility of cross-border reserve procurement, more upward reserve
is procured from Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands. On the other hand,
Germany imports some of its FRR requirement.
• Using an NTC based methodology to optimally allocate transmission capacity
for FRR exchange for a planning period of 24 hours, a reduction of EUR
26 million (≈ 8 %) in FRR procurement and EUR 53 million in total costs
is obtained compared to the base case of no reservation. This result asserts
that optimal reservation of NTC for FRR exchange can reduce both FRR
procurement costs and day-ahead costs simultaneously.
• For the model with NTC based optimal transmission capacity reservation,
where a reservation period of 24 hours has been normally used, sensitivity
analyses using a 12 hours reservation period showed very signiﬁcant cost re-
ductions. This emphasises the importance of short reservation periods for
reserve procurement.
• The implicit market clearance option, where the reserve requirement is implic-
itly considered as a constraint in the day-ahead market clearance, is generally
a more eﬃcient market clearance option than the sequential market clearance
with optimal transmission capacity reservation. The ﬂexibility due to short
planning period and eﬃciency of the market design option contribute to the
signiﬁcant total cost reduction oﬀered by the implicit market clearance option.
The ﬂow-based market coupling with implicit market clearance results in total
cost savings of EUR 413 million compared to the case with no transmission ca-
pacity reservation. On the other hand, ﬂow-based sequential market clearance
with optimal transmission reservation gives a saving of EUR 19 million.
• The possibility of cross-border balancing energy exchange gives cost reduction
beneﬁts in comparison to local balancing. The decrease in balancing costs is
due to the netting of imbalances and the use of cheaper balancing energy from
neighbouring zones. Due to the general improvement in market eﬃciency,
considering the IEEE 30-bus test system, the integrated ﬂow-based balancing
energy market clearing results in 20 % lower balancing cost compared to the
NTC based approach.
viii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In our day to day activities, there is hardly anything that does not need electricity
to function. It powers almost every industry and household one can think of. In
most cases, large power generation sources are located far away from load centers.
Hence, power has to be converted and transported to the end users by making use
of the grid infrastructure. Many stakeholders, such as power producers, traders, the
Power Exchange, and the system operator are involved in diﬀerent aspects of the
power system to ensure that the required power is delivered to its intended desti-
nation at the right time. In current power systems, which are mostly deregulated,
electricity can be traded like any commodity. Unlike other commodities, however,
it is yet to become economically feasible to store on a large scale. Consequently,
there should be suﬃcient reserve capacity in the system that can be deployed fast
enough to counteract imbalances in the power system. The system frequency is an
indicator of the active power balance in a synchronous system; i.e. an imbalance
in the system translates to frequency deviation. Consequently, to keep the system
frequency at the nominal operating value, there always has to be an instantaneous
balance between demand and supply.
In European power systems, driven by the awareness of environmental impacts, un-
sustainability of fossil fuel based generation, and motivated by the European Union
energy directives, massive renewable energy resources (RES) integration is observed.
The trend is expected to continue in the following years. Although the integration
of RES is crucial to relieving the fossil fuel dependence, the inherent intermittence
and limited predictability as well as controllability of these resources is challenging
for power system operation.
Apart from the increasing RES integration, more HVDC interconnectors and oﬀ-
shore super grids are expected to link European countries. Concurrently, a number
of successful initiatives in electricity market integration (especially the day-ahead
market) have been observed paving the way for an integrated European electricity
market, also called the internal electricity market (IEM).
Once integration in the day-ahead market is realized, an integrated balancing mar-
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ket (both for reserve procurement and balancing energy markets) becomes a natural
successor. Currently, there are a few regional integrated balancing markets in Eu-
rope. Unlike the integration of day-ahead markets, signiﬁcant harmonization steps
need to be undertaken to achieve a fully integrated balancing market. This thesis
assesses the implications of integrated balancing markets by proposing mathemat-
ical models that follow the current market clearance sequence in Northern Europe
while assuming that suﬃcient harmonization is in place.
1.1 Scope
The main objective of this PhD work is to analyze the impact of cross-border balanc-
ing market integration. To achieve this, a sequential electricity market model that
resembles the current electricity market clearance sequence is developed. The issues
of cross-border exchange of reserves, transmission capacity allocation for reserves
exchange, and cross-border balancing energy exchange are assessed. Extensive case
studies are performed for the North European power system (Nordic, Germany, and
Netherlands). The detailed scope of the thesis is presented as follows.
• Developing a market model where the reserve procurement phase is undertaken
prior to the day-ahead dispatch for the period reserves are contracted. This
is important as simultaneous clearance of the day-ahead market with reserve
procurement, which is theoretically more favorable, is not the current market
clearance trend in Europe.
• In the European electricity market context, given the possibility of cross-border
reserve exchange, some transmission capacity should be set aside for this pur-
pose. As a result, the work develops a model to optimally allocate cross-border
transmission capacity for reserves exchange before the day-ahead market clear-
ance.
• Another focus of the PhD work is to develop a mathematical model for a
balancing energy market with a possibility of cross-border exchange using
transmission capacity already allocated for reserves exchange in the reserve
procurement phase.
Flow-based market coupling (FBMC) gives better representation of the physical
characteristics of the grid compared to Net Transfer Capacity (NTC) based represen-
tation. This, among others, oﬀers more transmission capacity to the market which
in turn increases the total social welfare. The EU Guideline for Capacity Allocation
and Congestion Management [1] requires FBMC as the preferred method. FBMC is
presently used in the Central Western European (CWE) market coupling and there
is an ongoing work to prepare for the methodology in the Nordic system [2,3]. Cog-
nizant of this trend, the work also tackles the issue of balancing markets integration
in the context of a ﬂow-based mathematical model. This is preceded by adoption
of a methodology to aggregate the detailed nodal system representation to a zonal
approximation.
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1.2 Main contributions
The EU Guidelines and ENTSO-E Network Codes require integration of the bal-
ancing markets in the coming years. Even though the net turn over of balancing
market accounts for a small percentage of the total, it is believed that the integra-
tion of this market increases the socio-economic beneﬁt, nonetheless. A number of
research works have asserted this very fact. The thesis contributes to this discussion
by developing electricity market models that follow the market clearance hierarchy
in Northern Europe. The main contributions are presented as follows:
• Mathematical modeling of sequential electricity market clearance as presently
implemented in most European markets. It consists of three interdependent
optimization blocks; reserve bidding price determination, reserve procurement,
and day-ahead market clearance.
• Development of a methodology to optimally allocate cross-border transmission
capacity for reserves exchange.
• Mathematical formulation for a balancing energy market with a possibility
of cross-border exchange using transmission capacity allocated for reserve ex-
change.
• Development of mathematical models for reserve procurement and real-time
energy balancing market, discussed above, applying Net Transfer Capacity
(NTC) based as well as ﬂow-based formulations.
1.3 List of publications
The main ﬁndings of the research work are presented as a collection of the following
publications.
I Y. Gebrekiros, G. Doorman, S. Jaehnert, and H. Farahmand, Bidding in
the Frequency Restoration Reserves (FRR) market for a Hydropower Unit,
4th IEEE/PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Europe (ISGT EUROPE)
conference, Copenhagen, Denmark, 6-9 October 2013.
II Y. Gebrekiros, G. Doorman, S. Jaehnert, and H. Farahmand, Reserve Pro-
curement and Transmission Capacity Reservation in the Northern European
Power Market, International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems
(IJEPES), vol. 67, pp. 546–559, May 2015.
III Y. Gebrekiros, and G. Doorman, Optimal Transmission Capacity Alloca-
tion for Cross-border Exchange of Frequency Restoration Reserves (FRR),
18th Power Systems Computation Conference, Wroclaw, Poland, 18-22 Au-
gust 2014.
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IV Y. Gebrekiros, S. Jaehnert, and G. Doorman, Sensitivity Analysis of Opti-
mal Transmission Capacity Reservation for Cross-border Exchange of Reserve
Capacity in Northern Europe, 11th International Conference on the European
Energy Market (EEM), Krakow, Poland, 28-30 May 2014.
V Y. Gebrekiros, G. Doorman, A. Helseth, and T. Preda, Assessment of PTDF
Based Power System Aggregation Schemes, 2015 Electrical Power and Energy
Conference (EPEC), London, ON, Canada, October 26-28, 2015.
VI Y. Gebrekiros, G. Doorman, S. Jaehnert, and H. Farahmand, Balancing En-
ergy Market Integration Considering Grid Constraints, PowerTech conference,
Eindhoven, Netherlands, 29 June-2 July, 2015.
VII Y. Gebrekiros, S. Jaehnert, and G. Doorman, Flow-Based Optimal Trans-
mission Capacity Allocation for Cross-border Reserves Exchange, Submitted
to IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.
The research work also resulted in the following additional publications, that are
not included in the thesis.
VIII Y. Gebrekiros, H. Farahmand, and G. Doorman, Impact of reserve market
integration on the value of the North Sea oﬀshore grid alternatives, 9th Inter-
national Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM), Florence, Italy,
10-12 May 2012.
IX Y. Gebrekiros, G. Doorman, H. Farahmand, and S. Jaehnert, Beneﬁts of
cross-border reserve procurement based on pre-allocation of transmission ca-
pacity, PowerTech conference, Grenoble, France 16-20 June 2013.
X Y. Gebrekiros and G. Doorman, Balancing Energy Market Integration in
Northern Europe - Modeling and Case Study, IEEE Power and Energy Society
General Meeting, Washington DC, USA, 27-31 July 2014.
XI Y. Gebrekiros, G. Doorman, and S. Jaehnert, DCOPF based Optimal Trans-
mission Capacity Reservation for FRR Exchange using Implicit and Sequen-
tial Market Clearance, 12th International Conference on the European Energy
Market (EEM), Lisbon, Portugal, 20-22 May 2015.
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1.4 Organization of the thesis
This thesis is presented as a collection of the main publications produced in the
course of the PhD program which are provided in the Appendix. The remainder
of the thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 presents the background for the research work by narrowing down the
discussion from the overall electricity market to the balancing market. It reviews
relevant literature, compares results from research works bearing relevance to the
context of the thesis, and discusses current European regulations, initiatives, and
recommendations on balancing markets.
Chapter 3 brieﬂy discusses the models developed in this thesis and summarizes the
methodologies, assumptions, case studies, and the main results extracted from the
publications that make up the thesis.
The main conclusions and recommendations for future work are presented in Chap-
ter 4.
5
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 The power system
An electric power system is a network of electrical components composed of power
generation plants and consumers of electric power connected by the transmission
and distribution networks.
2.1.1 Generation
In many cases, a generation plant contains one or more generators that convert
mechanical energy to electrical energy, with some exceptions to this principle being
generation from photovoltaic (PV) and battery storage. Generation plants can use
nuclear fuel; burn fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and gas; employ hydropower; or use
renewable energy sources such as wind, solar, and biomass to generate electric power.
To generate electric power in a cost eﬀective way, power plants are usually scheduled
according to their marginal costs; i.e. units with low marginal costs (base load units)
operate most of the time and units with higher marginal costs, often characterized
by higher marginal cost and low startup time, are scheduled for operation during
peak-load hours. Wind, PV, and other variable renewable energy source (RES)
power plants have very low operating costs, which is usually considered to be zero,
and available power from these sources is always used as much as possible.
According to the response speed and controllability of their output, three types of
generating units can be identiﬁed.
• Some units based on nuclear and lignite coal have long startup times and only
supply base load with no need to change their generation set point. Such units
are called base-load units.
• In a power system, the instantaneous balance between supply and consumption
(demand summed with network losses) should be met. The power output from
RES such as wind, run-of-river hydro, and PV is usually intermittent and
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uncertain, thereby creating imbalances in the system. Such generating units
are called non-dispatchable units.
• To ensure that the instantaneous balance between power generation and con-
sumption is sustained, the system operator should guarantee the availability of
generating units that can start up and change their output fast. The response
makes such units instrumental to counteract system imbalances. Units based
on storable hydro, gas, oil, and hard coal units fall in this category and are
called regulating units.
2.1.2 Transmission and distribution system
Bulk power is normally transferred using high voltage AC (HVAC) transmission
system via a step up transformer from a remote generating station to the distribution
system. However, there are instances where HVDC transmission is preferred to
HVAC as in connecting two synchronous systems, transmitting large amount of
power over long distances, and long distance sub sea transmission. The distribution
system represents the ﬁnal stage in the transfer of power to the individual customers.
Small industrial customers are directly connected to the primary feeders, where as
residential and commercial customers are supplied by the secondary feeders [4].
Today’s power systems often have embedded generation or co-generation plants
connected at various distribution system nodes.
2.1.3 Power system loads
The ﬁnal destination of the power generated by the generators is to be consumed
by the loads to perform a certain task. Power system loads range from heavy
industrial consumers to small household appliances. In some cases, the electrical
loads contribute to the stable operation of the system by committing to adjust their
consumption in response to system imbalances (cf. [5] for the case in Norway).
2.2 Power system security
For reliable service, a power system should be designed and operated in such a
way that most probable contingencies can be sustained without loss of load and
the most adverse contingencies possible do not result in uncontrolled, widespread
and cascading blackouts [4]. A power system is designed in such a way that its
stability is maintained in the event of loss of major component (transmission line,
generator etc). This is described as the N-1 criterion. In the Network Code on
Operational Security [6], ETNSO-E deﬁnes operational security as “...Transmission
System capability to retain a Normal State or to return to a Normal State as soon
and as close as possible, and is characterized by thermal limits, voltage constraints,
short-circuit current, frequency limits and stability limits”. The network code further
elaborates on the frequency control that each TSO should operate with suﬃcient
upward and downward active power reserves to counteract imbalances. Moreover,
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the TSO shall ensure the activation of active power reserves at diﬀerent time scales
to correct frequency and power exchange errors.
2.3 RES integration in the power system
With population increase and emergence of new middle class, the global energy con-
sumption has increased rapidly. This is manifested in the consumption of massive
fossil fuel based energy sources (for electricity generation or other forms) that pol-
lute the environment as a result of increased emissions of anthropogenic green house
gases (GHG). The integration of RES is an important intervention in relieving the
dependence on fossil fuel based power generation.
Twidell et al. [7] deﬁne renewable energy as “... energy obtained from naturally
repetitive and persistent ﬂows of energy occurring in the local environment”. For
electricity applications, power plants based on hydro, solar (either PV or Concen-
trated Solar Power), wind power, tidal power, biomass power, and geothermal power
are some of the examples.
In 2012, 19 % of the global energy consumption1 was obtained from RES, 5.8 % of
which was provided by power from hydro, wind, solar, geothermal, and biofuels [8].
Focusing on wind power, more than 35 GW was added in 2013 raising the total
installed capacity to 318 GW globally. According to the European Wind Energy
Association (EWEA), there was about 129 GW of installed wind power capacity
(121 GW on shore and 8 GW oﬀshore) across the European Union (EU) by the end
of 2014, accounting for 14 % of the generation mix [9]. By the end of 2014, the
installed solar photovoltaic (PV) capacity in the EU reached nearly 87 GW with
Germany topping the list at about 38 GW and Italy following at 18.5 GW [10]. The
trend of annual RES installations in relation to total annual installed generation
capacity in the EU is illustrated in Fig. 2.1.
2.3.1 Energy directives aﬀecting RES integration in the EU
By setting future targets, the EU is fostering the RES integration into the power
system. One of these targets is the climate and energy package called “20-20-20”
target. To prevent climate change from reaching catastrophic levels this century,
and to decrease dependence on imports of foreign oil and gas, this EU’s climate
change and energy policy sets the following targets for 2020 [11]:
• Cutting greenhouse gases by at least 20 % of 1990 levels.
• Cutting energy consumption by 20 % of projected 2020 levels, by improving
energy eﬃciency.
• Increasing use of renewables to 20 % of total energy production.
1Traditional biomass accounted for 9 % renewable energy consumption and 4.2 % was the share
covered by heat energy from modern RES.
9
7
9
.1
%
 R
ES
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Peat Fuel oil 
Nuclear Coal 
Gas 
CSP 
Waste 
Biomass 
Ocean
Geothermal 
Hydro PV 
Wind 
Figure 2.1: Annual RES installed capacity in relation to total annual installed generation
capacity [9]
Furthermore, to keep the average temperature change below 2 ◦C, the European
Council conﬁrmed, in 2011, the EU objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions
by 80-95 % by 2050 compared to 1990, inline with the position endorsed by world
leaders in the Copenhagen and the Cancun Agreements [12].
2.3.2 System impacts of RES integration
RES, apart from storable hydro, are generally intermittent and characterized by
limited predictability and controllability. As a result, massive RES penetration has
a huge impact on the power system. System impacts of wind energy are categorized
as short-term and long-term2 in [13]. Additional reserve requirements and increased
cost of system balancing, which occur due to the ﬂuctuation in wind power out-
put, are among the short term impacts. Other short term impacts include amount
of fuel used and the corresponding emissions, stability of the transmission system,
transmission and distribution losses. Long-term, the expected wind power produc-
tion during peak load hours, i.e. the ability of wind power to replace conventional
capacity, has an impact on the power system adequacy. From the system balancing
point of view, increase in RES integration increases the need for more balancing
resources in the system. The impact of RES integration on reserve requirements is
discussed in Section 2.7.1 B.
2Short-term impacts are in the operational time scale in the range of minutes to hours where
as long-term impacts are the impacts on long-term transmission planning and generation capacity
adequacy.
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2.4 Electricity markets
Electricity market is a general name which refers to many constituent markets such
as forward, day-ahead, intra-day, balancing, and ancillary markets. In a restructured
power system, electricity market refers to a platform where sales and purchases,
through oﬀers to sell and through bids to buy respectively, of electric power and
energy is performed. In a typical electricity market, several entities like producers,
consumers, traders or brokers take an active role in the market process. In an
eﬃcient electricity market, all participants should have equal access to the market
and to all relevant information about prices and supply conditions [14]. The rules
and practical arrangements governing how the diﬀerent entities operate is called
market design.
2.4.1 Deregulation/Restructuring of the electricity industry
Historically, the electricity industry has been characterized by economies of scale
in the generation and necessity of an extensive transmission and distribution net-
work which were integrated within individual electric utilities [15]. However, in the
mid-1980s several countries realized that the natural monopolistic characteristics of
electricity supply and generation were considered less important compared to other
factors; thus, they had to become potentially competitive. As a consequence, it
was noted that a separation of network activities from generation and supply and
the introduction of competition to the potentially competitive parts of the industry
might increase the overall eﬃciency. A summary of the background for deregulation
in the electricity sector in many parts of the world is presented in [16]. Variation
of investment cost of similar generating unit across utilities, operating cost of gen-
erating units, employment practices and wages, pricing ineﬃciencies, and abated
innovation in a vertically integrated system are pointed out as the main drivers.
Deregulation or restructuring3 are the terms used for the reorganization of the ver-
tically integrated power supply industry which started in the early 1990s in many
countries. In a vertically integrated structure, one utility handles the functions of
generation, transmission and distribution within a certain geographical area. Re-
structuring of the power supply system includes unbundling of the system into a
competitive part comprising generation and retail, as well as a monopolistic part
comprising transmission and distribution. Discussion of the electricity industry be-
gins with the recognition of three distinct components: generation, transmission,
and distribution plus retail [17]. In Europe, England and Wales were the pioneers
of restructuring with the Electricity Act of 1989. Norway followed with the Energy
Act of 1990 and the other Scandinavian countries and Finland joined this market
during the 1990s [14].
3The term deregulation is most relevant in cases where the industry was privately owned and
under public regulation which was typical for the USA. In those cases public regulation could be
phased out for part of the system. In other cases, for instance where public ownership prevailed,
restructuring is a more suitable term for this process [14].
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2.4.2 Electricity markets in Europe
Power systems in diﬀerent corners of the world have diﬀerent electricity market struc-
tures. It can be generalized, however, that electricity trade starts quite long before
the actual delivery. In competitive power markets, assuming perfect competition,
the wholesale price is determined by the generation costs of the marginal technology,
i.e. the short run marginal costs (SRMC) of the most expensive plant needed to
meet demand. Consequently, risks emerge for market participants on either side of
the market due to the high volatility and occasional spikes in the electricity spot
prices. Long-term contracts like futures or forwards allow for management of the
price risk by eﬀectively locking in a ﬁxed price and therefore avoiding uncertain fu-
ture spot prices [18]. The authors also argue that forward markets price formation
in European Energy Exchange (EEX) is inﬂuenced by historic spot market prices.
A day before the actual delivery, the day-ahead market clears where prices are deter-
mined according to the demand and supply bids. In the Nordic and Baltic regions,
Elspot is the arena for trading energy in the day-ahead market [19]. Every morning
members send their bids to the Elspot trading system for the next day. Each bid
speciﬁes the volume in MWh/h that a member is willing to buy or sell at speciﬁc
price levels (EUR/MWh) for each individual hour in the following day. After the
deadline for submitting bids (12:00 CET), Elspot feeds the information into a spe-
cialist computer system which calculates the price, and prices are announced, and
from 00:00 CET the next day, energy is physically delivered hour for hour.
For any incidents that take place after the gate closure of the day-ahead market,
market participants can adjust their portfolio in the intra-day market. The deadline
for changes, gate closure in the intra-day market, can be up to one hour (or in some
cases 30 or 15 minutes) before energy delivery. Elbas is an intra-day market for
trading power operated by Nord Pool Spot and covering the Nordic region, Baltic
region as well as Germany and recently the UK [19]. At 14:00 CET, capacities
available for Elbas trading are published and trading takes place every day around
the clock until one hour before delivery.
Typically, before the day-ahead market is the reserve procurement market where the
TSO procures reserves for a given period of time to secure availability of resources
during real-time balancing. To counteract the imbalances during real-time, the
TSO activates (or asks for the activation of) the cheapest balancing resources in the
balancing energy market. The reserve and balancing energy market are discussed in
detail in Section 2.7. A typical sequence of electricity markets in Europe is shown
in Fig. 2.2.
2.5 Electricity market integration
Historically, electricity markets were limited to one or multiple TSO control areas
which often are bounded to national borders. Initially, the cross-border intercon-
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Figure 2.2: Typical electricity market chronology in Europe [20]
nectors were constructed for the purpose of improving the stability of the electricity
system and to enable mutual support between countries. After liberalization, they
are regarded as a means to foster international trade and to link markets which
otherwise have too little competition [21]. The integration of electricity markets can
bring about major eﬃciency gains in social welfare by utilizing generation capacity
more eﬃciently and, thus, reducing the necessity of large idle generation capac-
ity [22]. Depending on the market design and level of electricity market integration,
the transmission capacity is auctioned either explicitly or implicitly.
2.5.1 Explicit transmission capacity auction
Explicit transmission capacity auction refers to an arrangement where transmission
capacity is auctioned to the market separately and before the day-ahead market
clearance. It is a method of handling the capacity on cross-border interconnectors
where the capacity is normally auctioned in portions through annual, monthly and
daily auctions [23]. When parties are not able to predict prices in the connected
regions, results sometimes show adverse ﬂows, where a ﬂow from a high price area
to a low price area occurs. Lack of information due to separate auctions for energy
and transmission capacity can result in an ineﬃcient utilization of interconnectors
resulting in decrease of social welfare, less price convergence, and adverse ﬂows [24].
2.5.2 Implicit transmission capacity auctions
With implicit transmission capacity auction, the auctioning of the transmission ca-
pacity is implicitly included in the electricity market auctioning thus shielding mar-
ket parties from the adversities of price predictions4. Implicit auctions ensure that
ﬂow is from the surplus area to the deﬁcit area. This results in economical utilization
of transmission capacity as it avoids the ineﬃciencies of the explicit transmission
capacity auctions, and it generally eases the complexity of electricity trading. Im-
plicit transmission capacity auction is the basis used for market splitting and market
coupling.
4It should be noted that market parties still need to make predictions for planning purposes.
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A Market splitting
When the implicit capacity auctions are held within the domain of a single Power
Exchange (PX), it is referred to as market splitting [24]. When the transmission
capacity between the bidding areas is not enough to give price convergence, this
results in diﬀerent prices referred to as area prices.
B Market coupling
Electricity market coupling refers to the implicit auctioning of cross-border physical
transmission rights via the hourly auctions for electric energy organized by PXs a
day ahead of delivery with the objective of simplifying cross-border trade [23, 25].
It is common to diﬀerentiate between price coupling and volume coupling.
B.1 Price coupling In this type of market coupling, the involved PXs forward
all their market data and market rules to the market coupling algorithm which
centrally computes the prices and ﬂows and forwards them to the corresponding
PXs.
B.2 Volume coupling This uses the same input data as the price coupling
algorithm. However, the PXs only consider the ﬂows and calculate the prices in a
second step. Depending on how loosely or tightly the coupling algorithm follows the
market rules, one gets loose volume coupling or tight volume coupling [26].
2.6 Electricity market coupling: History and trends
in Europe
The European electricity market has been subjected to integration eﬀorts with the
long-term goal of establishing a single electricity market; alternatively called the
internal electricity market (IEM) [23]. In the following subsections, the market
integration trends in Europe will be discussed in detail. Depending on how the grid
constraints are considered in the market coupling algorithm, we identify Net Transfer
Capacity (NTC) based and ﬂow-based market coupling (FBMC) in Europe5.
2.6.1 NTC based market coupling
Prior to discussing NTC based market coupling, it is important to understand the
deﬁnition and calculation of NTCs6. The Total Transfer Capacity (TTC) refers
to the maximum exchange programme between two areas compatible with opera-
tional security standards stated in each TSO’s grid code. To cope with the un-
certainties on the computed TTC values, a security margin called Transmission
5Nodal pricing, for example in the PJM market [27], makes use of detailed grid representation.
However, this is not practiced in Europe and is outside the scope of this thesis.
6Proposed by European Transmission System Operators(ETSO) [28], a predecessor to ENTSO-
E, the deﬁnition and discussions are still governing.
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Reliability Margin (TRM) is introduced. As a result, the NTC is the maximum
exchange programme between two areas which can be oﬀered to the market without
aﬀecting system security and taking into account the technical uncertainties, i.e.
NTC = TTC − TRM [28]. In an NTC based market coupling, therefore, cross-
border capacity (NTC in this case) is allocated implicitly within the auctioning of
energy in the interconnected electricity markets disregarding the physical laws gov-
erning power ﬂow.
A communication from the European Commission sets an internal electricity mar-
ket (IEM) for Europe as a prerequisite to achieve the objectives of the Union policy
on energy7 [29]. Between 2006 and 2010, the Tri-Lateral Market Coupling (TLC),
integrated the French, Belgium and Dutch day-ahead markets [30]. The TLC was
initiated by the TSOs and PXs of the respective countries. Following the TLC, the
CWE coupling, an initiative launched in 2010 and covering the Netherlands, Bel-
gium, France, Germany and Luxembourg, created a single platform for day-ahead
electricity trading [31]. This was followed by the Interim Tight Volume Coupling
(ITVC) which increased the eﬃciency of the European power system by coupling
the day-ahead market of the CWE region with the Nordic market. The most recent
one is the Price Coupling of Regions (PCR), which has been in operation since May
2014 [32]. The project is an initiative of seven PXs: APX, Belpex, EPEX SPOT,
GME, Nord Pool Spot, OMIE and OTE, covering the electricity markets in Aus-
tria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
Slovenia, Sweden, and the UK. One of the key objectives of PCR project is the
development of a single price coupling algorithm, Pan-European Hybrid Electricity
Market Integration Algorithm (EUPHEMIA) which will be applied to calculate en-
ergy allocation and electricity prices across Europe, maximizing the overall welfare
and increasing the transparency of the computation of prices and ﬂows.
2.6.2 Flow-based market coupling
In the Nordic system, the respective TSOs determine all capacities between price
areas and communicate these capacities to Nord Pool Spot, who will enter these
values as constraints into their market splitting algorithm. In this system, NTC
based allocation gives reasonable results as interdependencies are low and market
ﬂows will not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from physical ﬂows. In the highly meshed Central
European system there is no market splitting and each country is considered a single
price area regardless of internal congestions. Thus, NTC based allocation has seri-
ous shortcomings in such instances. Because physical ﬂows follow the transmission
path of least resistance, power exchanges both within and between bidding areas
(or countries) will result in loop ﬂows that may lead to signiﬁcant unplanned cross-
7Set out in Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the objectives
of the Union policy include: secure and competitively priced supplies; renewables and climate
change targets of 2020 and beyond; and signiﬁcant increase in energy eﬃciency across the whole
economy.
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border ﬂows [33,34]. For instance, a single transaction between Germany and France
will partly ﬂow directly between the two countries but also through the Netherlands-
Belgium-France, Switzerland-France, and Switzerland-Italy-France corridors. Thus,
a model based on NTC tends to be ineﬀective in highly meshed power networks
since the physical reality is not accounted for [35].
The EU Guidelines on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management (CACM8
[1]) require a shift from the current NTC based market integration approach to
ﬂow-based market coupling (FBMC) [36–38] to increase the overall electricity mar-
ket eﬃciency. FBMC makes use of power transfer distribution factors (PTDF) and
is based on DCOPF: but, instead of modeling the whole grid, only interconnections
and so called Critical Network Elements (CNE) are considered. It is a linear ap-
proximation of the physical reality, albeit much better than the NTC approach. A
PTDF refers to the line ﬂow sensitivity for given transaction between two nodes.
Flow-based algorithms are expected to improve quality of results and increase the
social welfare compared to NTC based calculations as they better represent the
physics of power ﬂow. This results in better utilisation of the physical infrastruc-
ture within the FBMC region, which leads to an increased trading volume when
compared to NTC based auctions [35] (cf. Fig. 2.3). However, their ability to im-
prove total welfare heavily depends on the quality of grid models [23].
During the 2010 CWE FB experimentation [39], it was proven that the Enhanced
FB capacity calculation is feasible from an operational point of view. It was also
demonstrated that it increases the proposed capacity oﬀered to the market compared
to NTC in addition to addressing the transparency requirements and concerns on
market players understanding. The ﬂow-based methodology has been used on a
daily basis in the CWE day-ahead market coupling process since 20 May 2015 [2].
2.7 Balancing markets
A balancing market is an institutional arrangement providing market-based balance
management consisting of three design pillars namely balance planning, balancing
service provision, and imbalance settlement [40]. In the literature, balancing market
is sometimes used as a term for the balancing energy market (cf. Section 2.7.3). In
this thesis, the term balancing market is a collective term for the reserve procurement
market and balancing energy markets. Both reserve procurement and balancing
energy markets are discussed in the following subsections.
8These Guidelines deal with the integration, coordination and harmonisation of the congestion
management regimes, to the extent that such harmonisation is necessary in order to facilitate
electricity trade within the EU.
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2.7.1 Reserve procurement market
The TSOs procure reserve capacity in order to avoid the risk of insuﬃcient oﬀers for
balancing energy in real time. As a result, the TSOs hedge this uncertainty by secur-
ing, in advance, a suﬃcient amount of capacity available in their control area [33].
In liberalized European electricity markets, reserve adequacy is ensured through ap-
propriate institutional mechanisms. Typically, TSOs procure reserve capacity from
Balancing Service Providers (BSPs) to guarantee the availability of suﬃcient reserve
for real-time operation through either mandatory impositions, bilateral contracts, or
auctions [41]. BSPs are mostly producers whose generation resources are contracted
by the TSO for balancing purposes (cf. Section 2.7.2 B).
A Types of reserves and activation
To keep the system frequency at the nominal operating value, the instantaneous
balance between demand and supply should be sustained. As large scale electrical
energy storage in the transmission system is economically infeasible, there is a need
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to keep reserve capacity to counteract imbalances. ENTSO-E deﬁnes three types of
operating reserves9 [42–44].
A.1 Frequency Containment Reserves (FCR) are operating reserves de-
ployed between 2-20 seconds to counteract frequency change due to sudden imbal-
ance in the system. These reserves are also known as primary control reserves in the
Central European system and frequency controlled reserves normal (FCR-N) and
frequency controlled disturbance reserves (FCR-D) in the Nordic system [20]. For
the Nordic system 600 MW of FCR-N is constantly allocated for regulation in the
normal state. Similarly, 1200 MW of FCR-D, corresponding to the single largest
disturbance in the system reduced by 200 MW of self regulation, is jointly kept in
the system.
A.2 Frequency Restoration Reserves (FRR) are operating reserves acti-
vated to restore the system frequency to nominal value and are deployed to replace
the FCR. These reserves are activated within a period of 30 seconds to 15 minutes.
There exist automatic and manual components of the FRR termed FRR-A and
FRR-M respectively.
A.3 Replacement Reserves (RR) These reserves are used to release already
activated FCR and FRR. They are manually activated and called tertiary reserves
in the Central European system but are not available in the Nordic system.
The control actions taken and the system frequency behaviour in the event of a
typical fault is shown in Fig. 2.4.
B Reserve requirement
The Network Code on Load-Frequency Control and Reserves (NC LFCR) deﬁnes
minimum requirements for FRR and RR dimensioning based on a combination of a
deterministic and probabilistic approach and coherent with the quality requirements
[6, 45]. It speciﬁes that the minimum values for FRR and RR required for Central
Europe and Nordic shall be based on a combination of:
• A deterministic assessment based on the positive and negative dimensioning
incident10, i.e. the FRR Capacity shall not be smaller than the dimensioning
incident (separate for positive and negative direction).
• A probabilistic assessment of historical records for at least one full year. In
this case, a minimum value for the sum of FRR and RR capacities is deﬁned
by the 99 % quantile of the load frequency control block imbalances (separate
for positive and negative direction).
9The deﬁnitions are speciﬁc for the European power systems.
10The dimensioning incident is deﬁned as the maximum expected instantaneous power deviation
between generation and demand in a control area [46].
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Future power systems will incorporate massive RES integration. This increase in
RES capacity in the system will increase the volume of imbalances due to the lim-
ited predictability of these resources. Consequently, studies suggest that increased
RES integration, increases the required volume of reserve capacity. Vos et al. [47]
summarize literature on methodologies followed to determine the impact of wind
power on reserve requirements and list them as: heuristic (based on contingency
analysis), probabilistic (based on combining the probability density curves of all
three imbalance drivers namely demand variations, unexpected power plant outages
and RES variability), and system simulation approaches (Unit Commitment based
system cost calculation). Accordingly, they apply a probabilistic method to analyze
the impact of increased wind production on reserve requirement within the Belgian
power system. Similarly, based on the data for Finland, Holttinen et al. [48] suggest
a linear relationship between wind penetration and increased reserve capacity as a
percentage of installed wind capacity, resulting in a 7 % increase of reserve11 for 20
% wind penetration. The same study suggests an 8 % increase in reserve require-
ment for 15 % wind penetration in Germany. Table 2.1 shows the increased reserve
requirement for 2030 in each country based on the wind power penetration and the
data in [48].
2.7.2 Parties in balancing markets
Three main entities, described in the next paragraphs, take part in balancing mar-
kets. The interactions between these parties is illustrated in Fig. 2.5.
11Increase in reserve requirement expressed in percentage of wind capacity
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Table 2.1: Estimated increase in reserve requirements (MW) based on wind penetration
in the Northern Europe [41]
Wind Wind Increased Requirement
2030 (TWh) 2010 (TWh) Up (MW) Down (MW)
Norway 19 1 270 270
Sweden 23 1 513 513
Denmark 22 7 829 829
Finland 7 1 84 84
Germany 139 32 4385 4385
A Balancing Responsible Parties (BRP)
All electricity market participants interact with the market through a BRP, or are a
BRP themselves [49]. Before the hour of operation, each BRP has a market position
or balance, consisting of the sum of all its obligations in the form of sales and
purchases in organized markets like day-ahead and intra-day, and through bilateral
transactions. The balance is deﬁned for each Program Time Unit (PTU), which
typically can be 15, 30 or 60 minutes. The BRPs are responsible for their net
balance over the whole PTU, where as the TSO is responsible for balancing within
the PTU, as well as the transition between one PTU to the next [50].
B Balancing Service Providers (BSP)
In an unbundled system, a TSO does not own generation or consumption resources.
As a result, the TSO will be in lack of resources to compensate for the aggregate
deviations of the BRPs12. Hence, the TSO uses the resources of BSPs to balance
the system. BSPs are usually producers with generation resources and sometimes
speciﬁc consumers can also contribute [51].
C Transmission System Operator (TSO)
The TSO plays a central role in the balancing market: 1) by procuring reserves for
balancing from BSPs to guarantee suﬃcient capacity in real-time operation and 2)
by addressing real-time imbalances with least cost measures and charging the BRPs
for their deviations from the scheduled plans [41].
2.7.3 Balancing energy markets
The balancing energy market is the last electricity market on which energy can
be traded. It serves to procure energy that corresponds directly to the real-time
12Note that from a system point of view the individual imbalances of the BRPs are irrelevant,
it is only the net sum of all deviations at the system level that contributes to deviations in the
frequency and needs to be compensated.
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Figure 2.5: Interaction between the parties in a balancing market [50]
adjustment of generation and consumption in order to adjust the system imbalances.
In the NC EB [52], an imbalance is deﬁned as “...an energy volume calculated for a
BRP and representing the diﬀerence between the allocated volume attributed to that
BRP, and the ﬁnal Position of that BRP and any imbalance adjustment applied to
that BRP, within a given imbalance settlement period”.
Balancing energy can only be provided by generation and consumption resources
that are technically capable of providing balancing energy [53]. In general, aggre-
gate deviations over the whole PTU in a given balancing area are balanced by the
TSO and charged to the responsible BRPs by means of the imbalance settlement
mechanisms. On the other hand, the ﬂuctuations inside the PTU remain the respon-
sibility of the TSO [47]. The balancing energy market in the Northern European
system is presented in detail in Section 2.7.5.
2.7.4 Integration of balancing markets in Europe
It can be argued that integrated electricity balancing market is the ﬁnal step in
the creation of a single European electricity market. In 2012, ACER adopted the
Framework Guidelines on Electricity Balancing [54], with the aim, “... to providing
a solid framework for the integration of national balancing markets and the achieve-
ment of the single European electricity balancing market”. These guidelines focus
on increasing cross-border competition in the balancing time frame and on the over-
all eﬃciency of balancing the electricity system, while safeguarding the security of
supply. Based on the guidelines from ACER, ENTSO-E developed the Network
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Code on Electricity Balancing (NC EB) with the purpose of establishing common
rules for electricity balancing including the establishment of common principles for
procurement and settlement of FCR, FRR, and RR and common methodology for
the activation of FRR and RR [52]. Balancing market integration is expected to
allow TSOs to more eﬃciently procure balancing services and avoid simultaneous
up and down regulation in adjacent areas promoting eﬃcient and competitive price
formation and market liquidity [55]. For the exchange of balancing services between
countries, however, an integration of national regulating power markets is neces-
sary. This requires a harmonisation of regulating power market rules [56]. Van der
Veen [53] proposes four cross-border balancing arrangements listed in order of their
complexity and requirement for harmonization.
• System imbalance netting refers to the cancelation of positive and negative
imbalances in adjacent areas, preventing opposite balancing energy activation.
This arrangement does not require any change in balancing market design.
• BSP-TSO trading refers to an arrangement where two or more TSOs work to
establish a compatible balancing market [41]. BSPs can place bids in the mar-
ket area of the neighbouring TSO. For this arrangement, harmonization of the
PTU, gate closure times, and balancing service bid are necessary requirements.
• Additional voluntary pool is a multinational balancing service market in which
TSOs can share part of their balancing resources with other TSOs in a pool.
TSOs can use the bids from the pool, and add these to the bid ladder of
their own market. This arrangement is also referred to as TSO-TSO trading
without common merit order list.
• Common merit order list is an arrangement where all bids from the neigh-
bouring TSOs are combined to form a common merit order list. The TSOs
pass corresponding bids from their area to a regional TSO, that takes the re-
sponsibility of maintaining system balance by activating resources from the
common merit order list. This arrangement is also referred to as TSO-TSO
trading with common merit order list.
By performing a simultaneous reserve procurement and day-ahead market clearance
with implicit allocation of transmission capacity allocation for reserve exchange,
Farahmand et al. [57] numerically show that there is a cost reduction beneﬁt of
cross-border reserve procurement. Using a case study of the Northern European
power system, Jaehnert et al. [58] assert that there is a socio-economic beneﬁt by
integrating regulating power markets which results from a provision of reserve ca-
pacity from the Nordic to the continental European power system, and reduced
activation of reserves due to imbalance netting in the continental power system.
Similarly, based on Northern European power system, [40,59] also assert that multi-
national balancing markets signiﬁcantly reduce balancing costs.
Considering actual balancing market integration initiatives in the European power
market, the Grid Control Cooperation (GCC), where in March 2010 four of the
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German TSOs established a common platform for reserve procurement and real-
time balancing [60] is one example. As of 2012 GCC expanded to the surrounding
control areas forming International GCC (IGCC), where the TSOs of Denmark, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, Czech Republic, and Belgium became members. IGCC is
an inter-TSO cooperation aimed to prevent counteracting FRR activation in diﬀer-
ent control blocks by real-time netting of imbalances using the remaining ATC [61].
Similarly, in the Nordic system, a common regulating power market has been in
place since 2002. However, the reserve procurement is done separately by each of
the Nordic TSOs [62].
2.7.5 Balancing markets in Northern Europe
In the thermal dominated Central European system, it is often necessary to procure
reserves and pay for their availability. On the other hand, in the hydro dominated
Nordic system, with the exception of periods with high demand and prices, suﬃcient
reserve capacity is available that the market for reserves does not exist [56]. The
reserve markets in the Northern European system are discussed in Table 2.2.
In the Nordic system, 300 MW of FRR-A (introduced in 2013, and fully activated
in 2 minutes) is maintained in the morning and evening hours in 2015. The country
speciﬁc requirements are divided in proportion to their annual consumption, which
also applies to FCR-N and FCR-D. For the FRR-M, which are fully activated within
15 minutes, each TSO allocates a capacity to cover the dimensioning fault in its
own area. In the Netherlands, the FRR-M is only procured for upward regulation
purposes and designed to be used only in case of a sudden large generation outage
or an outage of an importing HVDC interconnector. In Germany, TSOs procure
FRR-M balancing capacity for upward and downward regulation with gate closure
for auctions being day-ahead at 10:00h; except for Sundays and Mondays for which
balancing capacity is always procured on Fridays. The product resolution in time is
four hours [63].
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2.8 Transmission capacity reservation for reserves
exchange
Electricity trade often starts far ahead of the actual energy delivery and is progres-
sively performed. A typical electricity market chronology in Europe13 is shown in
Fig. 2.2, in section 2.4.2. It can be seen that the reserve procurement takes place
some time before the day-ahead market clearance. Besides, the duration for which
reserves are contracted is diﬀerent and is usually longer compared to the resolu-
tion of the day-ahead market. As discussed in Section 2.7.1, FRR are currently
procured within national borders. However, if there is going to be a possibility of
cross-border procurement of FRR, it might be necessary to reserve transmission ca-
pacity beforehand to make sure that the reserves are available when needed. One
of the risks of transmission capacity reservation in advance is that it is diﬃcult to
predict how much of the allocated reserves will actually be called upon at a certain
time in real-time risking a valuable transmission capacity going unused [33]. The
ACER Framework Guidelines on Electricity Balancing stress that the ENTSO-E NC
EB [54] shall forbid TSOs to “... to reserve cross-border capacity for the purpose of
balancing, except for cases where TSOs can demonstrate that such reservation would
result in increased overall social welfare and provide a robust evaluation of costs and
beneﬁts”. As a result in the NC EB [52], ENTSO-E bestows the right for TSOs to
“... reserve cross zonal capacity (CZC) for the exchange of balancing capacity or
sharing of reserves when socio-economic eﬃciency is proved”. It proposes that the
socio-economic beneﬁt is proved in either one of the following:
• Co-optimisation process - TSOs bid the actual market value of CZC for the
exchange of reserves into auctions of CZC for the exchange of energy in an
electricity market in a given time frame.
• Market-based reservation process - based on a comparison of the actual market
value of CZC for reserves exchange and the forecasted market value of CZC for
the exchange of energy. This takes place if no transmission capacity auction
in available for the relevant time frame for procurement of reserves [45].
• Reservation based on economic eﬃciency analysis - takes place if it is not
possible to calculate any actual market values for both reserves and energy
exchange [45]. This is done based on a comparison of the forecasted market
value of CZC for the reserves exchange, and the forecasted market value of
CZC for exchanges of energy.
With the assumption of only two products (day-ahead energy and reserves) and
for a given level of transfer capacity, the optimal allocation of transfer capacity is
illustrated in Fig. 2.6 [49]. The main assumption taken here is that transfer capacity
has a positive and declining marginal value in all markets.
13This ﬁgure is intended to speciﬁcally show the time sequence of reserve procurement in relation
to the DA clearance. Detailed illustrations about the time sequence of electricity market clearance
are available in [20, 55].
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Optimal
allocation
Marginal value
of capacity for
day-ahead trade
Marginal value of
capacity for trade with
balancing services
Capacity for day-ahead trade Capacity for
balancing
services trade
Figure 2.6: A schematic for optimal transfer capacity allocation between two markets [49]
On the issue of transmission capacity reservation for FRR exchange, Jaehnert et
al. [60] assert that there is no beneﬁt of pre-reservation of transmission capacity for
FRR exchange. They mention that it is sub-optimal in a model where clearing of
the spot market is done simultaneously with reservation of reserve and transmission
capacity. Besides, this is not the approach in current European electricity markets.
By applying a quantitative analysis in Northern Europe, Abbasy et al. [59] show
that integrated balancing energy market results in reduction of annual balancing
costs by EUR 100 million when enough transmission capacity is reserved. More-
over, by considering the Northern European system in the state of 2030 as a case
study, Farahmand et al. [67] assert that a pre-reservation of 100 MW transmission
capacity on the Skagerrak HVDC interconnection between Norway and Denmark
results in socio-economic loss compared to the dynamic transmission capacity allo-
cation14.
In the following subsections, practical experiences and case studies regarding trans-
mission capacity reservation for FRR exchange in Northern Europe are presented.
2.8.1 Transmission capacity reservation between Sweden and
Germany [33]
By analyzing the average available transmission capacity on all corridors in the CWE
region in 2008, a case study undertaken by Sweco Energy Markets15 [33] determines
that for an average of 90 % of the time, the available capacity after the intraday
14In this case, the day-ahead market is run by implicitly considering the reserve requirement as
an additional constraint where the optimization gives dynamic transmission capacity allocation for
reserves exchange, among others. Consequently, pre-reservation of transmission capacity can only
increase the costs.
15http://www.swecogroup.com/en/Sweco-group/Services/8379/Energy-markets-and-regulation
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gate closure exceeds 100 MW.
By making use of historical data, they analysed the impact of transmission capacity
reservation for balancing purposes by combining the impacts of reservation on the
day-ahead markets and balancing markets. The study considered the impact of
reservation of 100 MW on both directions on the Baltic HVDC cable by using 2012
market clearance data and transmission capacity usage and estimated the value of
lost trade in the DA market and the impacts on balancing markets. They found
that, the loss in the DA market to be around EUR 41 million and gain in balancing
market of EUR 80 million, giving a net total gain of EUR 39 million. The EUR
80 million gain in balancing market translates to EUR 62 million in the balancing
energy market and EUR 18 million in the reserve procurement market.
2.8.2 Hasle pilot project [68]
The Hasle-pilot was a bilateral project between Statnett and Svenska kraftna¨t aimed
at FRR-A capacity exchange between Norway and Sweden. It was a market based
transmission capacity reservation project between October 27, 2014 to December 19,
2014 created to gain experience of transmission capacity reservation. The most im-
portant outcome from the Hasle pilot shows that market based capacity reservation
is possible and can increase the socio-economic beneﬁt.
• The FRR-A capacity exchange and corresponding reserved cross-zonal capac-
ity (CZC) have been calculated weekly for the upcoming week. Exchange has
been decided for three diﬀerent time blocks per week.
• The socio-economic optimum of the reservation would be reached if CZC is
reserved so that the marginal value of using CZC for FRR-A exchange would
equal the marginal value of using CZC in the day-ahead market.
• In the pilot, the amount of transmission capacity allocated to the exchange of
FRR-A was restricted to exchange a maximum of 50 MW of FRR-A, or 5 %
of the forecasted Net Transfer Capacity (NTC), whichever was the lowest.
• To enable exchange of FRR-A capacity from Norway to Sweden, cross zonal ca-
pacity between south-western (NO2+NO5) and eastern part of Norway (NO1)
has been reserved in addition to the reservation of CZC between Norway (NO1)
and Sweden (SE3). This is due to that most Norwegian FRR-A resources are
located in the south-western part of Norway.
• The total socio-economic beneﬁt of the FRR-A exchange and transmission
capacity reservation between Norway and Sweden for the eight week pilot
period was approximately EUR 62000 (just below EUR 8000 per week).
• All the FRR-A exchange in the Hasle pilot has been directed from Norway to
Sweden. The Swedish marginal FRR-A price has on average decreased with
EUR 4.0 while the Norwegian marginal price has on average increased with
EUR 0.9, considering the blocks where FRR-A has been exchanged.
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• The socio-economic beneﬁts of the eight week pilot period was more than EUR
20000 higher with daily procurement compared to weekly which is explained
as:
– With a GCT closer to operational hour the uncertainty and thus the risk
that FRR-A providers are exposed to will be reduced. It is expected that
this will contribute to reductions in the FRR-A prices.
– A GCT closer to real time make it possible to increase the accuracy of
the forecast of the value of transmission capacity in the DAM. This is
both with regard to DAM prices and available transmission capacities.
2.8.3 Skagerrak 4 [69]
The Skagerrak 4 is a 700 MW HVDC-VSC cable between Norway and Western
Denmark which has been in operation since December 2014. A total of 100 MW of
the capacity will be used for delivery of FRR-A from Norway to Western Denmark.
Socio-economic evaluation showed positive net-beneﬁts based on price diﬀerences in
availability payments for secondary reserves between the two countries.
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Chapter 3
Methodology, Results and
Discussions
The research work addresses two main topics: the reserve market and the balancing
energy market. The topics are evaluated using two market coupling approaches.
The ﬁrst one is NTC based and the other one is FBMC. In this chapter, the models
developed, summary of the main results, and excerpts of the main publications are
presented.
3.1 Model Description
In this section, the scenario descriptions, the models developed, and methodologies
followed to address the task of reserve procurement and balancing energy market
are discussed. Central for the understanding of the work is the distinction between
sequential and implicit market clearance options. In the sequential market clearance
option, FRR is procured followed by the day-ahead market clearance. On the other
hand, in the implicit market clearance, the day-ahead market is cleared by implicitly
considering the reserve requirements as additional constraints to the optimization
problem.
3.1.1 Model inputs
The Northern European system, which includes the Nordic region, Germany, and
the Netherlands in the state of 2010, is the case study considered for most part of
the thesis. In this subsection, we discuss the organization and handling of the input
data. The modeling of generating plants, especially the underlying assumptions in
aggregating and representing hydropower units is addressed ﬁrst. Subsequently, the
grid representation and the associated input data for NTC and ﬂow-based imple-
mentations is discussed.
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A Generating units
Based on their response speed and controllability of their output, generation units
are classiﬁed as base-load units (nuclear and coal plants), regulating units (storable
hydro, oil, and gas ﬁred power plants), and non-dispatchable units (wind, run-of-
river (ROR) hydro, and PV plants).
A.1 Hydropower units Hydropower accounts for 99 % of the power generation
in Norway [70]. It is also quite signiﬁcant in the whole Nordic system taking around
50 % of the power generation mix. As a result, dealing with electricity market
analysis in the Nordic system requires a detailed modeling of the hydropower system.
However, modeling of hydropower systems is very challenging and a list of some of
the challenges is presented as follows [71]:
• Hydropower systems often have quite complex topologies with up to tens of
cascaded reservoirs and power plants in the same river system. The reservoirs
may also have diﬀerent storage capacity with signiﬁcant water travel time that
couples the decisions between several time steps [72];
• There may be diﬀerent owners for the reservoirs or power stations with the
decision of one owner impacting the conditions for the other owners;
• There may be very complicated physical structures in a river system, which
represent both non-linear and discrete relationships;
• Uncertainty related to market prices, inﬂow, and demand;
• Unlike thermal plants, where the fuel price is correlated to the generation cost,
the direct cost of hydro is very low. However, the amount of water available
is limited and producing now creates an opportunity cost of not using it in a
future.
Hence, to account for uncertainties associated with hydropower modeling and obtain
solutions that are robust against changing conditions, one should use stochastic
models. Hence, long-term hydropower scheduling models such as EMPS1 are needed.
For this work, a simpliﬁed and aggregated reservoir representation obtained from the
EMPS model is used. The Nordic system, is represented by 49 aggregated reservoirs,
with an aggregated hydro unit connected to each reservoir as shown in Fig. 3.1.
This level of aggregation is a compromise between expected impractical results due
to over aggregation and mathematical complexity of considering individual units.
In a given planning period, the marginal cost for hydro units is given by the water
value [56]. As there is no signiﬁcant production cost for hydro power, but rather
limited amount of water available, water value refers to the opportunity cost of
storing reservoir water for future utilization. These values are dependent on the
time of the year and the reservoir level. The water value proﬁle for one reservoir in
Norway is shown in Fig. 3.2.
1EMPS refers to EFIs Multi-area Power-Market Simulator and is developed by SINTEF Energy
Research for long-term hydro power planning [73].
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Storable
inflow
Non-storable
inflow
Overflow
Power Output from
non-storable inflow
Power output from
storable inflow
Power output from
total inflow
Figure 3.1: Hydro power generation representation
Figure 3.2: Water value matrix for a reservoir in Norway as obtained from EMPS. The
water value is generally high when the reservoir level is low and viceversa. Similarly, for
a given reservoir level, we can see that the water value is low during high inﬂow period
(late spring and summer) and high during low inﬂow period.
The detailed hydro modeling approach in this work is as follows. Two set of inputs
from two diﬀerent models; PSST2 and EMPS are used to constitute the hydro
modeling approach in this thesis. 49 aggregated hydro plants are obtained from
the PSST model and 18 aggregated EMPS areas from the EMPS model. Each
EMPS area is characterized by a reservoir capacity, water value proﬁle, and time
series for inﬂow. The 49 power plants are then distributed to the respective EMPS
areas. For example, 4 aggregated hydro plants are assigned to the EMPS area N5
in Fig. 3.8. Each hydro plant is then directly connected to a reservoir where the
reservoir capacity and inﬂow time series are sized relative to the maximum hydro
2Power System Simulation Tool (PSST) [74], is a DC optimal power ﬂow based market model,
developed by SINTEF Energy Research, that minimizes the total generation costs in the system
for each hour of the year.
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plant capacity in each EMPS area. Moreover, the reservoirs will take a water value
proﬁle of the EMPS area. A number of EMPS areas constitute a balancing area.
The hydro power modeling used in this thesis as a combination of inputs from the
PSST and EMPS models is shown in Fig. 3.3.
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(a) Aggregated hydro repre-
sentation from PSST
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(c) Hydro modeling in this thesis
Figure 3.3: Nordic hydro power modeling followed in this thesis by combining inputs
from the PSST and EMPS models
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A.2 Thermal units Thermal units based on oil, gas, and hard coal are called
regulating thermal units. These types of units are characterized by the ability to
suﬃciently ramp up or down in a short time. On the other hand, thermal units
based on nuclear and lignite coal tend to generate at their nominal operating point
and require long time to startup and are used to cover the base load, hence referred
to as base-load thermal units. Their cheaper marginal cost compared to regulating
thermal plants makes them useful for non-stop operation over extended periods. A
thermal generation unit has a certain startup cost and a generation cost which is
represented by a quadratic function. In this work, the quadratic generation cost
function is approximated by linear function (cf. Fig. 3.4). As a result, generation
cost of thermal units is represented by a constant marginal cost and an operation
dependent ﬁxed cost component. In this model, the Northern European system
incorporates a total of 340 thermal units, with 217 of them situated in the German
system.
Fixed cost
component
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dra
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ost
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rve
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Cost
Figure 3.4: Linearized generation cost representation of a thermal unit
A.3 Non-dispatchable units Units whose outputs are diﬃcult or impossible
to control fall into this category. The availability of these resources depends on the
weather conditions: such as solar radiation for PV plants, wind speed for wind farms,
non-storable inﬂow for ROR hydro plants. We might opt to decrease the output by
curtailing the production at a given time but it is not possible to obtain more
output than given by the weather conditions. These resources are characterized by
zero marginal production cost and will be prioritized in the day-ahead Merit Order
List (MOL) and will be fully utilized provided that there are no bottlenecks in the
system. Despite some reports of a possibility of wind farms to provide downward
regulation (for example in [75]), no FRR provision from these resources is considered
in this work.
B Transmission capacity
Depending on the pursued market coupling, NTC or ﬂow-based, the treatment of
the transmission capacity varies. For the NTC based formulation, the NTC between
balancing areas is used as the exchange constraint in the computations. The NTC
between balancing areas and cross-border connections for 2010, are obtained from
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the ENTSO-E website [76]. In this formulation, both HVDC and HVAC intercon-
nections are treated similarly. For the FBMC consideration, the following are the
key diﬀerences as compared to the NTC based analysis (cf. Fig. 3.6 and Fig. 3.8
for comparison):
• When applying FBMC, ﬂow on AC lines is determined by linearized power
ﬂow equations;
• As ﬂow along an HVDC corridor is controllable, it is modelled as a positive or
negative net injection;
• Aggregated transmission capacity values between balancing areas are used.
C FRR requirement in Northern Europe
The required FRR capacity in a given region is set by the respective TSO. The TSO
ensures that the required reserves are in place for their respective planning periods.
In the current market arrangement in Northern European countries, the planning
periods are diﬀerent. In this PhD work, we assume that the planning period is
the same for all the countries, with the underlying assumption of harmonized cross-
border reserve procurement rules.
Currently, all the TSOs in Northern Europe deﬁne and characterize the manual
and automatic components of FRR, FRR-M and FRR-A as shown in Table 2.2.
As a result, the required volumes, deﬁnitions, purposes, and activation of FRR-
A and FRR-M are diﬀerent. In this work, we consider the general FRR without
specifying the the automatic and manual components. The deﬁnition we follow refers
to the reserves that are activated to replace FCR and their purpose being to restore
the frequency to its nominal value and to restore the scheduled exchanges. The
upward and downward FRR requirements for 2010 in Northern European countries
is presented in Table 3.1.
3.1.2 FRR procurement and day-ahead market clearance
In this subsection, variations of the methodologies for FRR procurement and day-
ahead market clearance are discussed. The cross-dependency of transmission capac-
ity reservation, choice of sequential or implicit market clearance, and consideration
of NTC or FBMC is discussed. Table 3.2 presents the possible combinations of FRR
procurement day-ahead market clearance. It also speciﬁes which combinations are
considered in this thesis.
NTC is the present approach in the Nordic countries, and is therefore a reference for
all reservation cases. The case of No reservation can be seen as a kind of default, and
is therefore also considered for FBMC. Moreover, optimal reservation is considered
with FBMC, because it is seen as a “second best” to implicit market clearing with
optimal reservation. Implicit market clearing with FBMC is included as a potential
future market design, and compared with the sequential market clearance options.
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Table 3.1: FRR requirement for Northern European countries in 2010: NO-Norway, SE-
Sweden, DK-W-Western Denmark, DK-E-Eastern Denmark, FI-Finland, DE-Germany,
NL-Netherlands [41, 56, 77–80]
Country FRR requirement [MW]
Upward Downward
DE 2400 2045
NL 300 300
DK-W 262 262
DK-E 262 262
NO 1200 1200
SE 1220 1220
FI 865 865
Table 3.2: Possible combinations of the FRR procurement and day-ahead market clear-
ance according to market design, market coupling, and transmission reservation criteria.
The boxes with letters are considered in this thesis.
Transmission reservation NTC FBMC
Sequential No reservation U X
market clearance Fixed reservation V
Optimal reservation W Y
Implicit No reservation
market clearance Fixed reservation
Optimal reservation Z
The other options with Implicit market clearance are seen as less relevant because
ﬁxed reservation seems unnecessary combined with optimal reservation. The No
reservation case is also less relevant in this thesis where exchange of reserves is the
main focus. All the models are developed on GAMSIDE3 and employ the CPLEX
solver4.
A No and Fixed reservation of NTC for FRR exchange (U, V)
A sequential market clearance model containing FRR bidding, FRR procurement,
and day-ahead market clearance by making use of NTC based implementation,
shown in Fig. 3.5, is the core model developed. The formulation is applied to
the Northern European power system in the state of 2010, shown in Fig. 3.6. The
scope of this section refers to U and V in Table 3.2.
3http://www.gams.com/default.htm
4http://www-01.ibm.com/software/commerce/optimization/cplex-optimizer
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Figure 3.5: Sequential market clearance model with FRR bidding, FRR procurement,
and DA clearance in an NTC based implementation.
The ﬁrst block is the FRR bidding block, where the bid prices for upward and down-
ward FRR provision are estimated. The spot price forecast is the main input, and is
used as the basis for estimating a unit’s opportunity cost in the day-ahead market.
We use a three case approach to determine the bidding prices. Each case represents
a unit’s proﬁt maximizing optimization task against hourly spot price forecasts for
a planning period under a given set of conditions unique for each case. In case 1,
there is no commitment for FRR provision. In case 2, the unit provides only upward
FRR. In case 3, the unit provides both upward and downward FRR. The diﬀerence
in proﬁt a unit incurs between case 1 and case 2 as well as case 2 and case 3 represent
the unit’s cost of commitment to provide upward and downward FRR, respectively.
The length of the planning period is considered 24 hours in most of the case studies
considered. However, in publication IV, a planning period of 12 hours is addition-
ally considered for sensitivity analysis. The complete mathematical formulation and
the assumptions considered in this block are thoroughly discussed in publication I.
It is also featured as a component of the model considered in publications II, III,
IV and, VII.
The second block, called the FRR procurement block, aggregates the bidding prices
and volumes for upward and downward FRR provision provided by the units in
a Merit Order List (MOL) and selects the winning bids with the possibility of
cross-border FRR procurement. The possibility of cross-border FRR procurement
is inﬂuenced by the NTC pre-allocated for exchange and the maximum FRR volume
one can procure cross-border. Marginally selected units set the FRR price in their
respective balancing areas and all units nominated to provide FRR are assumed to
stay online for the whole planning period. The objective function is the minimiza-
tion of FRR procurement cost in a given planning period, roughly shown in (3.1).
Complete set of equations are provided in publication II.
min
∑
∀Gen
rupg c
up
g + r
dn
g c
dn
g (3.1)
The FRR procurement cost is the sum of upward and downward FRR cost where
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each cost component is given by the product of the FRR bidding price and volume.
In (3.1), r
up/dn
g represent the up/down-ward bidding volumes and c
up/dn
g stand for
the up/down-ward bidding prices of a unit g. Some of the main constraints in this
block are:
• The FRR requirement should be provided locally or imported.
• The FRR import volume should stay within the limit of the reserved trans-
mission capacity.
• No more than a third of the FRR requirement can be imported.
The underlying mathematical formulation and assumptions for this block are dis-
cussed in publication II.
The day-ahead market clearance block comes last in the sequence and gets such
inputs as, online status of units, procured volumes of upward and downward FRR,
and NTC reserved for FRR exchange, from the FRR procurement block. The ob-
jective function is to minimize the total day-ahead cost for a given planning period.
A simpliﬁed representation of the objective function is shown in (3.2).
min
∑
∀time
∑
∀Gen
Ec+ Sc+ Fc+ Cc (3.2)
The total cost is the sum of energy cost (Ec), startup cost (Sc), operation depen-
dent ﬁxed cost (Fc), and curtailment cost (Cc). The startup and ﬁxed cost are only
valid for thermal units. The main constraint in this optimization block is that the
maximum generation capacity of a unit is decreased by the upward FRR provision
and the minimum is increased by the downward FRR provision. The mathematical
formulation and assumptions for this block is discussed in publication II.
B Optimal transmission capacity reservation for FRR exchange (W, X,
Y)
As opposed to the model shown in Fig. 3.5, i.e. where a ﬁxed NTC reservation is
given exogenously, in this section the transmission capacity reservation is optimally
determined. Optimal transmission capacity reservation is assessed both with the
NTC based and ﬂow-based market coupling formulations. This section refers to W
and Y in Table 3.2 for NTC and FB optimal transmission capacity, respectively.
Moreover, X in the same table refers to FB formulation with no transmission reser-
vation, used as a reference. A generic model description for optimal transmission
capacity reservation for FRR exchange, is shown in Fig. 3.7. The ﬁrst block, bid-
ding block, is the same opportunity cost based FRR bidding price determination
discussed above. In the second block, the FRR procurement and day-ahead markets
are co-optimized for a 24 hour block to determine the optimal cross-border trans-
mission capacity reservation. The optimization is a Mixed Integer Programming
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Figure 3.7: Sequential market clearance model for optimal transmission capacity reser-
vation. ∗Aggregated PTDF values are used only for the ﬂow-based implementation. †NTC
values are used for the NTC based implementation and for the ﬂow-based approach, ag-
gregated transmission capacities are used.
(MIP) problem with an objective of minimizing the total cost resulting from the
FRR procurement and day-ahead market within the planning period (cf. (3.3)).
min
{
FRRc+
∑
∀time
DAc
}
(3.3)
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In (3.3), FRRc represents the FRR procurement cost in the planning period and
DAc stands for the hourly day-ahead cost. Some of the main constraints are the
following:
• The maximum generation capacity of a unit is decreased by the upward FRR
provision and the minimum is increased by the downward FRR provision;
• Transmission reservation can not exceed a certain percentage of the capacity;
• No more than a certain percentage of the FRR requirement can be imported.
For the values of transmission capacity, the NTC values are used in the NTC based
implementation and aggregated transmission capacities are used for the ﬂow-based
implementation. Moreover, an additional constraint shown in (3.4) is used for the
ﬂow-based implementation.
pACx,y =
∑
z
pinjz .PTDFx,y,z (3.4)
The equation relates the ﬂow along AC line x y, pACx,y , to the PTDF, PTDFx,y,z, and
nodal injection, pinjz . The parameter PTDFx,y,z refers to the fraction of ﬂow along x
y for a unit injection at z and withdrawal at the reference node. The injection at a
given node comes from the sum of generation and HVDC injections minus the load
connected. The detailed mathematical formulations and assumptions for this block
are discussed in publications III and VII for NTC and ﬂow-based implementations,
respectively.
By varying the planning period and hydro inﬂow into the system, we assess the
sensitivity to these factors of optimal transmission capacity reservation in an NTC
based setting. The planning period, the contract period for which reserves are pro-
cured, is in most study cases considered 24 hours. A variation of this consideration
is to optimally allocate transmission capacity for peak and oﬀ-peak periods of a
day (i.e. planning period is decreased to 12 hours). Moreover, by considering three
inﬂow scenarios in the Nordic system; a low, a high, and a median inﬂow scenarios,
the impact on optimal capacity reservation is studied. A complete coverage of the
sensitivity analysis and the associated ﬁndings is discussed in IV. The formulation
in publications III and IV is applied to the system in Fig. 3.6. For the ﬂow-based
approach presented in publication VII, the Northern European system in the state
of 2010 updated for a ﬂow-based implementation and shown in Fig. 3.8 is considered.
C Implicit market clearance with ﬂow-based grid constraints (Z)
In this approach, the day-ahead market is cleared with the upward and downward
FRR requirements given as constraints to the optimization problem. This approach
is denoted by F in Table 3.2. The resolution of the FRR procurement is the same
as that of the day-ahead market, 1 hour. Moreover, transmission capacity reser-
vation for FRR exchange is one of the solutions implicitly obtained from the cost
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Figure 3.8: Northern European system in 2010 for a ﬂow-based implementation.
minimization problem. Further discussions and associated results of this approach
are presented in publication VII.
3.1.3 Balancing energy market
A ﬂow-based balancing energy market formulation with a possibility of cross-border
balancing is developed. We assume that the day-ahead market clearance results
are known and a regulating unit is ready to deviate from its generation set point
in the day-ahead market, for balancing purposes, as long as there is a margin to
change its output. The methodology is adapted to address NTC based balancing
market formulation for comparison. The upward regulation bidding price from a
unit is the marginal cost of the unit and the downward regulation bidding price as
the maximum of zero and the diﬀerence between the spot price and the marginal
cost of the unit. The simpliﬁed objective function is shown in (3.5) and it minimizes
the total balancing cost, which is the sum of upward and downward regulation cost.
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min
∑
∀time
∑
∀Gen
Δpupg,tC
up
g,t +Δp
dn
g,tC
dn
g,t (3.5)
Δp
up/dn
g,t respectively refer to the change in output of the unit upward or downward
from its current generation state. Moreover, C
up/dn
g,t are the corresponding regulation
prices for upward and downward regulation of a unit at a given time, t. The following
list presents some of the main constraints in the optimization problem.
• The export/import of balancing power along a line is limited by the transmis-
sion capacity and the power exchange along the line in the day-ahead market.
• A unit regulates upward or downward in relation to its output in the day-ahead
market, maximum and minimum generation capacities.
• The incremental injection in a given node is the sum of incremental generation
and positive nodal imbalance. A positive imbalance means that the system is
long and vice versa.
The upward balancing energy exchange in a given time is deﬁned in terms of the
net nodal injection, ΔP injz , and the PTDF values, PTDFx,y,z, as shown in (3.6).
pupx,y =
∑
z
ΔP injz .PTDFx,y,z (3.6)
The model is tested on an aggregated version of the IEEE 30-bus test system,
shown in Fig. 3.9. The simplicity of the test system and suitability for detailed
analysis is the main reason for the choice. A detailed presentation and discussion of
the approach and mathematical modeling is found in publication VI. The network
aggregation methodology followed is discussed in publication V. This aggregation
methodology is also the basis for the case study considered in publication VII (cf.
Fig. 3.8).
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Figure 3.9: Single line diagram of the modiﬁed IEEE 30-bus test system [81]. The
original IEEE 30-bus test system is without wind power plants [82].
3.2 Summary of publications
In this section, a summary of the main publications is presented. Table 3.3 shows
the categorization of the publications according to the case studies considered and
the theme (reserve procurement or balancing energy market). Two systems are
considered as case studies: the Northern European power system and the IEEE
30-bus test system.
Table 3.3: Allocation of publications according to focus area and methodology
Approach Study
system
Reserve
procurement
Balancing
energy market
PTDF
aggregation
NTC based
Northern Publication I
Europe Publication II
Publication III
Publication IV
Flow-based
Northern PublicationVII
Europe
IEEE 30-bus
test system
Publication VI PublicationV
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3.2.1 Bidding in the FRR market, FRR procurement, and
cross-border transmission capacity reservation
This section gives a summary of the following publications.
I Bidding in the Frequency Restoration Reserves (FRR) market for a Hydropower
Unit, Y. Gebrekiros, G. Doorman, S. Jaehnert, and H. Farahmand, 4th IEEE/PES
Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Europe (ISGT EUROPE) conference, Copen-
hagen, Denmark, 6-9 October 2013 and
II Reserve Procurement and Transmission Capacity Reservation in the Northern
European Power Market, Y. Gebrekiros, G. Doorman, S. Jaehnert, and H. Farah-
mand, International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems (IJEPES), vol.
67, pp. 546–559, May 2015.
In publication II, the core modelling for the NTC based FRR bidding price
determination, FRR procurement with cross-border exchange possibility,
and integrated day-ahead market clearance is presented. Publication I
focuses on the bidding price determination for FRR provision of a hy-
dropower unit. It is essentially an in-depth study of the ﬁrst block of the
model considered in publication II.
Publication I:
The expected opportunity cost in the day-ahead market for a given period is used
to determine the bidding prices for FRR provision for a hydro unit. For a given
planning period, the following assumptions are made in the formulation. A unit
makes a proﬁt of B1 without any commitment to provide FRR; a proﬁt of B2 by
only committing to provide upward FRR; and a proﬁt of B3 when it provides both
upward and downward FRR. Due to the increasing constrains, the following rela-
tion holds: B3 ≤ B2 ≤ B1. As a result, B1 − B2 and B2 − B3 represents the cost
of upward and downward reserve provision respectively. Dividing the changes in
proﬁt with the respective volume of FRR gives the bidding prices. The maximum
bidding volume for the unit is taken to be 20 % of the maximum generation capacity.
Taking a typical hydropower unit in Southern Norway as a case study, the following
main results are obtained (cf. Fig. 3.10)
• When average spot price is higher than the water value, a unit tends to operate
at maximum. However, if it has to provide upward FRR, then the reduction
in proﬁt in the day-ahead market should be compensated by higher upward
FRR bidding price.
• When the water value is higher than the spot price forecast, a unit does not
normally run. But, if it should operate and provide downward FRR, then the
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loss should be evened out by higher downward FRR price.
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Figure 3.10: Upward and Downward FRR bidding price versus water values and average
spot price forecasts for a hydropower unit
Publication II:
In this paper, the detailed mathematical formulation that resembles the current
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market clearance sequence in Northern Europe and consisting of the three consecu-
tive optimization blocks is presented and applied to a case study.
The ﬁrst block is an MIP optimization problem where, for a given period, reserve
providing units determine their FRR bidding prices. This block is extensively dis-
cussed in publication I. The second block, FRR procurement block, is a Linear
Programming (LP) optimization problem that takes bidding prices and volume of-
fers from the ﬁrst block and selects the winning bids from the merit order list with
a possibility of cross-border FRR exchange. Transmission capacity reservation for
FRR exchange for 0 %, 2 %, 5 %, 7 %, 10 %, 15 %, 20 %, 25 %, 30 %, and 35 %
of the NTC on all corridors are considered for the analysis. By considering that (a)
the units with winning bids from the second block stay online for the period they
are contracted for, (b) the NTC value for the day-ahead period is reduced with the
capacity reserved for FRR exchange, and (c) the input from all units participating
in the day-ahead market (MC, startup costs, ﬁxed costs, generation limits, etc) is
provided, the third block is cleared. This block solves a MIP problem by minimizing
the total day-ahead costs.
The main results from this work as applied to the Northern European system with
the topology and inputs of 2010 are:
• Transmission capacity reservation for FRR exchange can reduce the total cost
compared to no reservation case. For the considered system, the lowest total
cost is registered at an NTC reservation of 20 %.
• The FRR procurement costs decrease with increase in reserved capacity as a
result of procuring cheaper FRR cross-border.
• The day-ahead cost decreases for small shares of NTC reservation and is the
lowest for 5 % NTC reservation (cf. Fig. 3.11). The explanation for this
is that, for small value of reservation, procuring FRR from another system
reduces the need to keep FRR in the expensive system, which increases the
ﬂexibility and reducing the day-ahead cost. In other words, it avoids the
possibility that an expensive unit is only running to provide FRR; which in
turn creates a must run condition in the day-ahead market for the whole
planning period.
• Given the possibility of cross-border FRR procurement, more upward FRR is
procured from Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands compared to their re-
quirement. On the other hand, Germany becomes a major importer. The
results are valid under the assumptions made and may not be a general con-
clusion.
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Figure 3.11: Annual procurement costs vs. transmission capacity reservation for FRR
exchange
3.2.2 NTC based optimal cross-border capacity reservation
using a sequential market clearance setting
This section provides a summary of publications III and IV.
III Optimal Transmission Capacity Allocation for Cross-border Exchange of Fre-
quency Restoration Reserves (FRR), Y. Gebrekiros and G. Doorman, 18th Power
Systems Computation Conference, Wroclaw, Poland, 18-22 August 2014 and
IV Sensitivity Analysis of Optimal Transmission Capacity Reservation for Cross-
border Exchange of Reserve Capacity in Northern Europe, Y. Gebrekiros, S. Jaehn-
ert, and G. Doorman, 11th International Conference on the European Energy Market
(EEM), Krakow, Poland, 28-30 May 2014.
The mathematical formulation to optimally allocate transmission capac-
ity for FRR exchange using an NTC based implementation is laid out
in publication III. The formulation is applied to the 2010 Northern Eu-
ropean power system. Without altering the mathematical premise, the
impact of changing the planning period and the hydro inﬂow is addressed
in publication IV.
Publication III:
An NTC based two block optimization problem using the sequential market clear-
ance in Northern Europe is solved to optimally allocate transmission capacity for
cross-border FRR exchange.
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The ﬁrst block is the FRR bidding price formulation (explained in publications I and
II). The second block gets the FRR bidding price and volume oﬀers from the ﬁrst
block and inputs needed in the day-ahead market. It then solves an MIP problem to
obtain the optimal transmission capacity reservation by minimizing the day-ahead
and FRR procurement costs for a given planing period. The planning period for
the FRR procurement is 24 hours and the resolution of the DA market is 1 hour.
For reliability purposes, 2
3
of the FRR requirement is procured locally, and no more
than 30 % of the NTC can be reserved for FRR exchange.
By considering the Northern European system of 2010 topology and inputs, the
results of the optimal transmission capacity reservation are discussed in light of a
base case where no transmission capacity reservation is possible.
• With optimal transmission capacity reservation, a reduction of EUR 26.1 mil-
lion (≈ 8 %) in FRR procurement and EUR 53 million in total costs is obtained
compared to the base case.
• Because of the multiple balancing area interactions, transmission reservation
restrictions, and FRR procurement limits, the transmission capacity reserva-
tion is characterized by upper and lower bounds.
• Transmission capacity reservation along the Nordic-German and Nordic-Dutch
systems is signiﬁcantly lower in periods with reduced hydro availability, in the
simulations before the start of the snow meting season. This increases the
spot prices and consequently the opportunity costs for upward FRR provision,
lowering the reservation of transmission capacity.
• Compared to national requirement, more upward FRR is procured from Nor-
way, Sweden, and Netherlands. The excess is then exported to Germany,
Denmark, and Finland, inline with the observation in publication II.
Publication IV:
Following the same mathematical framework as in publication III, this paper anal-
yses the sensitivity of the results for changes in inﬂow scenarios and the length of
the planning period.
This work considers the same system and inputs as in publication III. To assess the
impacts of inﬂow variation on total system cost, optimal transmission reservation,
and country wise FRR procurement, three inﬂow scenarios in the Nordic system
are considered. These are, the dry year, a year with the lowest inﬂow; the wet
year, a year with the highest inﬂow; and the median year, a year with median
inﬂow. Moreover, to assess the impact of planning period duration on the mentioned
parameters, a shorter planning period of 12 hours (with peak and oﬀ-peak periods
of a day) is considered. The main ﬁndings are:
• Reduction of the planning period to 12 hours, with peak and oﬀ-peak daily
periods, provides more ﬂexibility to the system. For the median inﬂow, this
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results in about EUR 236 million (≈ 1 %) reduction in total cost compared to
when the planning period is 24 hours.
• The upward FRR procurement costs are the highest for the wet year compared
to the medium and dry year scenarios. In this scenario, the reservoir levels are
relatively higher at any given time making the water value comparatively lower.
Hence, the unit is better oﬀ generating in the day-ahead market than standing
by to provide upward FRR. This makes the upward bidding prices during the
wet year scenario relatively high, thus resulting in the highest upward FRR
procurement costs.
• The trend of per country FRR procurement is neither aﬀected with the in-
ﬂow variation nor with the change in planning period. More upward reserves
are procured from Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands compared to their
requirement for all cases.
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3.2.3 Assessment of PTDF based power system aggregation
This section summarizes publication V. This is slightly out of the main theme of the
thesis, but it is presented here as it is the basis for the PTDF aggregation approach
followed in publications VI and VII.
V Assessment of PTDF Based Power System Aggregation Schemes, Y. Gebrekiros,
G. Doorman, A. Helseth, and T. Preda, 2015 Electrical Power and Energy Confer-
ence (EPEC), London, ON, Canada, October 26-28, 2015.
In this work, three diﬀerent PTDF aggregation schemes are compared.
The performance of the aggregation schemes is analyzed by considering
the power generation, inter-zonal ﬂows, and total system costs in relation
to the nodal representation of the IEEE 30-bus test system.
Out of necessity or data limitation, aggregated power system representation is re-
quired. In PTDF based power system aggregation, nodal PTDFs are aggregated
into zonal PTDFs that give similar inter-zonal ﬂows. The nodal PTDF values are
determined from line reactances and aggregation to zonal PTDFs is done using three
schemes. The ﬁrst scheme assigns equal weighting factors for each node in a zone
(pro rata); the second and third schemes assign nodal weights from relative nodal
net injections and nodal generations respectively.
The main results after running a DCOPF on the system, performed by considering
two scenarios is presented as follows.
1. With perfect foresight of nodal generation and injections
This is considered as a benchmark and analysis is done on the IEEE 30-bus
test system.
• As expected, the aggregation scheme using relative nodal injection in a
given zone gives exact results as the nodal system.
• The aggregation scheme that is based on nodal generations only works if
there is generation in every zone. This is not the case in one zone of the
test system; thus, this scheme is not tested.
2. Under uncertainty due to wind and load forecasting errors
Analysis is done on a modiﬁed version of the IEEE 30-bus test system which
includes wind generation. In real systems, knowledge of the nodal injections
ex-ante is limited, which instead must be forecasted.
• Under uncertainty, the two other PTDF aggregation schemes give better
system representation compared to the pro rata scheme. However, the
pro rata scheme might have some comparative advantages over the other
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schemes in the following ways:
– Unlike the other two schemes, it allows the predetermination of the
zonal PTDFs.
– Always numerically stable unlike the other two which can face insta-
bilities (division by zero) if the sum of net injections or net generation
in any given zone is zero.
• By introducing an oﬀset to correct deviations, the aggregation based on
nodal generation gives the lowest inter-zonal ﬂow errors.
• The choice of a PTDF aggregation scheme depends on the quality of the
forecasts, simplicity of the PTDF aggregation, numerical stability of the
aggregation method, and desired accuracy of the results.
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3.2.4 Flow-based optimal transmission capacity allocation
for FRR exchange
This section summarizes the following publication.
VII Flow-Based Optimal Transmission Capacity Allocation for Cross-border Re-
serves Exchange, Y. Gebrekiros, S. Jaehnert, and G. Doorman, Submitted to IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems.
This work discusses ﬂow-based optimal transmission capacity reservation
following a sequential market clearance for FRR exchange in the Northern
European power system. It compares sequential market clearance with an
implicit market clearance option. The detailed mathematical modeling
is presented and an additional assessment of sequential market clearance
with no transmission capacity reservation is carried out.
In this publication, the following cases are analysed.
1. Sequential market clearance without cross-border transmission capacity reser-
vation.
In this case, as there is no transmission capacity reserved, there is no possibility of
cross-border FRR procurement.
2. Sequential market clearance with optimal cross-border transmission capacity
reservation.
The mathematical description of the ﬂow-based optimal transmission capacity allo-
cation for cross-border FRR exchange uses a model with two optimization blocks.
The ﬁrst block is the bidding block (cf. publication I), where as the second block
determines the optimal transmission capacity reservation by optimizing the FRR
procurement and day-ahead costs considering the grid constraints.
3. Implicit market clearance with a possibility of cross-border FRR exchange.
The implicit market clearance option considered here has a resolution of 1 hour; i.e.
FRR procurement and transmission capacity reservation are done on an hourly basis.
By still considering the 2010 Northern European system as a case study, the main
results from the paper are presented below.
• Compared to the base case (no transmission capacity reservation), the se-
quential market clearance with optimal transmission reservation option gives
a saving of EUR 19 million. The implicit market clearance option, on the other
hand, gives EUR 413 million saving compared to the base case. The signiﬁcant
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total cost reduction results from the attributes of implicit market clearance;
being an eﬃcient market design option and the short planning period of FRR
provision.
• Duration curves of annual optimal transmission capacity reservation for the
sequential and implicit market options show a number plateaus as a result of
the multiple balancing area interactions, transmission reservation restrictions,
and FRR procurement limits considered in the study. See, for example, the
transmission capacity reservation on Skagerrak HVDC cable in Fig. 3.12.
• In the implicit market clearance option, the planning period being 1 hour,
there could be a number of hours where no transmission is reserved in a given
day. As a result of this ﬂexibility, the percentage duration where no trans-
mission capacity is reserved is longer compared to the sequential option on all
interconnections.
100 200 300
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30
 Optimal Reservation (hour)
1500 4000 7000
10
20
30
Implicit Clearance (hour)
Figure 3.12: Sorted optimal transmission capacity reservation for sequential market
clearance (green line) and implicit market clearance (blue dotted line) for Skagerrak HVDC
cable [% of max. capacity].
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3.2.5 Flow-based balancing energy market integration
This section presents a summing up of the publication below.
VI Balancing Energy Market Integration Considering Grid Constraints, Y. Ge-
brekiros, G. Doorman, S. Jaehnert, and H. Farahmand, PowerTech conference, Eind-
hoven, Netherlands, 29 June-2 July, 2015.
This work provides the mathematical modelling of balancing energy mar-
ket integration using a ﬂow-based and NTC based implementations. The
impact of cross-border exchange of balancing energy is studied on an IEEE
30-bus test system. It assumes that the day-ahead market has already
been cleared and the results are known.
Each unit determines its upward and downward balancing energy bid prices as a
function of its marginal cost and the spot price. The TSO then selects the bids from
the merit order list based on the real-time system imbalances. Both the ﬂow-based
and NTC based implementations adhere to these notions except that power ﬂow
constraints and NTC restrictions are considered for the ﬁrst and latter respectively.
The NTC values are estimated from the transmission capacities iteratively, as in
Fig. 3.13. A modiﬁed IEEE 30-bus test system, aggregated into 5 zones and incor-
porating large scale wind integration is considered for the study. The imbalances
are generated from load and wind forecast errors.
Solve transport model with 
the NTC restriction
NTC = 100 % of transmission 
capacity
Run DCPF without 
transmission constraints
Constraint
violations?
Finish
Reduce NTC 
values
Yes
No
Figure 3.13: Flowchart for NTC calculation
The main results of this work are presented below.
• In both arrangements (NTC and ﬂow-based), the balancing energy costs are
reduced when there is inter-zonal exchange of balancing energy. The decrease
in balancing costs is a result of the netting of imbalances and the use of cheaper
balancing energy from neighbouring zones.
• For both arrangements, a signiﬁcant decrease of about 50 % in average imbal-
ances is obtained as a result of allowing inter-zonal balancing energy exchange.
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Since the considered test system is small, with little meshing and no inter-zonal
congestions, the net imbalances for both arrangements are identical.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions
In this PhD work, balancing market integration in the European power system is
studied. This work contributes to the research topic by developing models for re-
serve procurement and balancing energy markets. These models are applied to case
studies of the Northern European power system and the IEEE 30-bus test systems.
This work has two main contributions. The ﬁrst is the development and detailed
interdependence among reserve procurement, day-ahead market clearance, and bal-
ancing energy market. This is done by making use of two separate models where the
ﬁrst one incorporates unit based bidding price determination for reserve provision,
reserve procurement with a possibility of cross-border exchange, and day-ahead mar-
ket clearance. The second one deals with balancing energy market formulation by
taking the results of the day-ahead market clearance into account. The other main
contribution is the modeling approach that uses a setting similar to the current se-
quential market clearance order in Northern Europe, where previous research often
used an integrated or implicit design. The models are used to analyze the impact
of balancing market integration in the current electricity market settings and allow
the comparison of two fundamentally diﬀerent market designs.
The European electricity market, and the day-ahead market speciﬁcally, has been
subjected to integration eﬀorts with the long-term goal of establishing a Pan-European
electricity market. An integrated market is expected to increase the overall eﬃ-
ciency, competition, security of supply, and social welfare. Similarly, the integration
of balancing markets, although in a much smaller economic scale compared to the
day-ahead market, is also expected to give a socio-economic beneﬁt. The reason is
that, common balancing market oﬀers economic beneﬁt in the form of sharing of bal-
ancing resources, reduced activation costs through the use of the cheapest available
units, and the reduction of required balancing actions by evening out the activation
of counteracting balancing actions in adjacent areas. However, for the realization of
fully integrated balancing market, at least some market design elements have to be
harmonized ﬁrst. The existence of such regulatory arrangements is taken as a main
assumption in the mathematical formulations and the associated results in this work.
To assess the impact of balancing market integration, two main optimization models
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have been developed: one addressing cross-border reserve procurement and another
dealing with balancing energy market integration. The main modeling blocks are
summarized as follows:
• Reserve bidding price determination - By making use of spot price forecasts,
the bidding prices for the provision of upward and downward reserves are
determined on the basis of the opportunity cost for the units in the day-ahead
market.
• Reserve procurement market - The bidding prices for reserve provision pro-
vided by the units are aggregated in a system wide common merit order list
and bids that result in the least reserve procurement cost are selected. Units
selected to provide reserves must stay online for the whole period the reserves
are contracted for. The reserve procurement incorporates diﬀerent options for
the allocation of cross-border transmission capacity.
• Day-ahead market clearance - Taking the online status of reserve providing
units, and procured volume of upward and downward FRR from the reserve
procurement phase, system wide day-ahead market is cleared with the objec-
tive of minimizing the total day-ahead costs.
• Balancing energy market - Based on the results of the day-ahead market clear-
ance, a regulating unit is ready to change its generation for balancing purposes
as long as there is a margin to change its output. For a given generation unit,
the deviation from its day-ahead set-point results in a regulation cost. This
is used as a basis to determine the bidding price for upward and downward
regulation of the unit.
With some modiﬁcation and rearrangement of the blocks speciﬁed above, a method-
ology to optimally allocate cross-border transmission capacity using a framework
based on Net Transfer Capacities (NTC) is also developed. On the basis of the
ongoing developments towards ﬂow-based market coupling (FBMC) in Europe, an
alternative formulation based on this approach is ﬁnally developed to compare the
results with the NTC based formulation.
4.1 Main results
The main ﬁndings of this thesis grouped in their respective focus areas are the fol-
lowing:
4.1.1 NTC based sequential market clearance
The eﬀect of reserving NTC capacity for FRR exchange is analyzed by allocating
equal percentages of NTC on all corridors for a whole year. As expected, the FRR
procurement costs decrease with an increase in reserved transmission capacity if
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there is access to cheaper FRR cross-border. Naturally, this is in general counter-
acted by a cost increase in the day-ahead market. However, it appears that for small
shares of reserved transmission capacity (in this particular study, up to 5 %), the
day-ahead costs also decrease, resulting in a win-win situation. The explanation for
this result is that, the possibility to import some FRR cross-border and reducing
the local FRR provision correspondingly, increases the ﬂexibility of the generation
system in the “expensive” area. This leads to a cost reduction in the day-ahead
market. Thus, transmission capacity reservation for FRR exchange can reduce the
total cost in relevant cases.
With the possibility of cross-border FRR procurement, more upward FRR is pro-
cured from Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands. On the other hand, Germany
imports some of its FRR requirement. The cheaper, hydro based, FRR provision
from Norway and Sweden makes them provide more upward FRR compared to their
requirements. On the other hand, thermal generation dominated Netherlands has
lower FRR requirement per peak load compared to Germany, making the Nether-
lands a net exporter of upward FRR.
4.1.2 NTC based optimal transmission capacity reservation
Allocating a ﬁxed share of NTC for FRR exchange over a long period of time is not
expected to give the best result for several reasons. First, the NTC allocation might
only be necessary in some periods of time but not in others. Secondly, transmission
capacity reservation for FRR exchange might be very important in some corridors
where as other corridors might be better oﬀ using the whole NTC for energy ex-
change. As a result, an allocation approach that is speciﬁc both in time period and
cross-border corridor is expected to give better results. Hence, by using an NTC
based methodology to optimally allocate transmission capacity for FRR exchange
with a planning period of 24 hours, a reduction of EUR 26 million (≈ 8 %) in FRR
procurement and EUR 53 million in total costs is obtained compared to the base
case of no reservation. This result conﬁrms the ﬁnding in the previous section: op-
timal reservation of NTC for FRR can reduce both FRR procurement costs and
day-ahead costs simultaneously.
Transmission capacity reservation along the Nordic-German and Nordic-Dutch cor-
ridors is signiﬁcantly lower in periods with low hydro availability. In these periods,
the spot prices increase, which increase the opportunity costs for upward FRR pro-
vision, reducing the proﬁtability of reserving transmission capacity.
An important market design feature is the length of the period that reserve capac-
ity is procured. In general, longer periods are expected to increase costs, as they
force units to stay running through periods where the price is too low, or restrict
units from generating at their maximum when prices are high. In most cases of the
present work, a reservation period of 24 hours has been used. For the model with
NTC based optimal transmission capacity reservation, a sensitivity analysis using a
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12 hours reservation period showed very signiﬁcant cost reductions. This conﬁrms
the expectations, and underlines the importance of short reservation periods for re-
serve procurement.
The wet year scenario results in the highest upward FRR procurement cost compared
to the medium and dry year scenarios. At any given time, the reservoir levels are
the highest for the wet year lowering the water value. Hence, a unit is better oﬀ
generating in the day-ahead market than standing by to provide upward FRR. This
results in the highest upward FRR bidding prices for the wet year scenario, which
subsequently increase the upward FRR procurement costs. On the other hand, the
total cost is the lowest for the wet year scenario and the highest for the dry year
scenario.
4.1.3 Flow-based optimal transmission capacity reservation
The implicit market clearance option, where the reserve requirement is implicitly
considered as a constraint in the day-ahead market clearance should, from a theo-
retical point of view, be a more eﬃcient market clearance option than the sequential
market clearance with optimal transmission capacity reservation. This is because,
primarily, of the ﬂexibility due to short reserve procurement period, 1 hour in this
work, compared to the 24 hours in the sequential market clearance. Secondly, the
day-ahead market clearance in the sequential market clearance option is constrained
by the decisions made in the reserve procurement phase. For instance, a unit se-
lected to provide reserve creates a must-run condition in the day-ahead market for
that planning period. This assumption is conﬁrmed by the simulations, where the
sequential market clearance with optimal reservation results in a saving of EUR 19
million. The implicit market clearance, on the other hand, gives a saving of EUR
413 million both compared to the case with no transmission capacity reservation.
The short planning period of the implicit market clearance, i.e. 1 hour, avoids the
need for reservation of transmission capacity during some periods in a given day. As
a result, in the implicit market clearance, there is a possibility where no transmission
capacity is reserved in some hours of a given day. Thus, in all interconnections, the
percentage duration where there is no transmission capacity reservation is longer in
the implicit market clearance compared to the sequential option.
4.1.4 Balancing energy market integration
A possibility of cross-border balancing energy exchange lowers the the balancing
costs compared to local balancing. This is because, ﬁrstly, the net imbalances are
lower than the total imbalances because of cancelation of opposing imbalances with
the neighbouring zones. Secondly, with cross-border balancing energy exchange,
there is a possibility of utilizing cheaper balancing resources from neighbouring
zones. By making use of the IEEE 30-bus test system as a case study, and using
both NTC and ﬂow-based cross-border balancing market implementations, we ﬁnd
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a signiﬁcant decrease in balancing energy costs.
In general, ﬂow-based market coupling approach utilizes transmission capacity bet-
ter compared to an NTC based approach, which can improve the relative eﬃciency
of ﬂow-based market coupling. In this case study, ﬂow-based integrated balancing
energy market clearance results in about 20 % lower balancing cost compared to the
NTC based.
4.2 Recommendations for future work
This PhD work dealt with the modelling and analysis of balancing market integra-
tion in Northern Europe. The following is a discussion of some aspects where this
work can be extended.
The case study considered in most of the publications is the Northern European
system in the state of 2010. In the near future, the Northern European system is
expected to be more interconnected compared to its status now (the possible realiza-
tion of the North Sea oﬀshore grid is one example). Besides, the Northern European
system will integrate more wind (both oﬀshore and onshore) and solar power gener-
ation into the network. These two factors are very important for balancing market
integration: 1) The limited predictability and controllability of RES integration is
an important issue in balancing given that the proportion of RES in the power mix
increases. 2) The increasing interconnections increase the interactions and sharing
of resources between systems, highlighting the signiﬁcance of transmission reserva-
tion for reserves exchange. As a result, consideration of more case studies referring
to the future states of the Northern European system are important.
In European power markets, an intra-day market typically exists between the day-
ahead market and balancing energy activation. Getting close to the actual time of
energy delivery, the system understanding increases and the accuracy of the fore-
casts get better. Thus, the portfolio adjustments in the intra-day market, relieve the
burden in the balancing energy market by reducing the imbalances. Hence, when
designing a sequential market model that follows the actual order in practice, every
market component should be considered. As a result of the change in inputs (im-
balances, and generator operating set points), the results associated with balancing
energy market might be diﬀerent. Hence, future work should incorporate the intra-
day market as a part of the sequential market clearance model.
According to the current ENTSO-E classiﬁcation of reserves, manual and automatic
components of FRR (FRR-A and FRR-M) are identiﬁed. In this work, we only
considered general FRR. It would therefore, be important that future work makes
a distinction of FRR-A and FRR-M and their interactions.
In this work, the FRR bidding prices are determined in relation to the opportunity
cost the unit could incur in the day-ahead market. Thus, the impact of activation
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in the balancing energy market is not taken into account in the estimation of FRR
bidding prices. Consequently, FRR bidding prices might be slightly over estimated.
Hence, future work could account for the activation in the balancing energy market
when estimating the FRR bidding prices.
In a deregulated power system, a producer might own a number of generation plants.
In this work, the general assumption taken is that each unit has a separate owner,
thus the FRR bidding prices are estimated for individual units. As FRR provision
leads to a must-run condition for the whole FRR procurement period, this reduces
the unit’s ﬂexibility in the day-ahead market rising the FRR bidding prices. With
multiple units, on the other hand, a producer gets more ﬂexibility, thus lowering the
FRR bidding prices. Further work should, therefore, consider portfolio bidding for
FRR provision.
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This paper provides the modeling approach and the associated results of determination of bidding prices
for frequency restoration reserves (FRR) provision, and implications of cross-border transmission capac-
ity reservation for FRR exchange. A model with three optimization blocks is developed. The FRR bidding
price determination block uses an opportunity cost based approach to calculate the cost of providing FRR.
For the FRR procurement, the transmission system operator (TSO) selects the cheapest bids with the pos-
sibility of cross-border exchange if transmission capacity is reserved for this purpose. In the day-ahead
procurement block, optimal unit commitment and dispatch is determined, taking into account the
reserve and transmission capacity allocations.
A case study is done for the Northern European power system, consisting of the Nordic countries, Ger-
many and the Netherlands. The results show how, among others, the FRR bidding prices are determined
by the difference between the daily averaged sport price forecasts and the units’ marginal costs. The day-
ahead and total reserve procurement costs are positively and negatively correlated to the system load
respectively. As could be expected, costs are reduced in the FRR market when transmission capacity is
reserved for this purpose. But a decrease in cost in the day-ahead market was also obtained for small
transmission capacity reservations, caused by the increased ﬂexibility in the FRR importing market.
The total costs are the lowest for a transmission capacity reservation level of around 20%, illustrating that
such reservation can be beneﬁcial.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
An increasing share of the generation mix in the European
power system is covered by non-dispatchable renewable energy
sources (RES); predominantly wind and solar. The share is
expected to rise even more in the following years. In 2012, in the
German system, RES contributed 25% of the energy demand and
the installed wind and photovoltaic (pv) capacity amounted to
31 GW each [1,2]. Besides, the European Wind Energy Association
(EWEA) targets 230 GW of wind power capacity in Europe by 2020
[3]. On the one hand, the integration of RES is an important step in
relieving the dependence on fossil fuel based power generation.
The massive penetration of these resources, on the other hand, is
not with out challenges. RES are generally intermittent and charac-
terized by limited predictability and controllability. Several studies
show that these characteristics call for more operating reserves
with fast response, to secure the system balance [4–6].
In addition to the increasing RES integration, more interconnec-
tors are linking European countries and in the coming decade, sev-
eral new ones are expected to be commissioned [3]. At the same
time, signiﬁcant progress has been observed in the progress
towards a pan European electricity market. An initiative launched
in 2010, the Central Western European (CWE) coupling, which cov-
ers Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg, cre-
ates a single platform for day-ahead electricity trading [7].
Following this, Interim Tight Volume Coupling (ITVC) resulted in
increased efﬁciency of the European power system by coupling
the day-ahead market of the CWE region, with the Nordic market.
Meeus et al. [8] discuss in detail the regional successes of electric-
ity market integration initiatives in Europe.
To keep the system frequency at the nominal operating value,
the instantaneous balance between demand and supply should
be met. For economic reasons, it is fairly impossible to store elec-
tricity in a large scale. Hence, there is a need for reserve capacity
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2014.12.042
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in the system to counteract imbalances. The European Network of
Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E), deﬁnes
three types of operating reserves1 [9,10].
 Frequency containment reserves (FCR) – operating reserves
deployed between 2 and 20 s to counteract frequency change
due to sudden imbalance in the system. These reserves are also
known as primary control reserves in the Central European sys-
tem and frequency controlled normal and disturbance reserves
in the Nordic system [11].
 Frequency restoration reserves (FRR) – operating reserves acti-
vated to restore the system frequency to nominal value and
which are deployed to replace the FCR. These reserves are acti-
vated between 30 s and 15 min. In the Nordic system, they are
called fast active disturbance reserves (FADR) and have until
recently been manually activated. In the Central European sys-
tem these types of reserves are automatically deployed and are
called secondary reserves.
 Replacement reserves (RR) – these reserves are used to release
already activated FCR and FRR. They are manually activated and
called tertiary reserves in the Central European system but are
not used in the Nordic system.
Given the progress towards a common day-ahead market in
Europe, a natural next step would be the integration of the reserve
procurement and balancing markets in Europe. A notable progress
Nomenclature
Sets
A set of balancing areas
T set of time periods
R set of balancing regions
C set of planning periods
H;Ha set of hydro units, hydro units in area a respectively
G;GR;GB;Ga set of thermal, regulating thermal, base load ther-
mal, and thermal units in area a respectively
X set of reservoir segments
Ar set of balancing areas in balancing region r
Indices
a; b balancing area
r; s balancing region
s planning period
t time period within s
g thermal unit
h hydro unit
x reservoir segment
Parameters
Pa;g ; Pa;g maximum and minimum generation capacity of
thermal unit g in area a (MW)
Pa;h; Pa;h maximum and minimum generation capacity of
hydro unit h in area a (MW)
Psa;s;t solar power capacity in area a at t (MW h)
Pwa;s;t wind power capacity in area a at t (MW h)
PLa;s;t load level in area a at t (MW h)
MCa;g marginal cost thermal unit g in area a (EUR/MW h)
WVa;h;x;s water value of a hydro reservoir of h in area a for a
reservoir segment x at s (EUR/MW h)
SPa;s;t spot price forecast of area a at t within planning
period s (EUR/MW h)
SCa;g startup cost of thermal unit g in area a (EUR)
FCa;g ﬁxed cost of thermal unit g in area a when running
(EUR)
VLL rationing cost (EUR/MW h)
La;h maximum reservoir level of hydro reservoir associ-
ated with unit h in area a (MW h/h)
Qsta;h;s storable inﬂow to reservoir associated with h in
area a within planning period s (MW h/h)
Qnsa;h;s non-storable inﬂow to reservoir associated with h
in area a within planning period s (MW h/h)
R"a;g ;R
#
a;g maximum upward and downward FRR capacity
offer from thermal unit g in area a (MW)
R"a;h;R
#
a;h maximum upward and downward FRR capacity
offer from hydro unit h in area a (MW)
c"a;g;s; c
#
a;g;s upward and downward FRR bidding price of ther-
mal unit g in area a for planning period s (EUR/
MW)
c"a;h;s; c
#
a;h;s upward and downward FRR bidding price of hydro
unit h in area a for planning period s (EUR/MW)
Rr"a;s;Rr
#
a;s upward and downward FRR required in area a for
planning period s (MW)
NTCAa;b NTC between balancing areas a and b (MW)
NTCRr;s NTC between balancing regions r and s (MW)
K reserve contribution factor from a thermal/hydro unit
Z share of NTC between balancing regions set aside
for reserve exchange
Y"=# share of upward and downward FRR requirement
that must be procured from own balancing region
Variables
da;g;s;t online status of thermal unit g in area a at t;2 f0;1g
ua;g;s;t =1 if thermal unit g in area a is started up at t;¼ 0
otherwise
pa;g;s;t output of each thermal unit g in area a at
t (MW h/h)
r"a;g;s; r
#
a;g;s procured upward and downward FRR from thermal
unit g in area a for planning period s (MW)
r"a;h;s; r
#
a;h;s procured upward and downward FRR from hydro
unit h in area a for planning period s (MW)
rp"a;s; rp
#s
a upward and downward FRR capacity procured in
area a in s (MW)
trA"a;b;s; trA
#
a;b;s upward and downward FRR exchange from area a
to b for planning period s (positive is export) (MW)
trR"r;s;s; trR
#
r;s;s upward and downward FRR exchange from region r
to s for planning period s (positive is export) (MW)
pa;h;s;t output of each hydro unit h in area a at t (MW h/h)
psta;h;s;t component of the hydro output of unit h in area a
at t from the storable inﬂow (MW h/h)
pnsa;h;s;t component of the hydro output of unit h in area a
at t from the non-storable inﬂow (MW h/h)
psa;s;t solar power output in area a at t (MW h/h)
pwa;s;t wind power output in area a at t (MW h/h)
pcura;s;t load curtailed in area a at t (MW h/h)
La;h;s level of reservoir associated with unit h in area a at
the end of planning period s (MW h)
Ofa;h;s spillage (overﬂow) from reservoir associated with h
in area a in planning period s (MW h/h)
epAa;b;s;t energy exchange from area a to b at t (positive is
export from a) (MW h/h)
epRr;s;s;t energy exchange from region r to region s at
t (positive is export from a) (MW h/h)
1 The deﬁnitions are rather speciﬁc for the European power systems, and
comparison with practices in the US is difﬁcult due to quite different market
solutions.
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was made by the Grid Control Cooperation (GCC),2 where by March
2010 four of the German TSOs established a common platform for
reserve procurement and real-time balancing [12]. As of 2012 GCC
expanded to the surrounding control areas forming International
Grid Control Cooperation (IGCC), where the respective TSOs of Den-
mark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Czech Republic, and Belgium are
the members. IGCC is an inter-TSO cooperation aimed to prevent
counteracting FRR activation in different control blocks by real-time
netting of imbalances using the remaining available transmission
capacity (ATC) [13]. Currently, reserve procurement in the IGCC
members outside Germany is done separately. Similarly, in the Nor-
dic system, a common regulating power market has been in place
since 2002. The reserve procurement, however, is done separately
by each of the Nordic TSOs [14].
In this work, we will investigate the impact of a common
market for FRR procurement in the Northern European countries
(Nordic countries + Germany and the Netherlands). A common
reserve market offers economic beneﬁt by increasing the sharing
of balancing resources within the region and the reduction of
required balancing actions by centralized activation of shared
reserves [9]. The relatively cheaper and ﬂexible Nordic hydro
resources, with big reservoirs and good ramping ability, could play
a pivotal role as a source of balancing services in this region.
Although many research works have asserted this idea
[15–18,12,19], the modeling approaches they follow are different
from the existing electricity markets. Earlier work [18], considered
an integrated day-ahead and reserve procurement market clear-
ance for future scenarios. This results in optimal allocation of
energy and reserves as well as implicit transmission capacity allo-
cation for reserves exchange. In the current Northern European
power markets, however, reserves are contracted for a given period
of time and cleared before the day-ahead market, based on the
winning bids. Besides, there is no cross-border reserve3 procure-
ment. We model similar to the reserve procurement approach in cur-
rent practices and apply it to the Northern European system. The
results are compared for different shares of transmission capacity
reservation between balancing regions for reserve exchange. The
model is based on hourly spot price forecasts to determine the
reserve bids, and reserves are procured before the day-ahead market
clearance.
The paper is structured in the following order. First, the model
is described in Section 3 by presenting the mathematical formula-
tions. Then, the input parameters to the model and the underlying
consideration are discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, the case
study considered for this work is discussed and the modeling is
veriﬁed with a set of benchmark results. Finally, the ﬁndings of this
work are discussed and concluding remarks presented in Sections
6 and 7 respectively.
Model description
A multi-region FRR procurement model is developed and
applied to the Northern European countries and an analysis is
conducted with respect to the impact of transmission capacity res-
ervation between balancing regions for FRR exchange. We consider
that there is a common day-ahead market in the system under con-
sideration, i.e. exchange of energy between balancing regions is
possible if there is available transmission capacity. A balancing area
represents a geographical area whose production–consumption
balance is taken care of by a transmission system operator. A
balancing region, on the other hand, can consist of several balancing
areas [16] (cf. these terms deﬁned in the context of Northern Europe
in Fig. 6). The model is developed on GAMSIDE4 using the CPLEX
solver5 and comprises three successive optimization blocks (see
Fig. 1), each of them based on mixed integer programming (MIP).
The ﬁrst block is the FRR bidding block. In this block, FRR providing
units determine their bidding volumes and bidding prices for the pro-
vision of upward and downward FRR based on the spot price forecast.
The second block is FRR procurement block; where the bids are
aggregated on a common Merit Order List (MOL) and all selected
units stay online throughout the planning period, s, while the mar-
ginal unit sets the respective FRR price. In this block, allocation of
transmission capacity for the exchange of FRR between balancing
regions is taken into account. The third block is the day-aheadmarket
clearance. This block receives the online status of units providing FRR
and volume of reserves of the selected units from the reserve
procurement block and clears the day-ahead dispatch by reducing
the net transmission capacity (NTC) with the capacity reserved for
FRR exchange. Online status of FRR providing units at the end of
the planning period is then fed-back to the bidding block. The resolu-
tion of the day-market is t ¼ 1 h and the planning period, for the
bidding and FRR procurement blocks, is s ¼ 24 h, minimum of the
planning period lengths, reported in Table 1.
Three types of generating units are identiﬁed:
 Base load units – Units that only supply base load and do not
provide FRR: Nuclear plant, lignite coal.
 Regulating units – Units that can provide FRR: Hydro, oil, gas,
and hard coal units.
 Non-dispatchable units – Units that do not provide reserves:
Wind, solar, Run of River hydro (ROR), and other renewable
resources.
Bidding block
The bid prices for upward and downward FRR are determined
on the basis of the opportunity cost for units in the day-ahead mar-
ket. For a given planning period each producer determines the bid-
ding prices for FRR based on spot price forecast, SPa;s;t , for each
hour within a planning period in its balancing area. Many
approaches are proposed, in literature, on how to make the
day-ahead spot price forecasts. For instance, Pousinho et al. [20]
propose an approach based on the combination of particle swarm
optimization and adaptive-network based fuzzy inference system.
On the other hand, Vilar et al. [21], propose methods based on
using nonparametric regression techniques with functional
explanatory data and a semi-functional partial linear model to
forecast the day-ahead prices. In this work, the spot price forecasts
are determined based on a simultaneous market clearance (day-
ahead and FRR procurement) where the FRR requirements are
taken as constraint. For the spot price forecast, a 24 h ahead wind
forecast is used. A producer is ready to provide FRR given that they
are compensated for the foregone opportunity to proﬁt in the
day-ahead market. Eqs. (1)–(6) detail the procedure of determining
bidding prices and volumes for a reserve providing thermal unit.
Thermal units
Hard coal, oil, and gas ﬁred power plants can provide FRR, hence
we describe them as regulating thermal units. We follow a three
case approach where each unit tries to maximize its proﬁt for a
given planning period, s. In the ﬁrst case, the unit tries to maximize
its proﬁt within the planning period without any reserve provision.
In the second case, the unit provides only upward FRR. In the third
2 The cooperation was implemented in four steps starting from the simplest
imbalance netting.
3 Reserves in this paper refer to FRR.
4 http://www.gams.com/default.htm.
5 http://www-01.ibm.com/software/commerce/optimization/cplex-optimizer.
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case, the unit provides both upward and downward FRR. A given
share of the difference between maximum and minimum genera-
tion capacity, K, of each thermal unit is taken as the maximum bid-
ding volume. This value should at least correspond to the value a
unit can ramp in 15 min. The time requirement is according to
the ENTSO-E network code on load–frequency control which states
that FRR should be fully activated within 15 min [22]. Since, differ-
ent regulating thermal units have varying ramping capabilities, an
average value of K ¼ 0:2 is taken, (cf. [23]). For each case, the rev-
enue for the unit comes from the sale of energy in the spot market;
and the fuel cost, the start up cost, and ﬁxed cost of the unit when
running account for the cost of the unit. Fig. 2 shows the linearized
cost approximation of a thermal unit [24,25]. Thermal units are
represented with a constant marginal cost and a ﬁxed cost.
 case 1: With no commitment to offer reserves,
R"a;g ¼ R#a;g ¼ 0; 8g 2 GR
 case 2: With the unit committed to offer only upward FRR,
R"a;g ¼ K  ðPa;g  Pa;gÞ;R#a;g ¼ 0; 8g 2 GR
 case 3: With the unit committed to offer both upward and
downward FRR,
R"a;g ¼ R#a;g ¼ K  ðPa;g  Pa;gÞ; 8g 2 GR
The objective functions for the three cases considered are
shown in (1) and the set of constraints in (2)–(4).
Objective function:
8g 2 GR; a 2 A; s 2 C; i 2 f1;2;3g
max
X
t2T
pia;g;s;t  SPa;s;t MCa;g
  da;g;s;t  FCa;g  ua;g;s;t  SCa;gn o
ð1Þ
The i in pia;g;s;t takes 1, 2, or 3 corresponding to the respective case
considered.
Subject to:
8a 2 A; g 2 GR; s 2 C; t 2 T
pia;g;s;t 6 da;g;s;t  Pa;g  R"a;g ð2Þ
pia;g;s;t P da;g;s;t  Pa;g þ R#a;g ð3Þ
ua;g;s;t P da;g;s;t  da;g;s;t1 ð4Þ
Fig. 1. Model description (only major inputs to each block shown).
Table 1
FRR requirement and planning period for FRR procurement in Northern European countries: NO-Norway, SE-Sweden, DK-W-Western Denmark, DK-E-Eastern Denmark, FI-
Finland, DE-Germany, NL-Netherlands.
Country Planning
periods
2010 FRR req. up/
down (MW)
Comments
DE One week 2400/2045 Via a common internet platform of the 4 German TSOs, the publication of tenders, the completion of tender
submissions and the bidder information about acceptance of bids and/or refusals are announced [36]
NL One year 300/300 Yearly bilateral contracts between supplier and the TSO [37]
DK-W One month 262/262 The TSO (Energinet.dk) buys these reserves as a combined, symmetrical reserve for upward and downward regulation
[38]
DK-E One day 262/262 Energinet.dk purchases these reserves in collaboration with the Swedish TSO (Svenska Kraftnät) as a symmetrical
product for up and downward FRR [38]
NO One week 1200/1200 Statnett runs the Reserve Options Market (ROM) to procure FRR in Norway. This market is mainly active during winter
months (October to April) [39]
SE One year 1220/1220 Svenska Kraftnät procures reserves annually based on bilateral contract with suppliers [16,24]
FI One year 865/865 Finnish TSO (Finngrid) has competitive bidding for capacity in the annual market and hourly market for
supplementary procurement once a day if needed [16]
Fig. 2. Linearized cost representation of thermal unit.
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The purpose of solving this problem is to ﬁnd the opportunity cost
of withholding generation capacity from the spot market for reserve
provision. For case 1, the reserve volume is zero, and the whole
capacity can be used in the spot market. For case 2, some capacity
is reserved for upward regulation reserves, and therefore less can
be used to earn proﬁts in the spot market. For case 3, capacity is
reserved for both upward and downward regulation reserves,
reducing the revenue in the spot market even further. The decrease
in the respective revenues between the ﬁrst two cases and the last
two cases represents the corresponding cost of providing upward
and downward FRR respectively.6 Dividing the costs with the max-
imum offer for upward and downward FRR gives the respective bid-
ding prices for each unit in the planning period.
Given that B1;B2, and B3 represent the proﬁt for each respective
case of a unit, (5) and (6) determine the upward and downward
FRR bidding prices respectively.
8a 2 A; g 2 GR; s 2 C
c"a;g;s ¼ ½B1  B2 
1
R"a;g
ð5Þ
c#a;g;s ¼ ½B2  B3 
1
R#a;g
ð6Þ
Hydro units
The methodology for hydro units follows a similar formulation
as FRR providing thermal units with the following differences:
 The minimum hydro output from a unit, Pa;h, is considered zero.
Because of their fast startup, hydro units can provide FRR with-
out being started up. Besides there is no ﬁxed cost component
for hydro units.
 The marginal cost of hydro units are represented by their water
values, WVa;h;x;s. The water value is dependent on the reservoir
level, La;h;s, and the period, s. Hence, it has to be updated for
each planning period.
 Since FRR procurement is performed prior to the day-ahead
clearance, the bidding volume is constrained to avoid draining
the reservoir when the level gets lower than 10% of the maxi-
mum capacity.7 This is done in accordance to Fig. 3, where:
R"n#a;h;s ¼
K  ðPa;h  Pa;hÞ if La;h;s P La;h10
10K La;h;s
La;h
 ðPa;h  Pa;hÞ if La;h;s 6 La;h10
8><
>:
By taking the bulleted points into consideration, the bidding price
determination for hydro units is similarly evaluated using (1)–(6).
Reserve procurement block
The FRR providing units determine their bidding prices and vol-
umes for upward and downward FRR and send their bids to the
TSO.8 The TSO stacks the bids in a Merit Order List (MOL) and selects
the winning bids with the possibility of procuring reserves from
other balancing regions. Marginally selected units set the FRR price
in their respective balancing areas. Two methods of reserve procure-
ment are considered:
 Region based FRR procurement – In this arrangement, it is only
possible to procure reserves within ones own balancing region.
This is generally inline with the current practice in Northern
Europe.
 Cross-region FRR procurement – In this arrangement, a given
share of the NTC between balancing regions, Z, is reserved for
FRR exchange. It is, therefore, possible to procure reserves from
other balancing regions if it decreases the total FRR procure-
ment cost. The main assumption taken here is that certain
aspects of the FRR procurement market in the balancing
regions, such as reserve procurement mechanisms, pricing
mechanisms, and FRR procurement contract periods are harmo-
nized [26]. According to ENTSO-E [9] and Agency for the Coop-
eration of Energy Regulators (ACER) [27], reservation, on both
DC and AC links, should only be allowed if it renders an increase
in social welfare.
Units selected to provide FRR must stay online throughout the
planning period, s ¼ 24 h. In both of the FRR procurement arrange-
ments considered, the day-ahead market is integrated and power
exchange between any connected areas is possible as long as there
is available transmission capacity.
The TSO’s objective in this phase is to minimize the reserve pro-
curement cost within the planning period. The objective function is
shown in (7) and the set of constraints are presented in (8)–(19).
Objective function:
8s 2 C
min
X
a2A
X
g2Ga\
g2GR
r"a;g;s c"a;g;sþ r#a;g;s  c#a;g;s
n o
þ
X
h2Ha
r"a;h;s  c"a;h;sþ r#a;h;s  c#a;h;s
n o2664
3
775
ð7Þ
Subject to:
8a 2 A; s 2 C
rp"a;s ¼
X
g2Ga\
g2GR
r"a;g;s þ
X
h2H
r"a;h;s ð8Þ
rp#a;s ¼
X
g2Ga\
g2GR
r#a;g;s þ
X
h2H
r#a;h;s ð9Þ
Eqs. (8) and (9) dictate that, for each planning period, the total pro-
cured reserves in a given balancing area should be provided by reg-
ulating thermal and hydro units. The reserve exchange between
regions r and s is given as the sum of reserve exchange between
areas located in the regions and is shown in (10) and (11).
8r; s 2 R; s 2 CX
a2Ar
X
b2As
trA"a;b;s ¼ trR"r;s;s ð10ÞX
a2Ar
X
b2As
trA#a;b;s ¼ trR#r;s;s ð11Þ
The condition that total upward and downward FRR procured in a
Fig. 3. Reservoir level, La;h;s , vs. maximum FRR provision from hydro unit.
6 The present order is chosen, as the sole reservation of downward reserves tends
to be at zero costs. However, if upward reserves are procured at the same time, there
normally is a higher cost for downward reserves too. Thus, the marginal costs of
providing downward reserves are calculated from the difference of the second and
third case.
7 In the Norwegian system this only happens occasionally during short periods
before the snow melting in the spring in a dry year. 8 By TSO we assume a super TSO responsible for the balance in the whole system.
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given balancing region reduced by the export of reserves to other
regions should equal to the reserve requirement in the region is
given by (12) and (13) respectively.
8r 2 R; s 2 CX
a2Ar
rp"a;s 
X
a2Ar
X
bRAr
trA"a;b;s P
X
a2Ar
Rr"a;s ð12ÞX
a2Ar
rp#a;s 
X
a2Ar
X
bRAr
trA#a;b;s P
X
a2Ar
Rr#a;s; ð13Þ
The contribution for upward and downward FRR provision from a
regulating thermal unit should not exceed the maximum limit. This
condition is shown in (14) and (15) for upward and downward FRR
respectively.
8a 2 A; g 2 GR; s 2 C
r"a;g;s 6 R"a;g ð14Þ
r#a;g;s 6 R#a;g ð15Þ
Eqs. (16) and (17) ensure that the FRR exchange between balancing
regions stays within the limit of the share of NTC reserved for
upward and downward FRR exchange respectively.
8r; s 2 R; s 2 C
 Z NTCRs;r 6 trR"r;s;s 6 Z NTCRr;s ð16Þ
trR#r;s;s 6 Z  NTCRr;s þ trR"r;s;s ð17Þ
The last two equations in this section, (18) and (19), are added to
guarantee that at least Y";Y# of the required upward and downward
FRR should come from ones own balancing area, respectively.
8a 2 A; s 2 C
rp"a;s P Y
"  Rr"a;s ð18Þ
rp#a;s P Y
#  Rr#a;s ð19Þ
The dual values of the reserve balance represent the respective
reserve prices and the value of the objective function gives the
reserve procurement cost.
Day-ahead market block
In this block, the day-ahead market is cleared. This block gets
the online status of FRR providing units, procured volume of
upward and downward FRR, r"=#a;g;s and r
"=#
a;h;s, from the reserve pro-
curement block. For wind, 3 h ahead forecasts are used.9 It then
minimizes the total day-ahead cost for the planning period (cf.
(20)). Day-ahead costs are comprised of energy costs of thermal
units, startup costs and ﬁxed cost (cf. Fig. 2) of thermal units, energy
cost of hydro units (due to generation and spillage), and rationing
costs (when load is shed). In normal cases, it is assumed that there
is adequate supply to fulﬁll the demand. If this does not happen, load
is curtailed at a very hight price, VLL, to meet the demand–supply
balance. In this model, it is assumed that the day-ahead market is
integrated for the considered system, resembling the current state,
and that cross-border energy exchange is allowed as long as there is
free transmission capacity. Eqs. (21)–(34) represent the set of con-
straints for the day-ahead block.
Objective function:
8s 2 C
min
X
a2A
X
t2T
X
g2Ga
pa;g;s;t MCa;g þ ua;g;s;t  SCa;g þ FCa;g  da;g;s;t
 "(
þpcura;s;t  VLL
i
þ
X
h2Ha
Ofa;h;s þ
X
t2T
psta;h;s;t
 !
WVa;h;x;s
)
ð20Þ
Subject to:
8g 2 GR; s 2 C; t 2 T
pa;g;s;t P da;g;s;t  Pa;g þ r#a;g;s ð21Þ
pa;g;s;t 6 da;g;s;t  Pa;g  r"a;g;s ð22Þ
When generating and standing by for upward FRR and downward
FRR, the maximum generation capacity is reduced by r"a;g;s and the
minimum generation capacity is increased by r#a;g;s. These conditions
for reserve providing thermal units are enforced by (21) and (22)
respectively. The corresponding conditions for a hydro unit are
shown by (23) and (24). It should be noted that r"=#a;g;s and r
"=#
a;h;s are
now parameters as their values have been determined in the previ-
ous block.
8a 2 A;h 2 H; s 2 C; t 2 T
pa;h;s;t P Pa;h þ r#a;h;s ð23Þ
pa;h;s;t 6 Pa;h  r"a;h;s ð24Þ
pnsa;h;s;t þ psta;h;s;t ¼ pa;h;s;t ð25Þ
Eq. (25) deﬁnes the generation from a hydro unit to be the sum of
output components of storable and non-storable inﬂow (cf. Fig. 4).
The total generation from non-storable inﬂow component of a
hydro unit should not exceed the total non-storable inﬂow in the
period (shown in (26)).
8a 2 A;h 2 H; s 2 CX
t2T
pnsa;h;s;t 6 Q
ns
a;h;s ð26Þ
Since, base thermal units do not provide FRR, the only restrictions
for these units are that a unit can only generate between the min-
imum and maximum limit when running (Cf. (27) and (28)).
8g 2 GB; s 2 C; t 2 T
pa;g;s;t P da;g;s;t  Pa;g ð27Þ
pa;g;s;t 6 da;g;s;t  Pa;g ð28Þ
Solar and wind power plants are modeled similarly. The respective
generation is aggregated per balancing area. Eqs. (29) and (30)
ensure that the outputs should not exceed the solar and wind
capacity during the speciﬁed hour respectively.
8a 2 A; s 2 C; t 2 T
psa;s;t 6 Psa;s;t ð29Þ
pwa;s;t 6 Pwa;s;t ð30Þ
The load balance in a given hour is deﬁned in (31). It dictates that
the total generation from all units (thermal, hydro, and RES) in a
given area reduced by the export to other areas added with the
energy curtailed should equal to the load level in the area during
the speciﬁed hour t. The dual value of the load balance equation
represents the spot price.
8a 2 A; s 2 C; t 2 T
9 The fact that the day-ahead market being cleared 24 h ahead, the choice of 3 h
ahead wind forecast might seem out of place; but the following points justify the
choice.
 Since the resolution of the FRR procurement is 24 h and relies on the spot price
forecasts made 24 h ahead, we wanted to have a different wind forecast in the
day-ahead market clearance. This is necessary as in reality, the spot price forecasts
are different from the actual spot prices.
 The intraday market is not considered in this formulation. Thus, taking 3 h ahead
wind forecasts for the day-ahead market clearance results in better price signals
than 24 h ahead wind forecasts as this emulates the portfolio adjustment by pro-
ducers in the intraday period. This is due to the fact that wind forecast errors are
among the reasons for the portfolio adjustment.
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PLa;s;t ¼
X
g2Ga
pa;g;s;t þ
X
h2Ha
pa;h;s;t þ psa;s;t þ pwa;s;t 
X
b2A
epAa;b;s;t
þ pcura;s;t ð31Þ
The power exchange between regions r and s at a given time period
t is the sum of power exchanges between areas located in the
respective regions, as described in (32).X
a2Ar
X
b2As
epAa;b;s;t ¼ epRr;s;s;t ; 8r; s 2 R; s 2 C; t 2 T ð32Þ
Equations related to hydropower reservoirs are represented by (33)
and (34). The reservoir balance at the end of a planning period s
equals previous period reservoir level plus the storable inﬂow
reduced by total hydro generation minus the total hydro spillage
in the planning period (cf. (33)). Eq. (34) on the other hand ensures
that the reservoir level does not go above the maximum reservoir
level.
8a 2 A;h 2 H; s 2 C
La;h;s ¼ La;h;s1 þ Qsta;h;s 
X
t2s
psta;h;s;t  Ofa;h;s ð33Þ
La;h;s 6 La;h ð34Þ
Inputs to the model
The model is implemented as a fundamental model of the
Northern European power system. The objective of the optimiza-
tion model is the minimization of the total operation costs, given
the demand and reserve requirements. The inputs to the model
include generating units, the transmission as well as the demand
in the power system, described in the following subsections.
Generation units
Generation units are classiﬁed as base-load units (nuclear and
coal plants), FRR providing units (hydro, oil, and gas ﬁred power
plants), and non-dispatchable units (wind, run of river (ROR)
hydro, and solar power plants).
Hydropower units
Hydropower units are represented as in Fig. 4. Hydropower sys-
tems may have quite complex topologies with many cascaded res-
ervoirs and power plants in the same rivers system. The reservoirs
may have different storage capacity with signiﬁcant water travel
time that couples the decisions between several time steps [28].
For this work, a simpliﬁed and aggregated reservoir representation
obtained from the EMPS model10 [30] is used. Each balancing area
contains one or more aggregated hydro reservoirs, where each hydro
unit is connected to a respective reservoir as in Fig. 4.
In a given planning period, the marginal cost for hydro units is
given by the water value [30]. As there is no signiﬁcant production
cost for hydro power, but rather limited amount of water available,
water value refers to the opportunity cost of storing reservoir
water for future utilization. These values are dependent on the
time of the year and the reservoir level (cf. Fig. 5).
Thermal units
As explained in the beginning of Section 3, thermal units based
on oil, gas, and hard coal are regulating thermal units. These types
of units are characterized by the ability to sufﬁciently ramp up or
down within 15 min. On the other hand, thermal units based on
Nuclear and lignite coal tend to generate at their nominal operat-
ing point and require long time to startup and are used as base load
thermal units. Their cheaper marginal cost compared to regulating
thermal plants makes them useful for long period, non-stop
operation.
Non-dispatchable units
Units whose outputs are difﬁcult or impossible to control are
referred to as non-dispatchable. The availability of these resources
depends on the weather conditions.11 We might opt to decrease the
output by curtailing the production at a given time but it is not pos-
sible to obtain more output than given by the weather conditions.
Solar, wind, ROR hydro are the resources considered in this work
that fall into this category. These resources are characterized by zero
marginal production cost and will be prioritized in the day-ahead
Merit Order List (MOL) and will be fully utilized provided that there
are no bottlenecks in the system. Even though there are reports of
utilizing wind farms to provide downward regulation (for example
see Ref. [31]), no FRR provision from these resources is considered
in this work.
Transmission capacity
One of the main objectives of this work is to assess the effect of
transmission capacity reservation between balancing regions for
reserves exchange. The NTC between balancing areas or balancing
regions are used as the value of transmission capacity in the com-
putations. As per ENTSO-E12 deﬁnition, NTC refers to the maximum
total exchange between two connected power systems available for
commercial purposes, for a certain period and direction of active
power ﬂow [33].
Reserve requirement
FRR, also called secondary reserves in the Central European sys-
tem and Frequency Disturbance Reserves in the Nordic system, are
Fig. 4. Hydro power generation representation.
10 EMPS refers to EFIs Multi-area Power-Market Simulator and is developed by
SINTEF Energy Research for long term hydro power planning [29].
11 Weather condition in this context means solar radiation for pv plants, wind speed
for wind farms, non-storable inﬂow for ROR hydro plant.
12 An acronym for European Network of Transmission System Operators for
Electricity, ENTSO-E represents all electric TSOs in the EU and others connected to
their networks, for all regions, and for all their technical and market issues [32].
552 Y. Gebrekiros et al. / Electrical Power and Energy Systems 67 (2015) 546–559
types of operating reserves activated to restore the system
frequency to nominal value and are deployed to replace the
primary reserves [10]. The FRR requirement for a given balancing
area or country is deﬁned by the respective authorities. The
required FRR capacity in a given region mainly depends on the load
[11]. The increasing wind power integration in the European power
system and the subsequent increase in system imbalances, how-
ever, is expected to increase the operating reserve requirement
[5,34]. The TSOs make sure that the required reserves are in place
for their respective planning periods13 (the time span where
reserves are contracted for). In the current market arrangement in
Northern European countries, the planning periods are different
(see Table 1). For this work, because of the underlying assumption
of harmonized cross-border reserve procurement, we assume that
the planning period is the same for all of the countries. Thus,
s ¼ 24 h, the minimum of all areas shown in Table 1. Since, a unit
providing FRR has to stay online for the duration of the planning per-
iod, considering longer periods exacerbate the sub-optimal solutions
due to the electricity market clearance sequence. Moreover, reserve
requirement per area is constant for all planning periods.
Case study
We consider the Northern European power system in its state of
2010, shown in Fig. 6. Three balancing regions are modeled: the
Nordic system, Germany, and the Netherlands. The Nordic system
contains Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark.14 Germany is
divided into 4 balancing areas, representing the 4 German TSO areas.
The Netherlands is considered as one balancing area. Norway, Swe-
den, Finland, and Denmark are divided into 5, 4, 1, and 2 balancing
areas respectively. The division in the Nordic system is according
to the Elspot price area division [40]. For the Nordic system we con-
sider 49 aggregated reservoirs, with an aggregated hydro unit con-
nected to a reservoir (cf. Fig. 4). For reliability purposes, 2/3 of the
required reserves should be procured from ones own balancing area
[41], i.e Y"=# ¼ 2=3.
Installed generation capacity in 2010 is considered. Generation
capacity and peak demand per country is shown in Table 2. Data
for thermal generation units is taken from [16]. Thermal units
are represented with a constant marginal cost, ﬁxed, and startup
costs (cf. Fig. 2). Marginal costs of hydropower plants are repre-
sented with their respective water values obtained from the EMPS
Fig. 5. Water value plot for a reservoir in South Norway as obtained from EMPS (truncated at 250 EUR/MW h). It can be seen that the water value is generally high when the
reservoir level is low and low when the reservoir is full. Similarly, for a given reservoir level, we can see that the water value is low during high inﬂow period (late spring and
summer – weeks 20–35) and high during low inﬂow period.
Fig. 6. Northern European system in 2010.
13 The provision of voluntary balancing reserves based only on the incentives of the
real-time balancing market could sometimes be insufﬁcient. Hence, steps to make
sure that sufﬁcient balancing reserves are available in the system are necessary (cf.
[35] for the case in Norway).
14 It should be noted that in the real system, West Denmark is synchronous with the
Central European system and East Denmark is synchronous with the Nordic System.
For this work, however, the whole Danish system is considered as part of the Nordic
balancing region.
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model [30]. Aggregated wind farms per area are modeled with
maximum output equal to the available wind power capacity for
the given hour. A similar approach is used for solar power produc-
tion. The wind and solar time series data are obtained from the
COSMO EU, which offers a high resolution numerical weather
predictions as well as measurements15 [42]. The NTC between bal-
ancing areas and balancing regions for 2010, obtained from ENTSO-E
[43], are used as exchange constraints in the optimization.
Results and discussions
In this section, we ﬁrst analyze the energy exchange between
balancing regions in Section 6.1. Following that, we asses how
the FRR bidding prices are related to the spot price forecasts and
the unit marginal cost (water value in the case of hydro) in Sec-
tion 6.2. Following this, we assess the relation between the system
load, day-ahead cost, and downward FRR procurement cost in
Section 6.3. In Section 6.4, the cost implication of NTC reservation
for FRR exchange is addressed. Finally, the FRR procurement per
country for varying NTC reservation is discussed in Section 6.5.
Energy exchange
Fig. 7 shows the energy export from the Nordic to the Central
European system in winter and summer. The ﬂow is predomi-
nantly from Nordic to Central European system in summer during
daytime on weekdays. This is generally the result of low demand
and high inﬂow in the Nordic system. Lower demand in the Central
European system and ﬂexible hydro in the Nordic systemmake the
latter importer of Electric energy during nights and weekends. On
the other hand, the ﬂow is generally from the Central European to
the Nordic system in the winter due to the need for heating and
low hydro inﬂow in the Nordic system.
Similarly, Fig. 8 shows the sorted annual energy exchange
proﬁle from the Nordic region to Germany, Netherlands, Central
European system and Germany to Netherlands. It can be seen that
the ﬂow direction is predominantly from Nordic system to the
Central European system (for about 65% of the time). There is,
however, no dominant ﬂow direction between Netherlands and
Germany as can be seen from the ﬁgure.
FRR bidding prices
The FRR bidding prices in relation to the spot price forecasts and
the marginal cost of a thermal unit (analogously, the calculated
water value of a hydro unit) are plotted in the following set of
ﬁgures.
Fig. 9 shows the bidding prices for upward FRR for a hydro unit
plotted (solid line left axis) against the water value of the hydro
reservoir at the respective period and averaged spot price forecasts
over the year (right axes). The thin dashed line shows the daily
water value of the reservoir. The average daily spot prices are plot-
ted as the thick dashed line in the ﬁgure. Fig. 10 shows the down-
ward FRR bidding price for the hydro unit plotted against the
calculated water vales and averaged spot price forecasts.
It can be seen from Figs. 9 and 10 that when the averaged spot
prices forecasts are higher than the water value (e.g. days 50–100
in Fig. 9), the upward FRR bidding price is positive and increases
with the increase in the difference. Similarly, the downward bid-
ding prices are positive when the water values are higher than
the average spot price forecasts (e.g. some days between 150 and
250 in Fig. 10) and the bidding prices become higher when the dif-
ference gets higher.
When the average spot price is higher than the water value, the
unit tends to produce at maximum capacity where it gets more
proﬁt. When it has to standby to provide upward FRR, it has to
operate at a lower output level, thus reducing its proﬁt. This loss
represents the opportunity cost of providing upward FRR. In this
case, the unit is ready to provide downward FRR at a zero price.
When the water value is higher than the average spot price
forecasts, the unit does not normally run as it incurs a loss. But,
if it has to operate anyway, it tends to operate at the minimum
possible operating point to reduce its loss. If it has to provide
downward FRR, however, it has to operate at a value higher than
the minimum value further increasing the losses. The downward
bidding prices, therefore, reﬂect this cost. It can, however, provide
upward FRR for free.
Table 2
Generation capacities and peak demand in Northern Europe in 2010 [MW].
NO SE FI DK DE NL
Thermal 0 15,698 15,382 9020 105,335 24,012
Hydro 28,000 14,966 3000 0 3838 0
Wind 450 2200 300 3785 27200 2500
Solar 0 8 0 11 12,200 85
Peak demand 23,427 27,666 13,780 6784 98,268 17,637
Fig. 7. Energy export from Nordic to Central European system with no reservation
of transmission capacity for reserves exchange (negative is import).
Fig. 8. Annual energy exchange sorted in decreasing order in 2010. (NTC values:
Nordic–DE = DE–Nordic = 2695 MW, Nordic–NL = NL–Nordic = 700 MW, NL–
DE = 3000 MW, DE–NL = 3850 MW).
15 The model uses the measured wind speeds and actual geographically distributed
installed capacities to calculate the wind power production output. The modeling
results are validated using TSO data from Germany (TenneT control area) and
Denmark as comparative values in [42].
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Fig. 9. Upward bidding price vs. spot price forecast for a hydro unit in South Norway.
Fig. 10. Downward bidding price vs. spot price forecast for a hydro unit in South Norway.
Fig. 11. Upward bidding price vs. spot price forecast for a hard coal thermal unit in Germany.
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Similar deductions can be reached for the bidding prices of ther-
mal units, (Figs. 11 and 12) as the bidding prices of a hydro unit
above. An interesting difference can be observed, however, on
how the bidding prices for thermal and hydro units evolve. The
upward bidding price for the thermal unit holds a value different
from zero throughout the year. For the hydro unit, the upward bid-
ding prices are zero except for a time span where the reservoir in
Norway is at its lowest. This is similar to the observation in reality
in the Norwegian system where the RKOM market is active (cf.
Table 1). Another important observation is that, for both the hydro
and thermal unit, the downward bidding prices are zero except
during the low demand periods (cf. Fig. 13).
Day-ahead and downward FRR procurement costs in relation to
system load
As can be seen from Fig. 13, the total day-ahead cost, energy
plus startup and ﬁxed costs, (green, solid line in the ﬁgure), is
highly correlated to the total system load (broken red line). The
downward FRR procurement costs (thin, blue line), on the other
hand, are high when the day-ahead costs are low and viceversa.
When the load is low, fewer units are committed in the day-ahead
market. However, some units have to run to solely provide down-
ward FRR reserves, thus, generate at the minimum possible capac-
ity in the day-ahead market. Such units should, therefore, take the
loss they encounter in the day-ahead market into consideration
when determining the downward FRR prices. This in effect results
in higher downward FRR bidding prices, subsequently higher
downward FRR procurement cost (cf. Figs. 10 and 12).
Cost implication of NTC reservation for reserve exchange
Fig. 14 shows the total cost at different levels of transmission
capacity reservation between balancing regions for FRR exchange,
Z. The total costs are the sum of FRR procurement costs and day-
ahead costs. Intuitively, because of the reduced transmission
Fig. 12. Downward bidding price vs. spot price forecast for a hard coal thermal unit in Germany.
Fig. 13. Day-ahead and downward FRR costs vs. total load in the system.
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Fig. 14. Annual procurement costs vs. capacity reservation between balancing regions for FRR exchange, Z.
Fig. 15. Upward FRR procured per country for varying transmission capacity reservation vs. the requirement: NO-Norway, SE-Sweden, FI-Finland, DK-Denmark, DE-Germany,
NL-Netherlands.
Fig. 16. Downward FRR procured per country for varying transmission capacity reservation vs. the requirement.
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capacity for energy exchange the day-ahead costs are expected to
be higher when there is transmission capacity reservation for
FRR exchange. In this case, however, the day-ahead cost (diamond
markers in the ﬁgure) decrease until Z ¼ 5%. The reason is the
increased ﬂexibility obtained in the FRR importing system for
low transmission capacity reservation. We have assumed that the
procurement period of the reserves is 24 h which means that units
need to be online for 24 h. This leads to high costs of reserves.
Allowing for the import of FRR increases the ﬂexibility of the
importing system, and thus reduces the day-ahead costs. The
day-ahead costs, however, start to pick up for reservation levels
above 5%. The FRR procurement costs (square markers) are the
highest when there is no possibility of cross-border reserve pro-
curement and decrease with increasing Z. This is as a result of
the possibility of cheaper cross-border reserve procurement with
increase in Z. As a result, we get a point Z  20% where the total
cost (circular markers in Fig. 14) is the lowest. This reservation
results in a saving of EUR 24.5 million per annum. These results
seem to contradict the ﬁndings in an earlier study [44], where
the authors conclude that such reservation is not proﬁtable due
to the losses in the day-ahead market. However, the contradiction
is not real. The analysis in [44] uses a model with an integrated
clearing of the reserve and day-ahead markets. The present model
reﬂects the existing European power markets, with separate mar-
kets for reserves and day ahead energy. The present analysis shows
that with this market design, reservation of transmission capacity
for reserve capacity can be proﬁtable.
Reserve procurement per country
Figs. 15 and 16 show the upward and downward FRR procure-
ment and requirement per country for different levels of transmis-
sion capacity reservation. There is an increase in upward reserve
procurement from Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands. On the
other hand, the upward FRR procurement from Germany decreases
with increase in transmission capacity reservation for FRR
exchange (cf. Fig. 15). At the least cost transmission reservation
point, i.e. Z ¼ 20%, the reserves procured from Norway, Sweden,
and the Netherlands are 32%, 31%, and 40% higher compared to
the requirement. For the same reservation, Germany procures
21% of the required upward FRR requirement from the Nordic
region and Netherlands. In General, for Z ¼ 20%, 10% more upward
FRR from the Nordic and 14% less from the DE + NL systems are
procured compared to the requirement. It can be observed that
for Z ¼ 0% the reserve procured by a Nordic country is not equal
to the requirement. This is because of the possibility of procuring
reserves from other balancing areas within ones balancing region.
Similarly, Fig. 16 shows the downward FRR procurement per
country for different values of transmission capacity reservation.
There is an increase in downward FRR procurement from Norway,
Denmark, and Netherlands by 16%, 8%, 8% and a decrease by 16%
and 7% from Sweden and Finland respectively compared to the
requirement.
Summary and concluding remarks
In this work, we developed a model that follows the temporal
hierarchy of the current electricity market arrangements in North-
ern Europe. We present the mathematical formulation and the
principle of bidding price determination by each reserve providing
unit, the reserve procurement on different levels of capacity alloca-
tion for FRR exchange, and the day-ahead market.
An opportunity cost based method is employed to determine
the FRR bidding prices for a unit. At a given time, the difference
(the loss in proﬁt) a unit incurs due to its commitment to provide
reserves is used as the corresponding cost of standing by to provide
the reserves. This cost is eventually used to calculate bidding prices
for upward and downward FRR capacity provision.
Reserve providers send their bid volumes and prices for upward
and downward FRR and the TSO selects the cheapest bids with the
possibility of procuring from other balancing regions if transmis-
sion capacity is reserved for this purpose. Reserves are procured
for a given planning period which is longer than the resolution in
the day-ahead market and selected units should stay online for
the whole period.
The day-ahead phase has a resolution of one hour and follows
the FRR procurement. The transmission capacity for energy
exchange is reduced with the value set aside for FRR exchange.
Cost minimization is performed for a period of 24 h.
The bidding prices for both upward and downward FRR from a
reserve providing unit are determined by the difference between
the daily average spot price forecasts and the unit marginal cost
(water value in the case of a hydro unit) at the given day.
The day-ahead and downward FRR procurement costs are pos-
itively and negatively correlated to the system load respectively.
Therefore, the day-ahead costs are high when the downward
reserve procurement costs are low and viceversa.
An interesting result is the fact that the day-ahead costs
decrease for small values of the transmission capacity reservation.
This is explained by the fact that procuring reserves in another area
reduces the need to keep reserves in the expensive system, increas-
ing the ﬂexibility and reducing the day-ahead cost. The FRR pro-
curement costs, on the other hand, steadily decrease with
increasing the reserved transmission capacity. The lowest total
costs occur in our model for a general transmission capacity reser-
vation level of 20%. With this value, a potential annual saving of
EUR 25 million is obtained, compared with the no-reservation case.
In these analyses, the same relative capacity reservation was used
for all interconnections and kept constant for the whole year. It is
expected that having more capacity reservation in some corridors
and less in some others could result in greater total cost reduction.
The optimal reservation of transmission capacity on individual
interconnections will be the focus of further work. At the least cost
operation point, 10% more and 14% less upward FRR are procured
from the Nordic and Central European systems respectively com-
pared to the requirement.
The scope of this work is limited to FRR procurement and day-
ahead market and does not include the real-time balancing market.
It is expected that reserving transmission capacity for exchange of
balancing energy will result in further cost reduction as a result of
imbalance netting and utilization of cheap cross-border resources.
This idea will also be addressed in future work.
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Abstract—Power ﬂow computations are essential for many
types of power system analyses. In order to reduce computation
time and reﬂect actual power market operation, network
aggregation principles are often used.
In this work we discuss network aggregation based on
power transfer distribution factors (PTDF), by testing three
different aggregation schemes. We analyze the performance of
the three schemes comparing their solutions with the results
obtained from a DC optimal power ﬂow (DCOPF) performed
on the non-aggregated system. The performance is evaluated
on the IEEE 30-bus test system using three indicators; power
generation, inter-zonal ﬂows, and total system costs.
To account for wind and load forecast uncertainty, we consider
a modiﬁed IEEE 30-bus system proposed to address massive
wind integration. The case study results show that the choice of
weighting scheme signiﬁcantly impacts the results. In particular,
the PTDF aggregation schemes based on nodal injections (pro-
duction minus demand) and production outperform the pro-rata
aggregation scheme.
Index Terms—DCOPF, Network reduction, PTDF, PTDF ag-
gregation, Wind energy integration
I. INTRODUCTION
To achieve the objectives of the Third Energy Package of
the European Union policy, a signiﬁcant progress is observed
towards the realization of an internal electricity market [1].
An initiative launched in 2010, the Central Western European
(CWE) coupling, which covers Netherlands, Belgium, France,
Germany and Luxembourg, created a single platform for
day-ahead electricity trading. Following this, Interim Tight
Volume Coupling (ITVC) resulted in increased efﬁciency
of the European power system by coupling the day-ahead
market of the CWE region with the Nordic market. And the
latest one is the Price Coupling of Regions (PCR); which
has been in operation since May 2014 [2]. The project is
an initiative of the seven Power Exchanges (PX) covering
the electricity markets in Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK [3]. One of
the key elements of the PCR project is the development
of a single price coupling algorithm, which will adopt the
name of EUPHEMIA (acronym of Pan-European Hybrid
Electricity Market Integration Algorithm) [3]. It will be
used to calculate energy allocation and electricity prices
across Europe, maximizing the overall welfare and increasing
the transparency of the computation of prices and ﬂows.
Moreover, there is a signiﬁcant integration of renewable
energy sources in to the European system, which is expected
to increase in the near future. In addition, the proposed
EU Guideline on Capacity Allocation and Congestion
Management (CACM) [4] requires the use of ﬂow-based
market coupling (FBMC) [5]–[7] unless in cases where
cross-zonal capacity is less interdependent and it can be
shown that the ﬂow-based approach brings no added value.
Handling large amounts of power system data for
operational and planning purposes is often cumbersome that
reduction of the system is needed. This raises the question of
how to obtain an aggregated grid representation that closely
represents the original system. This paper reviews power
ﬂow based grid reduction methods and contributes to this
discussion by analyzing PTDF-based aggregation schemes.
The paper is organized as follows. We brieﬂy discuss
FBMC and network aggregation methods in Section II and
III respectively and go through the mathematical formulation
in Section IV. We then present a case study Section in V and
discuss the ﬁndings in Section VI and windup with concluding
remarks in Section VII.
II. FLOW-BASED MARKET COUPLING (FBMC)
Market coupling refers to the implicit auctioning of
physical transmission rights via hourly auctions organized by
PXs in the day ahead market [8]. The ﬂow-based analysis
is a methodology which describes the network in order to
take into account the impacts of cross-border exchanges on
network security constraints when optimizing the market
ﬂows (i.e. matching of supply and demand) for the concerned
region, thus offering more capacity and maximizing the social
welfare generated [9].
FBMC, which is based on DCOPF, is expected to result
in better utilization of the grid while ensuring a same
Security of Supply (SoS) level as today [10]. Flow-based
(FB) computations are expected to improve quality of results
compared to NTC1 based calculations due to the fact that,
although linearized, the physics of power ﬂow is represented
in the market clearing. However, their ability to improve
total welfare heavily depends on the quality of grid models
[11], [12]. Based on analysis in the CWE region, Waniek et
al. [7] show that the FBMC by using PTDFs can improve
the efﬁciency of the coupled markets compared to the NTC
method. During the FB experimentation of the CWE TSOs,
it was proven that FB capacity calculations are feasible from
an operational point of view and increase the capacity offered
to the market when compared to NTC based calculations [9].
III. NETWORK REDUCTION AND (OR) AGGREGATION
Long distance power transmission requires the computation
of large scale power systems for operational and planning
purposes. Dealing with huge amount of data is computationally
demanding and reduction of the system is sometimes desirable
(e.g. for the ﬂow-based algorithm). Obviously, the nodal
to zonal reduction results in loss of accuracy of the
grid representation [13]. Based on the speciﬁc analysis,
Papaemmanouil et al. [14] broadly classify network reduction
techniques as static and dynamic. In static network reduction,
the reduced model represents a snapshot of the system and
is suitable for static analysis only. On the other hand, the
reduced system is applied for dynamic analysis in the latter.
For electricity market analyses the static network reduction
methods are applied.
In the standard reduction techniques, the size of a power
network is reduced by partitioning the network into a group
of internal, external, and boundary buses. An equivalent
network is created by deleting the external buses while
simultaneously modifying the boundary buses to represent the
electrical characteristics of the external buses with the internal
network left unchanged. Hence, the equivalent representation
models a portion of the network with the original detail while
eliminating the remainder of the network [15].
In the OPF based equivalencing techniques, buses are aggre-
gated rather than eliminated. In the PTDF based aggregation,
nodal PTDFs are aggregated into zonal PTDFs that give sim-
ilar inter-zonal ﬂows. In the aggregation process, estimating
the nodal injection factor for a given zonal injection is a
challenging task as the values are not known and have to be
estimated. As a result, many ideas are proposed on how to
address this issue (cf. Section IV-B). Van den Bergh et al.
[13] propose a new method to improve aggregated network
models by performing the nodal-zonal network reduction
separately for different generation type injections. They stress
that this method gives a considerable improvement in the grid
1The maximum value of transmission capacity which can be offered to the
market with out affecting system security reduced by the reliability margin is
referred to as Net Transfer Capacities (NTC) [11].
ﬂow modeling. For an analysis of the Nordic power system,
Helseth et. al [16] developed a model that considers different
PTDF aggregation schemes based on different nodal weighting
schemes. Based on the tests performed, they concluded that
the type of weighting scheme does not signiﬁcantly impact the
simulation results. In this work, we discuss the mathematical
derivation of PTDFs from network parameters and analyze the
performance of the considered PTDF aggregation schemes.
IV. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
A. Determination of PTDFs from line reactances
In a given system with N + 1 nodes and Nb branches, the
dimension of the admittance matrix, β, is N×N . Besides, the
ﬂow matrix, βf has a size of Nb×N . Considering a DCOPF,
all but the reference node will have unknown angles, δ. If δ
refers to N × 1 vector of angles, the following relations hold.
βδ = P inj (1)
βfδ = P f (2)
Where P inj and P f refer to the vector of net nodal
power injection and branch ﬂows, respectively. The net nodal
injection is the sum of all generation connected to the node
added with injections from HVDC cables, which can be
positive or negative depending on the direction of ﬂow, and
reduced by the load connected to the given node. Combining
(1) and (2), (3) gives the relationship between nodal injections
and branch ﬂows and the PTDF matrix, Φ is given by (4).
βfβ
−1P inj = P f (3)
Φ = βfβ
−1 (4)
Φ is an Nb × N matrix and is deﬁned for each branch in
relation to nodal injection. An element of the PTDF matrix,
φil,n, equals to the fraction of ﬂow along a branch connecting
nodes l and n for a unit injection in node i and withdrawal
in the reference node (cf. Fig. 1). Equation (3) is rewritten
compactly in (5).
ΦP inj = P f (5)
B. Nodal to Zonal PTDF Aggregation
The aggregation is done in such a way that the system
is divided into zones where each zone includes a number
of nodes. The generators and loads in each zone are then
connected to the aggregated node (zone). Furthermore,
inter-zonal transmission lines are aggregated and represented
by a single equivalent inter-zonal line. An important task
in achieving accuracy with a node aggregation approach is
identifying nodes belonging to a given zone and the number
of zones required [17]. This is because of the underlying
assumption taken while aggregating that no congestion occurs
within a given zone.
To calculate PTDFs at zonal level, nodal PTDFs are
aggregated. The detailed PTDFs within each zone are
weighted according to a given scheme. Some possible
schemes are equal weighting factor in all nodes (pro rata), net
active power injection, nodal production, remaining capacity
in generators, and change in power injection from previous
iteration [16]. Of these schemes, the predetermination of the
aggregated PTDFs is possible using the ﬁrst scheme only. For
the other schemes the PTDF should be recalculated before
every DCOPF computation.
In this work we compare three PTDF aggregation schemes.
• Scheme 1: assigns equal weighting factor for all nodes
within a given zone, i.e. given Nzn nodes in a zone the
weight of each node will be 1Nzn .
• Scheme 2: assigns the nodal weighting factors from
the net injections (generation minus load) in a given
zone. Hence, the nodal injections should be known or
estimated.
• Scheme 3: assigns the nodal weighting factors from the
injections due to only generation in a given zone. Hence,
the nodal generation should be known or estimated.
In actual conditions, the injections for Scheme 2 and gener-
ations for Scheme 3 are not known ex-ante, thus should be
forecasted. For this analysis, we consider two versions: one
with perfect foresight of nodal generation and injection, hence
using the result of the nodal DCOPF results for the zonal
DCOPF analysis. In the second version, we consider a case
with wind and load forecast uncertainty and run the zonal
DCOPF. Considering the sample network in Fig. 1(a) and its
aggregated representation in Fig. 1(b), (6) represents the zonal
PTDF between zones z and y for an injection in zone z.
ψzz,y = ψ
z
l,n + ψ
z
m,o (6)
Where:
ψzl,n = wiφ
i
l,n + wjφ
j
l,n + ...+ wmφ
m
l,n (7)
As can be seen from (7), the aggregated PTDF for one
of the lines connecting zones z and y for an injection in z
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Fig. 1. (a) Graphic description of node level PTDFs. Each colored arrow
along line l-n corresponds to the PTDF on the given line for a unit injection
in a given node (represented by the same colored arrow) and withdrawal at a
reference node (not shown in the ﬁgure). (b) PTDFs aggregated to zones
is given as the sum of the weighted average of the nodal
PTDFs in zone z for a ﬂow along the speciﬁed line. Based
on the weighting scheme, the nodal weighting factors in a
given zone may vary from each other. Besides the weighting
factor for a given node might also be time dependent.
With this, we get a zonal PTDF matrix Ψ with a dimension
of Nz × Nt. Where Nz + 1 is the number of zones and Nt
is the number of inter-zonal connectors. In practical systems,
each zone often contains a large number of nodes that a node
within a given zone is selected as a reference node, avoiding
the need to specify a reference zone. Thus in such systems,
the PTDF matrix have a size of (Nz + 1) × Nt. Helseth et
al. [16] use this approach in their analysis. Given a perfect
foresight of nodal injections, Scheme 2 gives identical results
as the nodal DCOPF analysis (cf. Section VI-A).
For the version where we have forecast uncertainty, the
inter-zonal ﬂows are calculated as follows. For Scheme 1 and
Scheme 2, the ﬂows are calculated in (8).
ΨP zinj = P
z
f (8)
Where Ψ represents the respective zonal PTDF matrix,
and the net injection and the inter-zonal ﬂow vectors are
represented by P zinj and P
z
f respectively. For Scheme 3, (8)
is modiﬁed by adding an offset vector F 0 in (9).
ΨP zinj + F
0 = P zf (9)
Considering the weighting factors due to only generation,
the effect of the loads in the nodal injections is ignored
affecting the accuracy of the zonal PTDF. As a result, ﬂow
calculations like (8) result in large deviations. To compensate
for this, we add an offset vector F 0 which is obtained by sub-
tracting the zonal from the nodal ﬂow results in this scheme for
the reference scenario (i.e., F 0 = P zf [Nodal]−P zf [Zonal]).
For the purpose of obtaining F 0, (8) is used to calculate the
zonal ﬂow for Scheme 3. In other words, the negative of the
ﬂow error due to aggregation according to Scheme 3 for the
reference scenario employing (8) is used as an offset, F 0.
V. CASE STUDY
We applied the PTDF aggregation methodology to the
IEEE 30-bus test system, shown in Fig. 2. The system
has 30 nodes, 41 branches, 6 generating units, and 21
loads. The data is obtained from [18]. The generation cost
function is approximated with linear interpolation, thus
each unit is described by a marginal cost and a ﬁxed cost
for simpliﬁcation. For each generation unit, the maximum
and minimum generation capacity is given. Each line is
represented with a maximum transmission capacity limit and
an admittance. Besides, to consider the effect of wind and load
forecast uncertainty in PTDF aggregation, (cf. Section IV-B), a
modiﬁed version of the IEEE 30-bus test system is considered.
Node 1 is taken as a reference node in the original system
and a reference zone in the aggregated system. The system is
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Fig. 2. Representation of the modiﬁed IEEE 30-bus test system taken from
[19]. The original IEEE 30-bus test system is without wind power plants [18].
aggregated into 5 zones. In the European context, the division
normally follows a mixture of country borders and system
bottlenecks. However, we did not try to optimize the split into
zones for the analysis, and we do not consider that to have
inﬂuence on the results as the system is small and uncongested.
The PTDF matrix of the original system is 41 × 29. The
aggregated system has 5 zones and 7 interconnectors; hence
represented by a 7 × 4 zonal PTDF matrix.
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Given the parameters, we run a Mixed-integer Program-
ming (MIP) optimization problem to minimize the total costs
satisfying the set of constraints. We use GAMS with the
CPLEX solver for the analysis. We perform DCOPF for
the 30-bus system and the aggregated equivalents performed
by making use of the three PTDF aggregation schemes. In
the following, we compare the DCOPF results of the three
PTDF aggregation schemes in relation to the original system
representation based on generation, inter-zonal ﬂows, and total
cost with the following considerations.
(A) Under perfect foresight of nodal generation and injections
using the original IEEE 30-bus test system and,
(B) Under uncertainty due to wind and load forecasting errors
using a modiﬁed IEEE 30-bus test system.
A. PTDF aggregation with perfect foresight of nodal genera-
tion and injection
We consider only Scheme 1 and Scheme 2. Scheme 3 is not
considered because there is no generation in zone 4.
1) Generation: The normalized mean generation deviation
as a result of using the equivalent network representation is
calculated in (10) with i referring to the respective scheme.
errScheme i%gen =
1
Ng
∑
g
∣∣pScheme ig − p30−busg ∣∣
p30−busg
∗ 100% (10)
Ng refers to the number of generating units; where as
p30−busg and p
Scheme i
g stand for the output of each generating
unit in the nodal DCOPF and the zonal DCOPF calculation
for the respective PTDF aggregation scheme respectively.
Scheme 1 results in a very low deviation and Scheme 2 gives
identical result as the nodal representation (cf. Table I). The
zero deviations of Scheme 2 are consistent with the discussion
in Section IV.
2) Flows: In the case of the 30-bus consideration, the ﬂow
along the lines connecting two given zones is summed to get
the inter-zonal ﬂows. In the zonal equivalents, on the other
hand, the inter-zonal ﬂows are directly obtained from the
DCOPF calculations. The average inter-zonal ﬂow deviations
are evaluated as a percentage of the inter-zonal maximum
capacity, Txz , as in (11) for the respective scheme i. As
some of the inter-zonal ﬂows are very low, representation of
errors in relation to the maximum line capacity gives a better
indication.
errScheme i(%fl) =
1
Nfl
∑
flows
∣∣∣pScheme ifl − p30−busfl ∣∣∣
Txz
∗ 100%
(11)
Nfl refers to the number of inter-zonal connectors, where as
p30−busfl and p
Scheme i
fl represent the inter-zonal ﬂows in the
30-bus and the respective aggregated system representations
respectively. As expected, the DCOPF calculations on the
aggregated system employing Scheme 2 result in identical
inter-zonal ﬂows as the DCOPF on the 30-bus representation.
On the other hand, Scheme 1 results in average inter-zonal
ﬂow error of 6.4% (cf. Table I).
TABLE I
NORMALIZED MEAN DEVIATION FOR THE AGGREGATION SCHEMES
COMPARED TO NON-AGGREGATED REPRESENTATION [%]
Scheme 1 Scheme 2
Generation 1.8 0
Flows 6.4 0
Cost 0.12 0
3) Total Costs: The total costs in the 30-bus system is
USD 1163.7. Similarly the total cost resulting from the
PTDF aggregation based on Scheme 1 is USD 1165.1, which
accounts for a deviation of just 0.12%.
B. PTDF aggregation with wind and load forecast uncertainty
In real systems we do not have a knowledge of the nodal in-
jections ex-ante, which instead must be based on forecasts, that
essentially are uncertain. To address this issue, we consider a
modiﬁed IEEE 30-bus test system that incorporates 76.5 MW
wind capacity equally distributed between nodes 3, 4, 7, 9, 17,
21, 26, 28, 30 [19]. To balance out the increased generation
capacity, each load is scaled up by 25%. Wind is added to
create forecast errors, representative of a real system today.
To account for the forecast uncertainty, we generate 1000
scenarios of wind power generation and nodal loads. The wind
output scenarios and nodal loads are uniformly distributed
around the expected output in the range of ±25% and ±5%
respectively. No correlation is considered between nodes for
the load forecast and wind power scenarios nor between load
and wind forecast scenarios2. To calculate the zonal PTDFs for
Scheme 2 and Scheme 3, the injection values for the reference
scenario are taken and the same PTDF matrices are used for
all scenarios, based on the expected values for load and wind
generation. The procedure is illustrated in Fig. 3. Following
this, the DCOPF is run according to (8) and (9).
Reference
Forecast 
(Wind & Load)
N 
scenarios
Solve 
Nodal 
DCOPF
Calculate Zonal 
PTDF (Scheme 1)
Calculate Zonal 
PTDF (Scheme 3)
Solve Nodal 
DCOPF
Solve Zonal 
DCOPF
Solve Zonal 
DCOPF
N Scheme 1 
solutions
N Scheme 3 
solutions
N correct 
solutions
Nodal 
PTDF
Calculate Zonal 
PTDF (Scheme 2)
Solve Zonal 
DCOPF
N Scheme 2 
solutions
Fig. 3. Handling the PTDF aggregation and subsequent DCOPF with N
forecast scenarios for the schemes considered
In Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, the normalized mean absolute errors
(NMAE) of generation, total cost, and inter-zonal ﬂows
for each PTDF aggregation scheme compared to the nodal
representation are presented3. Similarly, the NMAE over all
scenarios are shown in Table II. It can be seen from Fig.
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Fig. 4. Generation NMAE sorted in descending order (%)
4 that the generation NMAE are higher for Scheme 1 in
most scenarios and lower in some compared to Scheme 2.
Scheme 3, in contrast, results in errors that are in between the
other two schemes. As can be seen from Table II, Scheme 2
gives the least generation errors followed by Scheme 3.
The sorted total cost NMAE are presented in Fig. 5. The
NMAE in Scheme 3 are slightly higher than Scheme 2, where
as Scheme 1 registers the least errors. It seems slightly peculiar
that Scheme 1 results in the best cost estimate while it
gives worst ﬂow and generation representation. Closer scrutiny
reveals that this is not a general result, but is caused by the
2In reality, a geographic correlation between nodes can be drawn for a
given wind forecast scenario. However, the intention here is only to generate
wind forecast errors and nodal correlation is not considered for the forecasts.
31000 scenarios are generated but only the ﬁrst 150 scenarios are used for
display purposes.
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TABLE II
SCENARIO AVERAGE NMAE (%)
Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3
Gen. 0.96 0.58 0.78
Flow 8.84 4.46 3.59
Cost 1.57 1.89 1.98
speciﬁc properties of the test case, related to which generators
are committed in each scheme.
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Fig. 6. Inter-zonal ﬂow NMAE in relation to maximum transmission capacity
sorted in descending order (%)
Unlike the cost and generation deviations, the inter-zonal
ﬂows show a distinct non-overlapping error pattern. The sce-
nario NMAE for the average inter-zonal ﬂows are the highest
for Scheme 1 and the lowest for Scheme 3. This can also be
seen in the sorted errors in Fig. 6.
In Fig. 4, breaks are observed in the sorted errors which is
explained as follows. Because of the binary variables, some
units are running in some scenarios and turned off in other
scenarios. Besides, for a given Scenario, some unit(s) could
be running when considering Scheme 2 where as they could
be off in the base case. Thus, in the case where a unit is
off, another unit, g, should be generating more to account
for the power that otherwise should have been provided by
the turned off unit. As a result, when comparing the scheme
and the base case for unit g, there sometimes results an error
value equal to at least the minimum generation capacity of
the unit not running in one of the schemes. Hence, this break
occurs in the error curve for that unit which subsequently
affects the average generation error curve. The breaks in Fig.
6 and Fig. 5 are the direct consequences of this occurrence.
The results also show that Scheme 2 and Scheme 3 give
better results compared to Scheme 1, speciﬁcally for inter-
zonal ﬂows and generation. From the results in Section VI-A,
with perfect knowledge of the nodal injections, Scheme 2
represents the original nodal system perfectly. Even under
uncertainty, however, Scheme 2 gives a good representation
of the system. In general, the load and wind forecast errors
are relatively small compared the total load and generation
capacity. Besides, the forecast errors in wind and load are
uniformly distributed that there are netting (cancelation)
of deviation effects. Hence, for small deviations from the
reference value, Scheme 2 fairly represents the original system.
Scheme 3 gives the least inter-zonal ﬂow errors. This is
predominantly due to the introduction of the offset vector,
F 0, into the ﬂow calculation in (9). A check on the scheme
without applying the offset vector resulted in Scheme 3 giving
very large deviations compared to the other two schemes.
It should be noted that it is very crucial to have a good
estimation of F 0 for Scheme 3 to be as effective.
Scheme 1 gives the largest deviations between the nodal
and the zonal calculations. This is to be expected given that
this scheme employs a simple averaging of the nodal PTDFs
in a given zone to obtain the zonal PTDFs. It, however,
allows the predetermination of the zonal PTDFs and is always
numerically stable. Although not observed in the modiﬁed case
study, Scheme 2 and Scheme 3 can face numerical instabilities
when the sum of net injections or net generation in any
given zone is zero. The zones in reality, however, which often
represent country borders, encompass large number of nodes
with multiple generating units within, rendering the probability
of such scenario to be low.
VII. CONCLUSION
We test three PTDF aggregation schemes under two
conditions. The ﬁrst scheme is based on the use of equal
sensitivity for every node in a given zone for the aggregation.
The second scheme determines the nodal sensitivities based
on the net nodal injection in relation to the zonal injection.
The third scheme uses the nodal injection due to generation
to determine the nodal weighting factors. The ﬁrst scheme is
the simplest as it allows the predetermination of the zonal
PTDF values. The second and third schemes on the other
hand rely either on historical net injection (generation) data or
forecasted nodal injections (generation), thus becoming time
dependent inputs that need to be updated for every calculation.
Based on generation, inter-zonal ﬂows, and total cost,
we analyze the deviation of PTDF aggregation of the three
proposed schemes compared with the DCOPF calculation on
the node based PTDFs for the IEEE 30-bus test system.
With perfect foresight of the net injections, the errors
with the PTDF aggregation based on Scheme 1 are very low.
As expected, zonal DCOPF calculation based on Scheme 2
gives identical results as the nodal DCOPF calculation. In
the case with wind and load forecast uncertainty, the results
show that Scheme 2 and Scheme 3 give better results than
Scheme 1, especially with regard to generation and ﬂows.
Scheme 1 results in the least average cost error; however,
a closer look reveals that the on/off state of the generators
complicates direct comparison of costs. To get good system
representation with Scheme 3, an offset has to be added to the
ﬂow calculations. The results of Scheme 1 generally deviate
more from the nodal representation compared to the other two
schemes. Unlike the other two, however, this scheme allows
the predetermination of the zonal PTDFs and is numerically
stable.
In the end, among others, the choice of a certain scheme
for PTDF aggregation depends on the quality of the forecasts,
simplicity of the PTDF aggregation, numerical stability of the
aggregation method, and accuracy of the results we want to
obtain.
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1Flow-Based Optimal Transmission Capacity
Allocation for Cross-border Reserves Exchange
Yonas Gebrekiros, Student Member, IEEE, Gerard Doorman, Senior Member, IEEE, Stefan Jaehnert
Abstract—This paper presents a ﬂow-based modeling approach
to optimally allocate cross-border transmission capacity for
frequency restoration reserves (FRR) exchange in a sequential
market clearance setting. In this market clearance option, FRR
is procured ﬁrst and then followed by the day-ahead (DA) market
clearance. This market clearance option is pursued as it is the
dominant market clearance option in Europe.
By considering the Northern European power system, we ﬁnd
that it is proﬁtable to reserve transmission capacity for FRR
exchange in this case study. The net beneﬁt is the result of a
reduction in FRR procurement cost and an increase in the DA
cost due to optimal transmission capacity reservation.
To put the sequential market design in perspective, we also
consider optimal transmission reservation by using, the theo-
retically most optimal, implicit market clearance. In this case,
the reserve requirements are implicitly considered as additional
constraints to the optimization problem. The ﬂexibility due to
short reservation period and efﬁciency of the market design
option contribute to signiﬁcant total cost reduction offered by
this option compared to the sequential with optimal transmission
reservation.
Index Terms—FRR, Implicit Market Clearance, Sequential
Market Clearance, Cross-border FRR Exchange, FBMC.
I. NOMENCLATURE
Sets
Z,A,T ,R,Γ Set of zones, balancing areas, time periods,
balancing regions, and planning periods
Za/r Set of zones in balancing area a or balancing
region r
G,GR,
GB , Gz
Set of thermal, regulating thermal, base-load
thermal, and set of thermal units in zone z
H,Hz Set of hydro units, hydro units in zone z
Indices
z, y, v Zone
a, b Balancing area
r, s Balancing region
g,h Thermal, and hydro units
τ Planning period running from 1 to 365 days
t Time period running from 1 to 24 hours
Parameters
MCz,g Marginal cost of unit g in zone z (EUR/MWh)
SCz,g Startup cost of thermal unit g in zone z (EUR)
PLz,τ,t Load level in zone z at t (MWh/h)
Y. Gebrekiros and G. Doorman are with the Department of Electric Power
Engineering, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim,
Norway. G. Doorman is also with the Norwegian TSO, Statnett. (e-mail:
yonas.gebrekiros@ntnu.no; gerard.doorman@statnett.no)
S. Jaehnert is with SINTEF Energy Research, Trondheim, Norway
P z,g/h Maximum generation capacity of thermal unit
g or hydro unit h in zone z (MW)
P z,g/h Minimum generation capacity of thermal unit
g or hydro unit h in zone z (MW)
P
w/s
z,τ,t Maximum wind power w or solar power s
generation capacity in zone z at t (MWh/h)
FCz,g Fixed cost of thermal unit g in zone z when
running (EUR)
WVz,h,τ Water value of reservoir associated with unit
h in zone z at the end of τ (EUR/MWh)
SPa,τ,t Spot price forecast of area a at time t in
planning period τ (EUR/MWh)
V LL Rationing cost (EUR/MWh)
R
↑/↓
z,g/h Maximum up-/downward FRR capacity offer
from thermal/hydro unit g/h in zone z (MW)
c
↑/↓
z,g/h,τ Upward or downward FRR bidding price of
thermal unit g or hydro unit h in zone z for
τ (EUR/MW)
Rr
↑/↓
a,τ Upward & downward FRR requirement in
area a for planning period τ (MW)
ψz,y,v PTDF from zone z to y for unit injection in
zone v and withdrawal at the reference zone
P
DC/AC
z,y HVDC or HVAC capacity between zones z
and y (MW)
Variables
δz,g,τ,t Online status of thermal unit g in zone z at
t, δz,g,τ,t ∈ {0, 1}
uz,g,τ,t = 1 if thermal unit g in zone z is started up
in time step t, uz,g,τ,t = 0 otherwise
pz,g/h,τ,t Output of thermal unit g or hydro unit h in
zone z at t (MWh/h)
p
st/ns
z,h,τ,t Production from hydro unit h in zone z in
planning period τ at t from storable inﬂow st
or non-storable inﬂow ns (MWh/h)
p
s/w
z,τ,t Production from solar s or wind w in zone z
in τ at t (MWh/h)
r
↑/↓
z,g/h,τ Procured upward/downward FRR from ther-
mal unit g or hydro unit h in zone z in τ
(MW)
tr
(AC)↑/↓
z,y,τ ,
tr
(DC)↑/↓
z,y,τ
Upward or downward FRR exchange on
HVAC and HVDC interconnector, respec-
tively, from z to y for planning period τ
(positive is export from z) (MW)
rp
↑/↓
z,τ Upward or downward FRR capacity procured
in zone z in τ (MW)
pcurz,τ,t Load curtailed in zone z at t (MWh/h)
2pinjz,τ,t Injection at zone z at a given time t (MWh/h)
p
AC/DC
z,y,τ,t Power ﬂow on HVAC/HVDC line connecting
zones z and y at t (positive z → y) (MWh/h)
II. INTRODUCTION
The objectives of the EU energy policy include secure and
competitive supplies; renewables and climate change targets
of 2020 and beyond; and a signiﬁcant increase in energy
efﬁciency. One of the instruments to reach these goals is
the establishment of an internal electricity market [1]. The
Central Western European (CWE) started the development
by creating a platform for day-ahead (DA) electricity trading
among Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, and France. Since
May 2014, a DA market coupling initiative of seven Power
Exchanges (PXs) covering 20 countries in Europe [2], the
Price Coupling of Regions (PCR), has been in operation.
In addition, there is a signiﬁcant expansion of renewable
energy sources (RES) in the European power system. The
RES are predominantly wind and solar whose outputs are
intermittent and uncertain, thus challenging the power system
operation and planning.
A. Flow-based market coupling (FBMC)
In the electric power network, the ﬂow of power is governed
by Kirchhoff’s laws; i.e. electric power may take several
parallel paths from source to destination of the underlying
power exchange and not necessarily the direct contract path.
Considering the highly meshed European electric network,
for example, a single transaction between Germany and
France will partly ﬂow directly between the two countries
but also through the Netherlands-Belgium, Switzerland, and
Switzerland-Italy corridors. Thus, a spot market clearance
model based on Net Transfer Capacity (NTC) tends to be
ineffective in highly meshed power networks since the physical
reality is not accounted for (cf. [3]). The maximum value
of transmission capacity which can be offered to the market
without affecting system security is referred to as NTC [4].
The EU Guideline on Capacity Allocation and Congestion
Management (CACM) [5] require a shift from the current
NTC based market coupling approach to FBMC to utilize
the transmission system more efﬁciently [6]–[8]. FBMC uses
power transfer distribution factors (PTDF) and is based on a
DCOPF formulation. But, instead of modeling the whole grid,
only interconnections and Critical Network Elements (CNE)
are included. PTDF refers to the line ﬂow sensitivity for given
transaction between two nodes.
FBMC is expected to improve quality of market clearing
results compared to the NTC based as the physics of power
ﬂow is better represented. The quality of the results is deﬁned
as the efﬁcient use of cross-border capacity leading to increase
in socio-economic beneﬁt. Based on analysis in the CWE
region, it is shown in [8] that FBMC can improve the efﬁciency
of the coupled markets compared to the NTC method.
The approach presented in this paper uses a zonal based
DCOPF but is not strictly FBMC as we do not consider
CNEs other than interconnectors between zones. However, the
fundamental principles are the same and the terms are used
interchangeably.
B. PTDF aggregation
Although large scale nodal pricing is feasible, cf. the PJM
market, there is a strong opposition against this approach in
Europe. In fact only a few countries have even split their
market into price areas, while the majority uses a single price
area per country. Thus, the ﬂow-based approach with CNEs
can be seen as an attempt to consider the physical grid in the
market clearing, without using nodal prices. However, to do
so, it is necessary to aggregate the underlying grid.
Various power system reduction and aggregation methods
are found in literature [9]–[12]. Commercial softwares such as
PowerWorld1 and PowerFactory2 also include options to cal-
culate zonal PTDFs based on branch sensitivities. In the PTDF
based power system aggregation approach, nodal PTDFs are
aggregated into zonal PTDFs that give similar inter-zonal
ﬂows. However, estimating the nodal injection factor for a
given zonal injection is challenging as the values are not
known ex ante and have to be estimated. For an analysis
of the Nordic power system, Helseth et al. [11] developed
a model that considers different PTDF aggregation schemes
based on different nodal weighting schemes. They concluded
that the type of weighting scheme does not signiﬁcantly impact
the simulation results. Thus, we employ the “pro rata” based
PTDF aggregation scheme for this work, i.e. all nodes within
a given zone are assigned equal weighting factors. Consider-
ing all PTDF aggregation schemes, this scheme reduces the
computation effort as it allows for the predetermination of the
aggregated PTDFs.
C. Transmission capacity reservation for FRR exchange
The European Network of Transmission System Operators
for Electricity (ENTSO-E), deﬁnes three types of operating
reserves in order of their activation as Frequency Containment
Reserves (FCR), Frequency Restoration Reserves (FRR), and
Replacement Reserves (RR). For activation in real-time, to
counteract imbalances, Transmission System Operators (TSO)
reserve FRR for a given period of time prior to the DA
market clearance. Currently, the FRR requirements are set per
country and mostly procured with in each country. However, if
there is going to be exchange of FRR across country borders,
transmission capacity must be reserved in order to guarantee
the ﬁrmness of the reserves. The stance by the Agency for the
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) [13], which is also
shared by ENTSO-E, regarding the allocation of transmission
capacity for reserves exchange forbids TSOs “...to reserve
cross-border capacity for the purpose of balancing, except
for cases where TSOs can demonstrate that such reservation
would result in increased overall social welfare and provide
a robust evaluation of costs and beneﬁts”.
By employing different market clearance approaches, stud-
ies focusing on the reservation of transmission capacity in
Northern Europe have shown that reservation of transmission
capacity for reserves exchange can result in total cost reduction
to the system [14]–[16]. However, these analyses do not follow
1http://www.powerworld.com/
2http://www.digsilent.de/
3the market clearance sequence followed in Northern Europe,
where reserves are procured before the DA market clearance
and are usually contracted for a longer period compared with
the resolution of the DA market. By developing a model that
follows the general market clearance sequence in Northern
Europe, the authors of this paper previously assessed optimal
transmission capacity allocation for FRR exchange and con-
cluded that reservation can reduce total costs [17]. However,
this earlier work was based on the use of NTCs.
D. Implicit market clearance
In the implicit market clearance, the DA market is cleared
with the FRR requirements given as additional constraints
to the optimization problem. The resolution of the FRR
procurement is the same as that of the DA market, 1 hour.
Moreover, transmission capacity reservation for FRR exchange
is one of the solutions implicitly obtained from the cost
minimization problem. Studies demonstrated the substantial
beneﬁts obtained when the North American markets switched
to implicit markets [18], [19]. The Midcontinent Independent
System Operator (MISO), for instance, won an award in
2011 from INFORMS for their market design change from
sequential to implicit [20].
E. Organization of this paper
This paper provides the mathematical formulation of a
ﬂow-based optimal transmission capacity reservation for FRR
exchange in Northern Europe in a sequential market clearance
setting. The impact of transmission capacity reservation is as-
sessed against a reference case, where there is no cross-border
transmission reservation. For comparison, optimal transmis-
sion capacity reservation by using, the theoretically most
optimal, implicit market clearance is also pursued.
In Section III, the model is described with the underlying
mathematical formulation and afterwards applied to the case
study in Section IV. The ﬁndings are presented and discussed
in Section V and the concluding remarks given in Section VI.
III. MODEL DESCRIPTION
The model for the sequential market clearance comprises
two successive optimization blocks (see Fig. 1), both based
on mixed integer programming (MIP). In the ﬁrst block, each
reserve providing unit determines FRR bidding volumes and
bidding prices based on spot price forecasts. The second
block optimizes the reserve procurement and DA dispatch to
allocate optimal transmission capacity for FRR exchange. The
resolution of the day-market is t = 1 h and the planning period,
for the bidding and FRR procurement blocks, is τ = 24 h.
To assess the impact of market design variation, an implicit
market clearance option is considered for comparison. It runs
a ﬂow-based DA clearance where the upward and downward
FRR requirements are given as constraints to the optimization
problem. Unless speciﬁed, the model description and the
subsequent equations are for optimal transmission capacity
reservation using a ﬂow-based sequential market clearance.
A deterministic approach is used. Underlying this choice is
Determine the 
bidding volume 
and price for 
upward and 
downward FRR 
provision
xSelect FRR providing units 
and FRR volumes
xPerform the DA dispatch
xDetermine online status 
of FRR providing unit
xPower output of all units 
in the DA phase
FRR Bidding 
Block
FRR  Procurement  +
Day-Ahead Clearance Block
FRR Bids 
(Volume & Price)
END
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NoOnline status of FRR 
providing unit at the end of τ 
Spot price 
forecasts
1W  
1W W 
365W  
PTDF
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transmission 
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reserved for 
FRR exchangeLoad
Generation 
unit cost 
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Fig. 1. Sequential market clearance model for optimal transmission capacity
reservation (Only major inputs to each block are shown)
the fact that the required reserve quantities are deterministic.
The stochastic element lies in the uncertainty of the cross-
border price differences, which inﬂuence the proﬁtability of
the reservation. Although this obviously would have some
impact on the numerical results, it is not a principal issue in
the present approach, and therefor not included for the sake of
computational speed. The model is developed on GAMSIDE
using the CPLEX solver.
A. Spot price forecast
Spot price forecasts are essential inputs to determine the
FRR bidding prices. In a realistic setting, it is important to
have good forecasts in order to obtain the best possible reser-
vation of transmission capacity. The focus of the present paper,
however, is to demonstrate the approach, without spending
too much effort on good forecasts. The important issue is not
to use perfect foresight. A simpliﬁed approach is therefore
used. For the wind and solar, 24 hour-ahead forecasts are
used. The load forecasts: for each weekday but Monday,
the corresponding previous day load proﬁle; for Monday the
previous week Friday; and for the weekend, load proﬁle of
the corresponding day from the previous week are assumed.
Taking these values and considering the reserve requirements
as constraints, an MIP based implicit DA market clearance
with the objective of minimizing total cost is run for 24 hours
with 1 hour resolution. The dual values of the power balance
for each area are taken as the hourly spot price forecasts. The
approach is very simple and we have not tried to develop an
advanced forecasting method as the main objective is to obtain
a reasonable forecast with some uncertainty.
B. FRR bidding block
Based on the forecast for spot price, an FRR providing
unit determines bid prices for FRR provision as a foregone
opportunity of proﬁting in the DA market. A three step
approach is applied to determine the bidding prices for the
respective FRR provision. The objective of the optimization
formulation is for the unit to maximize its proﬁt in each
step, as shown in (1). The costs for each unit is the sum
of the fuel cost, startup cost and ﬁxed cost, while revenue
comes from spot market sales. For Step 1, the offered reserve
volume is zero, and the whole capacity can be used in the
spot market. For Step 2, the unit reserves a certain volume
4for upward FRR, hence less can be used to earn proﬁts in
the spot market. For Step 3, the unit reserves capacity for
both upward and downward FRR, further reducing the revenue
in the spot market. The decrease in the respective revenues
between the ﬁrst two steps and the last two steps represent the
corresponding cost of providing upward and downward FRR
respectively. The volume of FRR a unit can provide should
at least correspond to the value a unit can ramp up or down
in 15 min. This requirement is according to the ENTSO-E
network code on loadfrequency control which states that FRR
should be fully activated within 15 min [21]. However, hydro
power units can ramp up from zero to full power capacity
within 5 minutes. Moreover, different regulating thermal units
have varying ramping capabilities depending on the type of
fuel. Hence, for all units, a value of 20 % of the difference
between the maximum and minimum generation capacity of
the unit is considered as the FRR bidding volume in this study.
A need to spread the FRR provision to as many hydro units
as possible and being an average ramping speed of different
reserve providing thermal units, this value is appropriately
chosen, (cf. [22]). The reason for calculating the upward
FRR bidding prices followed by downward is that the former
normally have a much higher value. In previous work [23], we
found that the order in which bidding prices for hydro units
are determined have no impact on the FRR bidding prices.
Objective function:
∀g ∈ GR, a ∈ A, z ∈ Za, τ ∈ Γ, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
max
∑
t∈T
{
piz,g,τ,t · (SPa,τ,t −MCz,g)
− δz,g,τ,t · FCz,g − uz,g,τ,t · SCa,g
}
(1)
The objective function in (1) shows the proﬁt maximization
approach an FRR providing unit undertakes. Based on the step
considered, i in piz,g,τ,t takes 1, 2, or 3.
∀z ∈ Z, g ∈ GR, τ ∈ Γ
c↑z,g,τ = [B1 −B2] ·
1
R
↑
z,g
(2)
c↓z,g,τ = [B2 −B3] ·
1
R
↓
z,g
(3)
Given that B1, B2, and B3 represent the proﬁt for unit g
in each respective step, (2) and (3) determine the up- and
downward FRR bidding prices respectively. This approach is
speciﬁc for thermal units. The formulation is modiﬁed for
hydro units by using the water value instead of the marginal
cost of thermal units. Water value refers to the opportunity
cost of storing water in a reservoir for future utilization.
C. FRR procurement and DA clearance block
In this block the FRR and DA markets are co-optimized
for a 24 hour block to determine the optimal cross-border
transmission capacity reservation.
Objective function:
∀τ ∈ Γ
min
∑
z∈Z
⎧⎨
⎩
∑
g∈Gz∩g∈GR
(
r↑z,g,τ · c↑z,g,τ + r↓z,g,τ · c↓z,g,τ
)
+
∑
h∈Hz
(
r↑z,h,τ · c↑z,h,τ + r↓z,h,τ · c↓z,h,τ
)
+
∑
t∈T
⎛
⎝∑
g∈Gz
{
pz,g,τ,t ·MCz,g + uz,g,τ,t · SCz,g
+δz,g,τ,t · FCz,g
}
+ pcurz,τ,t · V LL
⎞
⎠
+
∑
h∈Hz
(
WVz,h,τ ·
∑
t∈T
pstz,h,τ,t
)⎫⎬
⎭
(4)
The objective function shown in (4) is an MIP problem
with an objective of minimizing the total cost resulting from
the FRR procurement and DA market within the planning
period, τ . It determines the optimal reserve provision from
each unit, the power output from each unit for each time step,
t, as well as the optimal transmission capacity reservation for
FRR exchange for each τ . The total cost is the sum of upward
and downward FRR procurement and DA costs. The DA costs
comprise fuel, startup, and ﬁxed costs for thermal units, the
cost of using water from a reservoir for hydro units, and load
curtailment cost. The set of constraints are deﬁned in (5) to
(10).
∀g ∈ Gr, t ∈ T, τ ∈ Γ, z ∈ Z
pz,g,τ,t ≥ δz,g,τ,t · P z,g + r↓z,g,t (5)
pz,g,τ,t ≤ δz,g,τ,t · P z,g − r↑z,g,t (6)
Equation (5) ensures that the minimum output of a regu-
lating thermal unit is greater than the minimum capacity plus
the downward FRR provision by the unit. Similarly, (6) limits
the maximum output of a unit not to exceed the maximum
generation capacity reduced by its upward FRR provision.
Similar constraints are used for hydro units with out the
equivalent binary variable as the startup cost is considered
zero. Moreover, for thermal units that do not provide FRR, i.e.
base load thermal units, (5) and (6) are equivalently applied
by removing the FRR components from the equations and
changing the generation domain to ∀g ∈ GB .
∀τ ∈ Γ, t ∈ T, z ∈ Z∑
g∈Gz
pz,g,τ,t +
∑
h∈Hz
[
pstz,h,τ,t + p
ns
z,h,τ,t
]
+ pwz,τ,t (7)
+ psz,τ,t +
∑
y∈Z
pDCy,z,τ,t − PLz,τ,t + pcurz,τ,t = pinjz,τ,t
pinjz,τ,t =
∑
y
pACz,y,τ,t (8)
∀z, y ∈ Z, τ ∈ Γ, t ∈ T
pACz,y,τ,t =
∑
v∈Z
(ψz,y,v · pinjv,τ,t) (9)
5Equation (7) deﬁnes the zonal injection as the sum of all
generation in the zone reduced by the total load in the zone
added with the injections from all HVDC lines connected to
the zone. Power ﬂow along AC lines is treated differently
from ﬂows along HVDC lines because of the controllability
of the latter (9). Power injected into zone z should be
exported to all zones connected to the zone, which is deﬁned
in (8). Equation (9) deﬁnes the ﬂow between the zones z and
y in relation to the PTDF and injection matrices.
∀z ∈ Z, τ ∈ Γ, t ∈ T
p
w/s
z,τ,t ≤ P
w/s
z,τ,t (10)
The constraint that the output from RES in a given zone can
not exceed the available production is shown in (10) for solar
and wind. The output can be lower if there is RES curtailment.
∀a ∈ A, τ ∈ Γ
Rr↑/↓a,τ =
∑
z∈Za
rp↑/↓z,τ −
∑
z∈Za
∑
y
tr(AC)↑/↓z,y,τ −
∑
z∈Za
∑
y
tr(DC)↑/↓z,y,τ
(11)
The upward and downward FRR balance in a given
balancing area a for a given planning period, equals the FRR
procured in the given area reduced by the export to other
areas along the HVDC and AC interconnectors, shown in (11).
∀z, y ∈ Z, τ ∈ Γ, t ∈ T
−PDC/ACz,y ≤ tr(DC)/(AC)↑z,y,τ + pDC/ACz,y,τ,t ≤ P
DC/AC
z,y (12)
tr(DC)/(AC)↓z,y,τ ≤ pDC/ACz,y,τ,t + tr(DC)/(AC)↑z,y,τ (13)
∀z ∈ Z, g ∈ GR, h ∈ H, τ ∈ Γ, t ∈ T
r
↑/↓
z,g/h,τ ≤ R
↑/↓
z,g/h (14)
∀z ∈ Z, τ ∈ Γ
rp↑/↓z,τ =
∑
g∈Gz∩
g∈GR
r↑/↓z,g,τ +
∑
h∈Hz
r
↑/↓
z,h,τ (15)
The sum of upward FRR and energy exchange from zone z
to y at any given time should not exceed the maximum HVDC
or HVAC capacity connecting the zones (12). Similarly, the
downward FRR exchange between two zones is expressed as
a function of the upward FRR and energy exchange between
the zones as in (13). As shown in (14), the maximum upward
and downward FRR provision should not exceed the respective
maximum possible FRR offer from a unit. Equation (15) shows
that the upward or downward FRR procured in a given zone
is the sum of the contributions from regulating thermal units
and hydro units in the zone.
For the implicit market clearance, the objective function
contains only the energy cost component in (4) considering
the FRR requirements as constraints. On the other hand, the
constraints used for the sequential option are also applicable
for the implicit.
IV. CASE STUDY
The North European system in the state of 2010, shown in
Fig. 2, is considered for the case study. Nodes are aggregated
into zones. The generators and loads in each zone are con-
nected to the aggregated node (zone). Furthermore, transmis-
sion lines are aggregated and represented by equivalent inter-
zonal lines. A number of zones constitute a balancing area,
where each area represents a price area in the Nordic system.
For the German system on the other hand, each balancing area
represents the control area of the respective TSO. Moreover,
the German system is divided into 6 zones; that are grouped
along corridors which are likely to be congested. In reality,
the German system is a single price area although there is an
ongoing discussion about the potential effects of introducing
bidding zones [24].
The system contains 27 zones, 40 aggregated AC transmis-
sion lines, and 7 HVDC lines. The HVDC interconnections
and their maximum capacities are presented in Table I. For the
Nordic system we consider 49 aggregated reservoirs, each with
an aggregated hydro unit connected to a reservoir. Water values
for hydro units, obtained from the EMPS model [25], are used
as the equivalent marginal costs. For reliability purposes, 23 of
the required FRR must be procured with the local area [26],
and the transmission capacity reservation for FRR exchange
between balancing regions cap is correspondingly set at 30 %
of the capacity. Besides, within a balancing region, up to 10
% of the transmission capacity between zones can be used
for FRR exchange. This value corresponds to the average
remaining transmission capacity after the DA market gate
closure time [27].
The FRR requirement is obtained from the respective TSO
of each country and the allocation to each balancing area is
done according to the average load. Three cases are considered
for the analysis:
• Case 1: Sequential market clearance with no possibility
of cross-border reserve procurement. This arrangement is
taken as a reference case.
• Case 2: Sequential market clearance where transmission
capacity for FRR exchange is optimally allocated for a
period of 24 hours. This option is the dominant market
clearance option in Europe.
• Case 3: Transmission capacity for FRR exchange is
allocated hourly by implicitly clearing the DA market
considering the FRR requirements as constraints. This is
considered to be theoretically the most optimal market
design option.
TABLE I
HVDC INTERCONNECTION IN NORTHERN EUROPE IN 2010
Name Capacity (MW) From To
NorNed 700 Norway Netherlands
Skagerrak 1000 Norway Denmark
Konti-Skan 550 Denmark Sweden
Baltic 600 Germany Sweden
Great Belt 600 East-Denmark West-Denmark
Kontek 600 Germany Denmark
Fenno-Skan 550 Finland Sweden
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Fig. 2. Northern European system in the state of 2010
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we discuss the results of the modeling
approach applied to the case study. We assess the impact
of optimal transmission capacity reservation in a sequential
market clearance setting by comparing them with a case of
no reservation. In addition, we compare the results with an
implicit market clearance option.
A. Optimal transmission capacity reservation
The duration curves for optimal transmission capacity reser-
vation on the HVDC connectors are shown in Fig. 3. The
curves illustrate the market design impacts of transmission
capacity reservation.
As shown in Fig. 3, the duration with no transmission
capacity reservation is longer in the implicit market clearance
than the sequential option in all corridors. This can also
be seen from the percentage durations in Table II. In the
sequential market clearance, transmission capacity is reserved
for one day where as it is one hour in the implicit case. This
means that, in a given day, there could be a number of hours
where no transmission is reserved in the sequential option,
offering the implicit market clearance more ﬂexibility.
TABLE II
DURATION WITH NO TRANSMISSION CAPACITY RESERVATION (%)
Skagerrak NorNed Konti-Skan Baltic Great Belt Kontek
Sequential 10.7 12.9 34.5 14.8 69.3 49.3
Implicit 46.2 60.8 72.8 47.5 72.0 72.5
The 30% cap on transmission capacity allocation for FRR
exchange gives the maximum limit. It can also be seen that
the plots also have at least one plateau. These plateaus result
from the interaction of the interconnected balancing areas
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Fig. 3. Optimal transmission capacity reservation for case 2 (green line) and
case 3 (blue dotted line) sorted in descending order. The values for case 3 are
hourly (top x-axis) and daily for case 2 (bottom x-axis).
and the limits associated with maximum FRR import and
transmission capacity reservation. For the Skagerrak cable,
for instance, two plateaus of transmission capacity reservation
are observed. One plateau is observed around 12 % and the
other one around 28 % of the HVDC capacity. West-Denmark
(D1) and the Tennet area of Germany (G2, G3, and G4 in
Fig. 2) tend to import as much upward FRR from the Nordic
system as possible. Due to a 10 % transmission capacity usage
for FRR exchange within a balancing region, maximum FRR
export from D1 to Germany is limited to 196 MW. Due to
the restriction that 23 of the FRR requirement should come
from ones balancing area, D1 can only import a maximum of
87.3 MW. Thus, it imports as much as 283.3 MW from the
Nordic system (via the Skagerrak and/or Kontiskan cables).
When it imports the maximum 30 % on the Kontiskan cable,
which translates to 165 MW, the remaining 118.3 MW should
be imported via the Skagerrak cable which gives the 11.8 %
plateau. On the other hand, when the import on the Kontiskan
cable is zero, all the 283.3 MW should be imported from
Southern Norway via Skagerrak cable, which results in the
other plateau of 28.3 % reservation. The plateaus on the
other HVDC cables are similarly explained by considering the
multiple balancing area interactions, transmission reservation
restrictions, and FRR procurement limits.
B. Day-ahead and FRR procurement costs
For the three cases, the annual DA, FRR procurement, and
total costs are shown in Table III. The costs are discussed
by highlighting the impacts of market design option and
reservation of transmission capacity.
1) Impact of optimal transmission capacity reservation on
costs: For the sequential market clearance option, a saving
of EUR 18.9 million per year is observed when optimally
allocating transmission capacity compared to no transmission
capacity reservation for FRR exchange. This total cost reduc-
tion is the result of a reduction in reserve procurement cost of
7TABLE III
DAY-AHEAD AND FRR PROCUREMENT COSTS [EUR]
Day-ahead FRR Total Improvement from
[Billion] [Million] [Billion] Case 1 [Million]
Case 1 22.74 458.65 23.20
Case 2 22.78 401.97 23.18 18.87
Case 3 22.55 235.88 22.79 413.34
EUR 56.7 million, but an increase in the DA cost of EUR 37.8
million. The decrease in total FRR procurement is caused by
the possibility of procuring cheaper reserves cross-border. This
increases the DA costs as the transmission capacity for energy
exchange is reduced, comparatively reducing the possibility of
cross-border energy exchange. Using the implicit DA market
clearance, a total cost reduction of EUR 413.3 million is
registered compared to the sequential market clearance option
with no transmission capacity reservation. This cost reduction
is a result of EUR 222.8 million reduction in FRR procurement
cost3 and EUR 190.6 million reduction in the DA costs.
As can be seen in Fig. 4, the FRR procurement costs are
the highest in the period between days 45-120 (Mid February-
April). In this period, the reservoir levels in the Nordic
system are the lowest, increasing the spot prices, which in
turn increase the FRR bidding price, thus increasing the FRR
procurement cost in the speciﬁed period for the whole system.
50 100 150 200 250 300 350
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FRR procurement costs in the 
Nordic and DK-West + DE + NL (EUR) 
Nordic system
DK-West + DE + NL
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Fig. 4. Time series of FRR procurement costs for the Nordic (blue line),
Germany + West-Denmark + Netherlands (dotted red line) system, and total
FRR procurement costs for case 2 (EUR).
2) Impact of market design option on costs: Compared to
the sequential market clearance option (case 2), a total cost
reduction of EUR 394.5 million, which is the sum of EUR
166.1 million reduction in FRR procurement and EUR 228.4
million reduction in the DA cost is obtained when considering
the implicit market clearance option (case 3). Making use of
implicit market clearance leads to the cost reduction because
of the following two reasons.
• The reservation in the sequential approach is based on an
uncertain forecast, as a result of the use of unsophisticated
forecasting approach, which necessarily does not result in
the ex post optimal result.
• In the consideration of the implicit market clearance, the
resolution of reserve clearance is taken to be the same as
the DA clearance, i.e. 1 hour. This value is 24 hours in the
3For the implicit market clearance, the FRR procurement cost is approx-
imated by running the implicit DA market clearance with and without FRR
requirement and taking the total cost difference.
sequential market clearance, meaning that a unit selected
to provide reserves should stay online for the whole
contract period. As a result, the implicit market clearance
offers more ﬂexibility that reduces total costs. Splitting
up the reservation period in 2–3 sub periods, would
improve the result and reduce the difference between the
approaches.
C. FRR procurement per country and per balancing region
The time series for annual upward and downward FRR
procurement in relation to the requirement of each balancing
region for the sequential market clearance option are shown in
Fig. 5. In general, with optimal transmission capacity reser-
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Fig. 5. Time series for upward FRR requirement (red line) versus procurement
(blue dotted line) in each balancing region for case 2 (MW).
vation (both implicit and sequential market clearances), the
Nordic region provides more FRR than the regional require-
ment, due to the abundance of cheaper hydro resources. This
is also the case in the Netherlands, which is mainly because
the FRR requirement relative to the peak demand is lower
compared to Germany. The Germany + West-Denmark region,
on the other hand, provides less FRR than the requirement
for the region. This happens because there is a possibility of
importing cheaper resources from the other regions. Besides,
the reservoir level impact on FRR requirement can be observed
from the plots. The low reservoir levels in the Nordic system
in the period between days 45-120 increase the FRR bidding
prices thus the Nordic system exports less upward FRR
(even imports FRR) which is compensated by increasing FRR
procurement in the other regions.
The annual average FRR procurement per country with
optimal transmission capacity reservation using sequential and
implicit clearance in relation to the FRR requirement is shown
in Fig. 6. In general, a similar trend is observed for FRR
procurement for the sequential and implicit clearance in all
countries. For upward FRR, more is procured from Norway,
Sweden, and Netherlands compared to their requirement. On
the other hand, Germany, Denmark, and Finland procure part
of their upward FRR requirement from adjacent areas. It can
also be seen that the average FRR procurement in the case of
implicit clearance is lower in Norway, Sweden and higher in
Germany and Netherlands compared to the sequential market
clearance. This is the direct impact of the 24 hour vs 1 hour
reservation in the sequential and implicit markets respectively.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents the modeling and analysis of cross-
border reservation of transmission capacity for FRR exchange
in a ﬂow-based market clearance framework. This is of partic-
ular interest in Europe, which is moving towards implementing
the ﬂow-based approach.
The paper contributes to the analysis of market design
for FRR procurement by laying out a modeling approach to
optimally allocate cross-border transmission capacity for FRR
exchange in a sequential market clearance setting. This setting
is today’s dominating market design in Europe, where FRR is
procured some time before the clearance of the DA market.
The procured FRR are taken into account in the DA market
clearance through the reduction in offered capacity by the FRR
providers, i.e. the successful bidders of reserve capacity. For
comparison, we also consider optimal transmission reservation
by using the implicit market clearance, which is considered
to be theoretically the most optimal market design option. In
this option, the FRR requirements are formulated as additional
constraints. The various effects are analyzed in a case study
of the Northern European power system.
The results show that, it is proﬁtable to reserve transmission
capacity to procure FRR cross-border in the case study. More
capacity is reserved with the sequential clearing design. This is
due to the ﬂexibility offered by the implicit market clearance
as a result of the short FRR procurement period. With the
sequential market design, the net annual beneﬁt of reservation
of transmission capacity is EUR 19 million, or 4 % of the
total reserve procurement cost. The net beneﬁt is made up of
a signiﬁcant reduction in FRR procurement cost, reduced by
an increase in the DA cost. Most probably, the beneﬁts will
increase with increasing penetration of RES. With the implicit
market design, the total cost saving is EUR 413 million or
90 % of the reserve procurement cost. In addition, there will
be savings in the balancing energy markets, which are not
included in the present analysis.
With respect to the market designs, the annual cost of the
implicit reservation model is EUR 395 million lower than the
total costs of the sequential option. The cost savings are split
rather equally between the DA and reserve capacity markets.
REFERENCES
[1] “Communication from the Commission - Delivering the internal elec-
tricity market and making the most of public intervention,” European
Commision, Brussels, Belgium, Tech. Rep. C(2013) 7243, Nov. 2013.
[2] “EUPHEMIA public description - PCR market coupling algorithm,”
Price Coupling of Regions (PCR), Public, Feb. 2013.
[3] M. Kurzidem, “Analysis of ﬂow-based market coupling in oligopolistic
power markets,” Ph.D. dissertation, ETH Zu¨rich, Switzerland, 2010.
[4] A. Weber, D. Graeber, and A. Semmig, “Market coupling and the CWE
project,” Zeitschrift fu¨r Energiewirtschaft, vol. 34, no. 4, Dec. 2010.
[5] “Framework guidelines on capacity allocation and congestion manage-
ment for electricity,” Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators
(ACER), Ljubljana, Slovenia, Tech. Rep. FG-2011-E-002, Jul. 2011.
[6] P. Schavemaker, A. Croes, R. Otmani, J. Bourmaud, U. Zimmermann,
J. Wolpert, F. Reyer, O. Weis, and C. Druet, “Flow-based allocation in
the central western european region,” in C5-307, 2008.
[7] M. Aguado, R. Bourgeois, J. Bourmaud, J. V. Casteren, M. Ceratto,
M. Jkel, B. Malﬂiet, C. Mestda, P. Noury, M. Pool, and others, “Flow-
based market coupling in the central western european region-on the eve
of implementation,” CIGRE, C5-204, 2012.
[8] “Flow-based evaluation of congestions in the electric power transmission
system,” in 7th International Conference on the European Energy
Market (EEM).
[9] A. Papaemmanouil and G. Andersson, “On the reduction of large power
system models for power market simulations,” in 17th Power Systems
Computation Conference (PSCC), Stockholm, Sweden, 2011.
[10] X. Cheng and T. Overbye, “PTDF-based power system equivalents,”
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 1868–1876,
Nov. 2005.
[11] A. Helseth, G. Warland, and B. Mo, “A hydrothermal market model
for simulation of area prices including detailed network analyses:
Hydrothermal Market Model With Area Pricing,” International Trans-
actions on Electrical Energy Systems, vol. 23, no. 8, pp. 1396–1408,
Nov. 2013.
[12] D. Shi, “Power system network reduction for engineering and economic
analysis,” Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State University, 2012.
[13] “Framework Guidelines on Electricity Balancing,” Agency for the Coop-
eration of Energy Regulators (ACER), Ljubljana, Slovenia, Tech. Rep.
FG-2012-E-009, Sep. 2012.
[14] A. Abbasy, R. van der Veen, and R. Hakvoort, “Effect of integrating
regulating power markets of Northern Europe on total balancing costs,”
in PowerTech, 2009 IEEE Bucharest, Jul. 2009, pp. 1 –7.
[15] H. Farahmand and G. Doorman, “Balancing market integration in the
Northern European continent,” Applied Energy, no. 0, pp. –, 2011.
[16] Y. Gebrekiros, H. Farahmand, and G. L. Doorman, “Impact of reserve
market integration on the value of the North Sea offshore grid alterna-
tives,” in 9th International Conference on the European Energy Market
(EEM), 2012, pp. 1–8.
[17] Y. Gebrekiros and G. Doorman, “Optimal transmission capacity allo-
cation for cross-border exchange of Frequency Restoration Reserves
(FRR),” in 18th Power Systems Computation Conference (PSCC), 2014,
Aug. 2014, pp. 1–7.
[18] T. Zheng and E. Litvinov, “Contingency-based zonal reserve modeling
and pricing in a co-optimized energy and reserve market,” Power
Systems, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 277–286, May 2008.
[19] Y. T. Tan and D. Kirschen, “Co-optimization of energy and reserve in
electricity markets with demand-side participation in reserve services,”
in Power Systems Conference and Exposition, 2006. PSCE ’06. 2006
IEEE PES, Oct 2006, pp. 1182–1189.
[20] “Franz Edelman Award for Achievement in Operations Research and the
Management Sciences.” [Online]. Available: https://www.informs.org/
Recognize-Excellence/Franz-Edelman-Award [Accessed: 2015-01-10]
[21] “Network Code on Load-Frequency Control and Reserves,” ENTSO-E,
Tech. Rep., Jun. 2013.
[22] S. Just and C. Weber, “Pricing of reserves: Valuing system reserve
capacity against spot prices in electricity markets,” Energy Economics,
vol. 30, no. 6, pp. 3198–3221, Nov. 2008.
[23] Y. Gebrekiros, G. Doorman, S. Jaehnert, and H. Farahmand, “Bidding
in the Frequency Restoration Reserves (FRR) market for a Hydropower
Unit,” in Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Europe (ISGT EUROPE),
2013 4th IEEE/PES. IEEE, 2013, pp. 1–5.
[24] J. Egerer, J. Weibezahn, and H. Hermann, “Two Price Zones for
the German Electricity Market: Market Implications and Distributional
Effects,” 2015.
[25] O. Wolfgang, A. Haugstad, B. Mo, A. Gjelsvik, I. Wangensteen, and
G. Doorman, “Hydro reservoir handling in Norway before and after
deregulation,” Energy, vol. 34, no. 10, pp. 1642–1651, Oct. 2009.
[26] “Border Crossing Exchange of Secondary Control Reserve – Limits
and Constraints,” Tech. Rep.
[27] “Annual Report on the Results of Monitoring the Internal Electricity and
Natural Gas Markets in 2013,” ACER/CEER, Slovenia/Belgium, Tech.
Rep., Oct. 2014.

